<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[The Statecraft Blueprint]]></title><description><![CDATA[You don't need to know everything that happened today to understand what is happening to the country.]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 19:03:37 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[thestatecraftblueprint@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[thestatecraftblueprint@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[thestatecraftblueprint@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[thestatecraftblueprint@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Intent Doesn’t Compile]]></title><description><![CDATA[When government follows the rules and still produces the wrong result, perhaps we should investigate the rules.]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/intent-doesnt-compile</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/intent-doesnt-compile</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 14:04:42 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png" width="1456" height="819" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:819,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!JHBp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7d399570-bb17-4133-bb9b-d6a1e8ee8512_1672x941.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h2><strong>One million friends</strong></h2><p>In October 2005, a young programmer named Samy Kamkar made more than a million friends on MySpace.</p><p>He didn&#8217;t know most of them. They hadn&#8217;t decided to become his friends, either. Many had never even visited his profile.</p><p>Yet their accounts were adding him as a friend, and then helping recruit more friends on his behalf. The process spread so rapidly that MySpace eventually had to take the site offline.</p><p>Kamkar had written a computer worm.</p><p>In the early days of social media, MySpace let users personalize their profile pages using HTML and CSS. You could change colors, backgrounds, fonts, and other elements to make your page your own.</p><p>It was a popular feature, and it worked remarkably well for what MySpace intended.</p><p>But Kamkar discovered that he could insert carefully constructed JavaScript into his profile and get it past the site&#8217;s defenses. When someone visited his page, their browser could be induced to perform actions the visitor hadn&#8217;t authorized, including adding Kamkar as a friend and copying the malicious code onto their own profile.</p><p>Each newly infected profile could then infect others.</p><p>The developers hadn&#8217;t intended for their customization feature to behave this way. They had implemented safeguards intended to prevent it.</p><p>Nevertheless, the system permitted it.</p><p>And that is the fascinating thing about software vulnerabilities. The program doesn&#8217;t have to malfunction in the ordinary sense for something to go terribly wrong. Sometimes the components behave exactly as implemented, and their interaction produces an outcome the designers never anticipated.</p><p>When programmers write software, they use programming languages that people can read and understand. But a computer&#8217;s processor doesn&#8217;t directly understand those instructions. They have to be translated into a form the processor can execute, a process called <em>compilation</em>.</p><p>The compiler doesn&#8217;t know what the programmer hoped to accomplish. It translates the instructions that were actually written.</p><p>And those instructions can be perfectly valid while producing results nobody anticipated.</p><p>That&#8217;s what makes the MySpace incident so interesting. The developers intended to let people customize their profiles. But the software also permitted something they never intended: a self-replicating worm.</p><p>Understanding what a system was designed to accomplish tells us why it exists. Understanding how it operates tells us what it can actually do. Those are different kinds of knowledge, and confusing them can conceal vulnerabilities even when everyone involved believes they&#8217;re following the rules.</p><p>That distinction matters far beyond computers.</p><h2><strong>What did you intend?</strong></h2><p>Years ago, while hiking with a friend, I got into an argument about the purpose of guns.</p><p>I argued that a gun&#8217;s function is to propel a projectile at high speed, making it capable of inflicting injury or damage. My friend insisted that guns could serve many purposes, including protection.</p><p>I asked how a gun protects someone.</p><p>&#8220;Because I have a gun.&#8221;</p><p>But why would having a gun discourage someone from attacking you?</p><p>&#8220;Because I have a gun.&#8221;</p><p>Around and around we went.</p><p>I was trying to describe the mechanism through which a gun could accomplish something. He was describing what he hoped to accomplish by possessing one.</p><p>Neither of us recognized that we were answering different questions.</p><p>When I later recounted the argument to my wife, she immediately recognized the misunderstanding.</p><p>We had been using the word <em>purpose</em> in two different ways.</p><p>Consider a hammer. Its physical function is to transfer force when you strike something. Its designer might optimize it for driving nails. But someone can use that same hammer to break a window.</p><p>Those are three different things: what the tool does, what it was designed to accomplish, and what the person using it intends to accomplish.</p><p>Usually, those things line up well enough that nobody needs to distinguish them.</p><p>But when they don&#8217;t, the difference becomes important.</p><p>A programmer intends to produce a particular result and designs software for that purpose. A user brings their own intentions. Between them lies the actual program, whose behavior is determined by its implementation and the environment in which it operates.</p><p>This is why software engineers test for behavior the developers never intended.</p><p>It&#8217;s also why security researchers approach software differently from ordinary users. They don&#8217;t merely ask what the program is supposed to do. They investigate what it can be made to do under unusual or adversarial conditions.</p><p>A feature intended to customize a MySpace profile turned out to permit a self-replicating worm.</p><p>That wasn&#8217;t a disagreement about the merits of profile customization. It was a discovery about the architecture of the system.</p><p>And we ought to be asking comparable questions about our government.</p><h2><strong>A law is a set of instructions</strong></h2><p>Congress doesn&#8217;t operate the federal government directly. It establishes laws that authorize, constrain, and direct the institutions responsible for carrying out its decisions.</p><p>Those laws resemble software in one important respect: they define what the system is supposed to do and the mechanisms through which it is supposed to happen.</p><p>Of course, government isn&#8217;t a computer. Laws are interpreted by people, exercised through institutions, and constrained by other laws and the Constitution. Ambiguity, discretion, and political judgment are unavoidable.</p><p>Nevertheless, every law creates some combination of duties, permissions, powers, conditions, and procedures.</p><p>I&#8217;ve found it useful to separate three things that ordinarily get bundled together.</p><p>The <strong>mandate</strong> is the political objective: what are we trying to accomplish?</p><p>The <strong>architecture</strong> is the arrangement of authorities, procedures, incentives, and constraints through which government is supposed to accomplish it.</p><p>And <strong>execution</strong> is what the officials and institutions operating under those arrangements actually do.</p><p>These distinctions matter because a failure in one doesn&#8217;t necessarily imply a failure in the others.</p><p>Congress might choose a perfectly clear objective but adopt a mechanism incapable of accomplishing it. An agency might faithfully follow every required procedure and still produce the wrong result. Or an official might use a power for a purpose Congress never anticipated.</p><p>One possibility requires reconsidering the objective. Another requires redesigning the mechanism. A third may require changing how the law is implemented or constraining how authority can be exercised.</p><p>Blaming everyone involved without establishing which problem occurred doesn&#8217;t tell us what needs to change.</p><p>And these problems aren&#8217;t hypothetical.</p><h2><strong>A peculiar way to prevent alcohol sales</strong></h2><p>In 2025, Utah passed House Bill 437, legislation intended in part to prevent certain people convicted of serious alcohol-related offenses from purchasing alcohol.</p><p>Courts could designate qualifying individuals as <em>interdicted persons</em>, and their Utah identification documents would indicate that alcohol could not be sold to them.</p><p>That sounds like a fairly straightforward policy objective.</p><p>Yet when the law took effect in January 2026, businesses and customers encountered something unexpected.</p><p>Broad identification-checking requirements meant many adults who were plainly old enough to purchase alcohol had to present identification anyway. Some establishments also had to scan it electronically.</p><p>Why require an age-verification scan for someone who obviously wasn&#8217;t underage?</p><p>Because the purpose wasn&#8217;t simply to establish the customer&#8217;s age. It was to identify people legally prohibited from purchasing alcohol.</p><p>But the electronic age-verification process did not itself determine whether someone had been interdicted. The relevant restriction appeared visibly on the new identification documents.</p><p>The mechanism and the objective were not the same thing.</p><p>Checking identification could help a business discover the restriction. Scanning identification for age verification, however, was not equivalent to checking whether the customer was interdicted.</p><p>The difference may seem minor, but it created real consequences for businesses and their customers, and Utah subsequently revised the requirements.</p><p>In software, this would be a familiar kind of problem. A developer implements a procedure believing it will accomplish an objective, only to discover that the procedure doesn&#8217;t produce the intended result under actual operating conditions.</p><p>The appropriate response is to investigate the mismatch.</p><p>Was the requirement necessary? Did it collect the information the business actually needed? Could the same objective be accomplished more reliably with fewer burdens?</p><p>Those questions don&#8217;t require anyone to oppose the underlying policy.</p><p>They require us to examine whether the design works.</p><p>And if a comparatively simple identification requirement can produce this kind of mismatch, what happens when the subject is presidential authority over international trade or military force?</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><h2><strong>The instructions we wrote decades ago</strong></h2><p>On January 3, 2026, American forces entered Venezuela and captured President Nicol&#225;s Maduro.</p><p>The operation was an extraordinary exercise of American military power. But what interests me here isn&#8217;t simply whether Maduro deserved prosecution or whether removing him served American interests.</p><p>It&#8217;s how the United States government determined that the president could authorize the operation without first obtaining congressional approval.</p><p>The Justice Department&#8217;s Office of Legal Counsel had examined that question in a December 23, 2025 memorandum.</p><p>Its reasoning depended heavily on a distinction between military operations that constitute <em>war</em> in the constitutional sense and operations that, although involving military force, are considered too limited in their nature, scope, and duration to require prior congressional authorization.</p><p>The memorandum argued that the president could reasonably conclude that the proposed operation fell into the second category.</p><p>This raises an intriguing question.</p><p>When the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, what exactly determines whether an operation counts as a war requiring congressional authorization?</p><p>Is it the objective? The expected duration? The number of troops involved? The prospect of sustained fighting? The risks of escalation?</p><p>And who evaluates those conditions before the operation begins?</p><p>The executive branch had developed a body of legal reasoning under which the president could initiate certain military operations based on national interests and assessments of their expected scale.</p><p>That reasoning did not originate with Donald Trump.</p><p>It reflects legal positions developed and used by administrations of both parties over many years.</p><p>The Venezuela memorandum drew on earlier precedents involving American interventions abroad. What changed was the situation to which the reasoning was applied.</p><p>Here, the proposed operation involved entering another sovereign country, overcoming resistance, and capturing its sitting head of state.</p><p>The administration&#8217;s lawyers concluded that it would not constitute constitutional war requiring advance approval from Congress.</p><p>Whether that conclusion is legally correct is a serious question, and the executive branch&#8217;s interpretation is not the same thing as a definitive constitutional ruling.</p><p>But even if we temporarily set aside that dispute, we can investigate the institutional arrangement.</p><p>The same branch of government proposing the operation supplied the legal analysis that permitted it to proceed.</p><p>Congress possessed constitutional powers related to war, appropriations, oversight, and legislation. Yet those powers did not produce a requirement that Congress approve the operation beforehand.</p><p>How did we arrive at that arrangement?</p><p>And what would have needed to be different for Congress to exercise an effective check?</p><h2><strong>A safeguard that depends on being used</strong></h2><p>Congress anticipated the danger of presidential military action without legislative participation decades ago.</p><p>In 1973, over President Nixon&#8217;s veto, it enacted the War Powers Resolution.</p><p>The law established reporting and consultation requirements and mechanisms intended to limit military engagements that Congress had not authorized.</p><p>Congress was trying to preserve its constitutional role in decisions about war.</p><p>But writing a safeguard into law doesn&#8217;t necessarily establish that it will work as intended.</p><p>The resolution operates within a larger constitutional and institutional system. Presidents have disputed aspects of its constitutionality. The meaning of hostilities can be contested. Congress may disagree internally about whether to intervene.</p><p>And if Congress attempts to impose a binding legal restriction after military operations have begun, it may need to enact legislation that survives the ordinary lawmaking process, including the possibility of a presidential veto.</p><p>The Supreme Court&#8217;s 1983 decision in <em>INS v. Chadha</em>, which invalidated a legislative-veto mechanism in another context, complicated the constitutional status of legislative-veto arrangements. Congress later revised the War Powers Resolution&#8217;s termination mechanism to rely on a joint resolution.</p><p>Think about that arrangement for a moment.</p><p>The president initiates military action. Congress seeks to stop it. But the legal instrument Congress uses may require the president&#8217;s signature&#8212;or enough votes to override the president&#8217;s veto.</p><p>That doesn&#8217;t make congressional intervention impossible. Congress retains important constitutional powers, and the precise legal mechanisms matter.</p><p>But it changes what is required for a safeguard to operate.</p><p>Congress can have the authority to restrain executive action without having an effective, easily usable mechanism for exercising it in a particular situation.</p><p>And congressional decision-making introduces another layer.</p><p>Party leadership influences which legislation reaches the floor, which members receive desirable assignments, and what political costs dissenting members may encounter. Members must weigh their individual judgments against electoral pressures, party interests, legislative opportunities, and the preferences of their constituents.</p><p>A representative may possess the formal power to oppose an administration and nevertheless face institutional incentives that make doing so difficult.</p><p>None of this establishes that every failure to check the president results from coercion or defective procedure. Sometimes lawmakers simply support what the president is doing.</p><p>That&#8217;s precisely the distinction an investigation should make.</p><p>We need to know whether Congress chose not to intervene, whether its members were prevented from producing a collective decision, or whether a decision they managed to produce lacked the legal force needed to change the outcome.</p><p>Those are different mechanisms.</p><p>And they cannot all be corrected by electing a different president.</p><h2><strong>What changed when we declared an emergency?</strong></h2><p>Another revealing example comes from an entirely different area of government: tariffs.</p><p>In 1977, Congress enacted the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, known as IEEPA.</p><p>The law granted the president substantial authority to regulate specified economic transactions in response to an unusual and extraordinary foreign threat during a declared national emergency.</p><p>Its purpose was not to establish an ordinary presidential power to rewrite American tariff policy.</p><p>Nevertheless, the Trump administration invoked IEEPA to impose broad tariffs on imports.</p><p>The dispute eventually reached the Supreme Court.</p><p>On February 20, 2026, the Court held that IEEPA did not authorize the president to impose those tariffs.</p><p>Here is an important example of an institutional safeguard operating: the judiciary reviewed an executive claim of statutory authority and rejected it.</p><p>Yet the case also illustrates the difference between what a law was designed to accomplish, what the executive claimed it permitted, and what the courts ultimately determined it authorized.</p><p>For a period of time, a contested interpretation became the operating basis for consequential economic policy.</p><p>The ruling did not eliminate every statutory avenue for presidential tariffs. Other trade laws separately grant tariff-related powers under specified conditions.</p><p>So one legal avenue was closed, while the broader question remained: how much authority should Congress delegate to the president to alter trade policy, under what circumstances, and with what safeguards?</p><p>The fact that a court eventually rejects a particular application doesn&#8217;t answer whether the system&#8217;s earlier safeguards were adequate.</p><p>Nor does it prove that Congress intended the result.</p><p>It tells us that the executive attempted to exercise a power, that litigation challenged the claimed authority, and that the Court ultimately found the statute did not grant it.</p><p>Those are findings from which a more complete institutional investigation can begin.</p><h2><strong>The interactions matter</strong></h2><p>Now consider what these examples have in common.</p><p>Utah established a mechanism intended to prevent prohibited alcohol sales. Its implementation created requirements whose relationship to the objective proved less straightforward than lawmakers apparently anticipated.</p><p>The executive branch used a longstanding interpretation of presidential military authority to justify an operation in Venezuela without advance congressional authorization.</p><p>Congress&#8217;s war-powers safeguards existed, but their practical operation depended on disputed legal interpretations and the institutional capacity to produce binding legislative action.</p><p>An emergency economic-powers statute became the basis for a presidential tariff program until the Supreme Court ruled that the law did not authorize it.</p><p>These are not identical failures.</p><p>Indeed, whether each event represents a failure depends partly on the standard being evaluated. An executive might accomplish its immediate objective while undermining a constraint Congress intended to establish. A court might successfully check an asserted power, but only after the disputed policy has operated. A statute might work as enacted yet impose costs lawmakers failed to anticipate.</p><p>That&#8217;s why identifying a disliked political outcome is not enough.</p><p>We need to reconstruct the sequence.</p><p>What did lawmakers intend? What did they actually authorize? How did officials interpret and use that authority? Which constraints applied? Which institutions could intervene? What happened when they tried&#8212;or chose not to?</p><p>The United States and Israel began military operations against Iran on February 28, 2026. Those operations developed into a wider regional conflict, prompting renewed debate over presidential war powers and congressional authorization.</p><p>The question of whether the military campaign was justified deserves its own examination.</p><p>But another question runs alongside it.</p><p>What institutional arrangements allowed the executive to initiate and sustain these operations, and what means did Congress possess to direct, constrain, or terminate them?</p><p>To answer that, we need more than a catalog of presidential statements and statutory provisions. We need to examine the interactions among constitutional powers, executive legal interpretations, congressional procedures, appropriations, and the political incentives affecting legislative action.</p><p>An accident investigator would not examine a failed component in isolation from the systems connected to it. Government deserves the same discipline.</p><h2><strong>What would an accident report tell us?</strong></h2><p>Imagine an investigation into the Venezuela operation conducted with the rigor we expect from a transportation accident investigation.</p><p>It would reconstruct the sequence of decisions, identify the legal authorities invoked, examine the available evidence and contemporary reasoning, distinguish disputed claims from established facts, and assess the institutional safeguards intended to constrain the operation.</p><p>It would investigate whether the safeguards operated as designed.</p><p>And, importantly, it would not begin by assuming that every presidential action it examined was unlawful or that every unfavorable political outcome reflected a defect.</p><p>Its conclusions would follow the evidence.</p><p>The resulting report might find an inadequate statutory constraint, a disputed but longstanding interpretation of constitutional authority, a failure of legislative procedure, or an entirely deliberate congressional decision to permit the outcome.</p><p>It might find some combination of these.</p><p>And its recommendations would depend on what the investigation established.</p><p>Perhaps a statute needs a more precise definition or a clearer limit. Perhaps Congress needs a procedure that allows members to exercise an existing constitutional power more effectively. Perhaps the executive should face an additional reporting requirement, or perhaps the existing mechanism worked and the remaining disagreement concerns the political objective itself.</p><p>There would also be an important boundary to the investigation. Just as the NTSB doesn&#8217;t prosecute pilots or determine criminal guilt after an aviation accident, the GDA wouldn&#8217;t determine whether a government official had committed a crime. Evidence of potentially unlawful conduct could be referred to the appropriate authorities, while legal responsibility would remain a matter for prosecutors and courts.</p><p>An investigation could reveal serious design problems even if nobody had committed a crime. And prosecuting someone for misconduct wouldn&#8217;t necessarily correct the conditions that permitted it.</p><p>Those are separate questions, requiring separate institutions.</p><p>The GDA&#8217;s task would be to understand what happened and identify possible improvements.</p><p>Those alternatives could be studied, compared, and made available for public examination.</p><p>Citizens could see what went wrong, what remained uncertain, and which institutions were responsible for making changes. They could contribute evidence, question proposed designs, and communicate their preferences to their representatives.</p><p>Congress would still make the political decisions.</p><p>The executive would still carry out the laws.</p><p>The courts would still resolve the legal questions properly before them.</p><p>But we would have a better way to distinguish a failure of policy from a failure of design or execution.</p><h2><strong>We&#8217;ve been debugging the wrong thing</strong></h2><p>Most public discussions about government failure eventually return to the character of the people in office.</p><p>If we could elect better politicians, appoint more competent officials, or persuade people to act with greater integrity, perhaps government would work as intended.</p><p>Character and competence certainly matter. A good institutional design cannot make every bad decision impossible.</p><p>But the reverse is also true.</p><p>Good intentions cannot compensate for every defective mechanism. An honest official can operate within a poorly designed system and produce harmful outcomes. A conscientious legislator can possess a constitutional power that is extraordinarily difficult to exercise in practice.</p><p>And a system that works acceptably under one administration may reveal dangerous weaknesses when operated by another.</p><p>The solution cannot depend entirely on everyone who exercises public authority choosing to behave as we hope.</p><p>That was part of the founders&#8217; insight.</p><p>James Madison warned that constitutional boundaries alone could become mere parchment barriers. A functioning republic required institutions whose powers and incentives were arranged to make the constitutional structure effective.</p><p>Madison was thinking about institutional architecture long before we had the scientific vocabulary and tools available to study complex systems today.</p><p>Since then, we have developed remarkable ways to investigate failures and improve the things we build.</p><p>When aircraft crash, we reconstruct the sequence of events. When software is compromised, we trace the exploited vulnerabilities. When an engineering design fails, we examine its assumptions and operating conditions.</p><p>We don&#8217;t always discover a single cause. Sometimes the investigation reveals multiple contributing conditions, each of which appeared manageable on its own.</p><p>And we don&#8217;t need to abandon the original objective to improve the design.</p><p>An aviation accident doesn&#8217;t mean that we should stop flying. A software vulnerability doesn&#8217;t mean that we should abandon computers.</p><p>Likewise, discovering a defect in the mechanisms of representative government doesn&#8217;t mean that representative government was a mistake, or that we need to tear the entire system down.</p><p>It means we need to understand what failed, why it failed, and how to make it work better.</p><p>This is why I founded The Statecraft Blueprint, and why I&#8217;ve proposed a Governance Design Agency: an independent institution that would investigate failures of government, evaluate possible remedies, and make its findings available to the people.</p><p>The goal is not to replace political judgment with engineering judgment. It&#8217;s to give the public and its representatives better evidence about the consequences of the choices they make.</p><p>We&#8217;ve spent a great deal of time arguing about whether the people operating government are doing what they should.</p><p>It&#8217;s time we gave equal attention to whether the government we&#8217;ve designed allows them to do what we intended.</p><p>Because a computer cannot execute what its programmer merely hoped would happen. It can only execute the instructions it was given.</p><p>Government is more complicated than software. But the lesson still applies: writing down what we want to accomplish is not the same as creating a system capable of accomplishing it.</p><p><strong>Because intent, by itself, doesn&#8217;t compile.</strong></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Problem With Better People]]></title><description><![CDATA[Why we keep expecting extraordinary politicians to make ordinary government work.]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-problem-with-better-people</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-problem-with-better-people</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 12:33:31 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png" width="1456" height="819" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Qqtx!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc951dfb7-b636-471a-86f9-1601ff71b725_1672x941.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Most Americans have a pretty good idea of how Congress is supposed to work. For some, the lesson came from a civics textbook. For others, it came from a cartoon character sitting on the steps of the Capitol, waiting for the day he might become a law. <em>Schoolhouse Rock</em> managed to compress the legislative process into three minutes of music and animation, and for generations of Americans, that little bill became their introduction to representative government.</p><p>It was a reassuring story. A problem arose somewhere in the country, someone proposed a law to address it, and the proposal traveled to Congress. Committees studied the issue, listened to experts, and debated possible solutions. Representatives negotiated changes, the House and Senate voted, and eventually the bill might reach the president&#8217;s desk. We grow older and discover that the process is considerably more complicated than the cartoon suggested, but the basic model survives. We expect Congress to investigate problems, deliberate over competing solutions, and produce laws that address them.</p><p>And sometimes that&#8217;s exactly what happens.</p><p>Consider the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. During the preceding decade, members of Congress had been wrestling with an environmental problem that was becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Scientists were studying acid rain, industrial emissions, and toxic chemicals. Environmental advocates wanted stronger protections, while businesses worried about costs, technological limitations, and the consequences of new regulations. The challenge wasn&#8217;t simply deciding whether cleaner air was desirable. Congress had to determine what kinds of laws, institutions, and incentives could actually produce it.</p><p>The questions were formidable. Should regulators require companies to install particular technologies, or allow them flexibility in how they reduced pollution? How would compliance be measured? What responsibilities should belong to federal agencies, and which should remain with the states? What would happen to industries that depended on coal? And how could lawmakers accommodate competing interests without abandoning the objectives of the legislation?</p><p>Congressional committees investigated these questions, held hearings, and examined alternative approaches. Lawmakers negotiated among themselves, with the George H. W. Bush administration, and with organizations affected by the proposed changes. In 1990, the House passed its version of the legislation 401 to 21, while the Senate approved its version 89 to 11. The two chambers then reconciled their differences before President Bush signed the final amendments in November.</p><p>The resulting law was ambitious and technically complicated. It expanded regulation of toxic emissions, strengthened enforcement mechanisms, established new permitting requirements, and introduced a market-based system allowing certain businesses to trade emissions allowances. It wasn&#8217;t a perfect law, and its provisions remained subject to disagreement. But it demonstrated what the legislative process could accomplish when lawmakers had the resources, expertise, and political conditions necessary to tackle a difficult problem.</p><p>This is the Congress we recognize from our civics lessons, and it&#8217;s the Congress many of us expect to see when we turn on the news. When reality doesn&#8217;t match that expectation, we have no shortage of explanations. Politicians are too partisan, too selfish, too interested in reelection, too beholden to donors, or too unwilling to compromise. Every election brings another collection of candidates promising to clean things up, restore common sense, and make Washington work again.</p><p>There&#8217;s something comforting about this explanation. The committees still exist, Congress still possesses its constitutional powers, and the procedures for investigating problems and developing legislation haven&#8217;t simply disappeared. If the institution worked that way before, surely it could work that way again with the right people.</p><p>We readily accept that Congress works better under some circumstances than others. Sometimes it functions as we expect, and sometimes it doesn&#8217;t. That&#8217;s politics. But this leaves a curious question unexplored: if we know Congress can perform these functions, why do we accept that its ability to do so depends so heavily on the people and political conditions of the moment?</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>For a long time, I made a similar assumption about people who used the systems I built.</p><h2><strong>The people who couldn&#8217;t change the software</strong></h2><p>For nearly twenty-five years, I worked in software development. Much of that time was spent building and maintaining systems that other people depended on to do their jobs. I knew those systems intimately, including the decisions that had shaped their design, the compromises made along the way, and the dependencies that could make a seemingly simple change surprisingly difficult.</p><p>Every so often, something peculiar would turn up in the data. An account had been configured in a way that made no sense. A field contained information that belonged somewhere else. Sometimes an elaborate sequence of steps had developed around a task the software was supposed to perform automatically. I&#8217;d begin investigating, tracing the problem through the system until I found the person responsible.</p><p>There was usually a perfectly understandable explanation. An employee had encountered an obstacle. Perhaps a screen wouldn&#8217;t let them complete a task, or a particular field didn&#8217;t behave the way they expected. They tried a few things, discovered an alternative that seemed to solve the immediate problem, and moved on. Over time, the workaround became routine. Sometimes other employees adopted it, too, until an improvised solution had quietly become part of the organization&#8217;s normal way of doing business.</p><p>From my perspective, this could be maddening. The original problem might have required only a few minutes to correct, while the workaround had introduced months of complications. I&#8217;d find myself wondering why nobody had simply told me what was wrong.</p><p>Eventually, I learned that employees had actually been instructed not to contact me directly. They were supposed to use other channels for reporting problems, and meanwhile they still had work to do. From their perspective, inventing a workaround was often the most practical option available.</p><p>That changed how I understood their behavior. They had no reason to know whether a change would require five minutes of programming or five months of development. To me, the software was something I could modify because I knew how it worked and what its limitations were. To them, it was simply the environment in which they worked. They couldn&#8217;t see the possibilities I could see, and they had little practical reason to assume those possibilities were available to them. For all intents and purposes, the software was immutable.</p><p>I could have continued insisting that employees follow the prescribed procedures. After all, the software generally worked when people used it as intended. Plenty of programmers respond to these situations that way, treating unexpected behavior as evidence that users need more training or clearer instructions. But that wouldn&#8217;t explain why the same problems kept appearing, or why employees repeatedly found reasons to work around the system. Their behavior was telling me something about the environment in which they were operating.</p><p>The experience changed my approach to engineering. I became less interested in whether the software was doing exactly what I&#8217;d designed it to do and more interested in whether it was helping people accomplish what they needed. If employees continually invented workarounds, that was information about the system, not simply evidence that they needed better training. Wherever practical, I wanted the software to adapt to human needs rather than forcing humans to continually accommodate its limitations.</p><p>Years later, when I began studying Congress, I recognized a similar relationship between citizens and their government. Most Americans can recognize when government isn&#8217;t serving their needs, and they may understand quite well how a particular law affects their family, business, or community. What they generally don&#8217;t possess is the specialized knowledge, access, or time required to change the institutions and procedures responsible for those outcomes.</p><p>I encountered this while examining legislation in Utah. I could read the proposed bill, investigate its implications, and develop an informed opinion about what needed to change. But understanding the proposal didn&#8217;t give me a practical role in developing its provisions. I could contact representatives, try to engage with the legislative process, and spend additional time learning which procedures and relationships might give me an opportunity to be heard. Meanwhile, the legislation continued moving.</p><p>For someone who isn&#8217;t a professional advocate, meaningful participation can become a substantial undertaking in its own right. There are multiple legal and political avenues for influencing government, but learning how to use them effectively demands resources that citizens possess in vastly unequal amounts. A person who can hire attorneys, retain lobbyists, or employ policy specialists occupies a very different position from someone who has an hour after dinner to read a proposed bill.</p><p>The barriers don&#8217;t merely make participation inconvenient. They help determine who can participate consistently, whose objections receive sustained attention, and who has the capacity to develop alternative proposals. When participating in government requires extraordinary effort, people who can afford that effort acquire an advantage.</p><p>For many citizens, however, there is one part of the system that remains familiar and comparatively accessible: elections. They may have little ability to change the machinery itself, but they can replace the people operating it. And when those people don&#8217;t produce the results we expect, replacing them seems like a reasonable thing to try.</p><p>There&#8217;s just one complication. The people we elect are expected to do considerably more than operate the machinery.</p><h2><strong>An extraordinary job description</strong></h2><p>The American political system has a peculiar relationship with its founders. George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Benjamin Franklin, and their contemporaries occupy an almost mythical place in our national imagination. We study their arguments, quote their writings, and invoke their intentions when debating the problems of modern government. But consider what these people were actually doing.</p><p>They weren&#8217;t simply running for office and promising solutions to the problems of their day. They were studying political systems, examining historical failures, debating the behavior of governing institutions, and developing mechanisms intended to produce particular outcomes. Madison, in particular, approached questions of government with an intensity that would be familiar to someone studying the behavior of complicated systems. He examined historical confederacies, competing institutional arrangements, and the ways ambition, faction, and conflicting interests could undermine republican government.</p><p>These were not merely politicians. They were also architects of the institutions they intended to operate, working with the knowledge and experience available to them.</p><p>Now consider what we expect from an ordinary member of Congress. We elect someone because we believe they understand our community, share our priorities, or possess the judgment to represent our interests. Once in office, however, that person must confront problems that can occupy entire academic disciplines.</p><p>Immigration involves economics, international relations, labor markets, humanitarian obligations, and constitutional law. Climate change requires understanding atmospheric science, energy systems, technological possibilities, international cooperation, and economic trade-offs. Artificial intelligence introduces questions about computing, intellectual property, employment, national security, privacy, and technologies that change faster than most institutions can respond. A representative might be required to consider aspects of all three in the same legislative session, alongside countless other issues.</p><p>And understanding the underlying problems is only part of the assignment. Legislators must also help determine how to construct laws capable of addressing them. That requires considering which institutions should administer a program, what authority those institutions will need, what incentives the law will create, how compliance should be measured, and what unintended consequences might arise when its provisions interact with thousands of existing laws and regulations. Meanwhile, representatives must navigate Congress itself, with its committees, leadership arrangements, parliamentary procedures, budget constraints, party expectations, and competing constituent demands.</p><p>There is another complication that makes this arrangement unusual. Legislators aren&#8217;t simply subject to the rules governing their work. They also have authority to change many of those rules.</p><p>Congress determines how its committees are organized, how institutional resources are distributed, and which procedures govern the consideration of legislation. Political leaders can pursue changes intended to make the institution more efficient, maintain party unity, or help their members advance shared objectives. Each change may respond to a genuine difficulty encountered in the course of governing.</p><p>But an adjustment that makes one person&#8217;s job easier can change the conditions under which everyone else works. A procedure that gives leadership greater control over the legislative schedule might help a majority coordinate its priorities while limiting opportunities for individual members to advance competing proposals. Rules that strengthen party discipline may make collective action easier while changing the consequences representatives face when they disagree with party leaders.</p><p>The effects extend beyond the people who originally made the decisions. Future representatives inherit the procedures, incentives, and constraints their predecessors created, then adapt their own behavior accordingly. They may also modify those arrangements to address new problems, adding another layer of changes whose consequences interact with what came before.</p><p>We can observe the resulting behavior and conclude that representatives have become too partisan, too obedient to party leadership, or too unwilling to cooperate. Sometimes those judgments may be deserved. But they don&#8217;t tell us whether the rules themselves are contributing to the behavior we&#8217;re criticizing.</p><p>A legislator who modifies a procedure to solve an immediate problem may be doing something quite reasonable from their own perspective. Yet the change can affect the institution as a whole in ways that weren&#8217;t anticipated or independently evaluated. The people who operate the system are also helping redesign it, often in response to the incentives that system creates.</p><p>All of this takes place on top of the already extraordinary expectations we place on elected officials. We expect Congress to produce Madisons and presidents to be Washingtons, only now we&#8217;re asking them to govern a world vastly more complicated than anything the founding generation could have anticipated.</p><p>And when elected officials struggle to meet those expectations, our instinct is to look for someone more capable.</p><p>Madison had considered the danger of that approach long before the modern problems of governing existed. In <em>Federalist No. 10</em>, while examining the difficulties created by competing economic and political interests, he acknowledged that wise leaders might sometimes reconcile those interests for the common good. But he was unwilling to make good government depend on that possibility. &#8220;Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm,&#8221; he warned.</p><p>It was a remarkable admission from someone helping design a new political system. Madison understood that institutional arrangements needed to function even when the people operating them lacked extraordinary wisdom or virtue. He was trying to construct a system that could account for human behavior rather than merely hope that people would behave differently.</p><p>Two centuries later, the expectations we place on our representatives suggest that we haven&#8217;t entirely absorbed the lesson. And when lawmakers discover that they lack the expertise, time, or resources needed to fulfill all those expectations, they face a practical problem that would have been familiar to the employees using my software.</p><p>They still have work to do.</p><h2><strong>When someone else does the engineering</strong></h2><p>Imagine arriving in Congress with a collection of promises and priorities. Your constituents want something accomplished, and you intend to deliver. But the problem is complicated, the legislative calendar is crowded, and your staff is already managing more work than it can comfortably handle. Even if you understand the problem, translating that understanding into viable legislation is another task entirely.</p><p>Then someone offers to help. Perhaps it&#8217;s an advocacy organization that has spent years studying the issue, an industry association with considerable technical expertise, or a think tank with a proposal already prepared. Its representatives bring research, explanations, and legislative language that could be incorporated into a bill. You might share their objectives, disagree with parts of their recommendations, or believe that their proposal would genuinely benefit your constituents. Regardless, they&#8217;ve supplied something valuable: work that you would otherwise need to undertake or obtain somewhere else.</p><p>The American Legislative Exchange Council, commonly known as ALEC, provides one institutional example of this arrangement. It brings state legislators and policy participants together around legislative proposals and maintains a library of model policies that lawmakers can introduce or adapt. Supporters regard this as a way to exchange expertise and advance shared policy objectives; critics raise concerns about the influence of organized interests over laws affecting the broader public. The disagreement is important, but so is the arrangement itself. Organizations outside government are participating in the design of legislation before the public&#8217;s elected representatives decide whether to adopt it.</p><p>An especially revealing example emerged in 2013, when <em>The New York Times</em> examined proposed changes to federal financial regulations. According to emails reviewed by the newspaper, Citigroup&#8217;s recommendations appeared in more than seventy lines of an eighty-five-line bill considered by the House Financial Services Committee. Two important paragraphs prepared with other banks had been reproduced almost word for word. The proposal concerned the regulation of certain derivatives transactions, and its supporters argued that it would correct problems in the regulatory framework adopted after the financial crisis. Opponents argued that the changes would weaken protections intended to reduce financial risk.</p><p>The point isn&#8217;t that lawmakers should never consult people with an interest in legislation. Quite the opposite. A legislature that ignored the expertise of affected businesses, workers, scientists, attorneys, and communities would have difficulty making informed decisions. Nor does the presence of outside drafting prove that a particular legislator lacked the ability to develop an alternative. Political agreement, ideological preferences, and organized advocacy all influence which proposals receive attention.</p><p>But the episode illustrates a distinction that is easy to overlook. There is a difference between telling representatives what you want a law to accomplish and supplying the technical design of the law itself. Some stakeholders can afford to do both. They can employ people who understand the relevant institutions, investigate alternative approaches, prepare legislative language, and sustain their involvement through months or years of deliberation. Others may struggle just to find time to understand a proposal before it advances.</p><p>This creates a vulnerability that doesn&#8217;t depend on every politician being corrupt or every outside organization acting dishonestly. It can emerge through ordinary decisions made by people trying to accomplish difficult work with limited resources. A representative who lacks sufficient independent support may find a ready-made solution genuinely useful, even when the people supplying it have interests different from those of the broader public.</p><p>When the people responsible for making the rules can&#8217;t engineer them, someone else will.</p><p>And unlike the improvised workarounds developed by employees using software, the solutions legislators adopt can change the system itself. A proposal developed to address one group&#8217;s immediate needs may become a legal requirement governing millions of people, reshaping incentives and creating consequences that extend far beyond the original problem.</p><p>The question, then, is not simply who has the authority to approve legislation. It is whether the people exercising that authority have adequate independent capacity to evaluate the designs placed before them, including how those designs interact with the rules and institutions already in place. A legislator may have the final vote while still depending heavily on someone else to explain which alternatives are feasible, what the consequences might be, and whose requirements have been built into the proposed law.</p><p>That relationship is familiar in another field, where complicated decisions are routinely separated from the specialized work needed to carry them out.</p><h2><strong>A different way to organize the work</strong></h2><p>Large organizations confront problems of considerable complexity. A business developing a product used by millions of people must understand its customers, manage costs, comply with regulations, respond to changing technology, anticipate security threats, and reconcile competing demands. No single person can reasonably master every part of that work, and companies generally don&#8217;t attempt to solve the problem by searching for an executive capable of doing everything personally.</p><p>Instead, they divide responsibilities among people whose expertise serves different purposes.</p><p>In software development, one of those roles is commonly called the product owner or product manager. The terminology varies among organizations, but the underlying responsibility is familiar. Someone needs to understand what users and other stakeholders are trying to accomplish, determine which needs matter most, reconcile conflicting requirements, and establish what the product is supposed to deliver.</p><p>Engineers work with those requirements to develop the underlying design. They investigate technical alternatives, evaluate reliability and security, consider costs, and determine how different components should interact. Operations teams deploy and maintain the resulting system, while information about its actual performance informs subsequent decisions.</p><p>These groups work together, but they perform different jobs. A product manager doesn&#8217;t need to write the software, and engineers don&#8217;t independently determine the product&#8217;s purpose. Consequential changes remain subject to approval by the people responsible for the product and its requirements.</p><p>That arrangement helps explain something about the expectations we&#8217;ve placed on elected representatives. Citizens are the stakeholders in democratic government. They have different needs, priorities, values, and preferences, which sometimes conflict. Their representatives are responsible for understanding those interests, reconciling competing demands, and establishing public objectives through authorized political processes.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hJsA!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hJsA!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hJsA!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hJsA!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hJsA!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hJsA!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png" width="1200" height="850" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:850,&quot;width&quot;:1200,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:101059,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/i/222577705?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hJsA!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hJsA!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hJsA!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!hJsA!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F470f83b6-bcf1-4d93-a1d2-dcbb5d29779f_1200x850.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>But determining what government should accomplish is not the same as designing the institutions and legal mechanisms capable of accomplishing it. Those designs require specialized work, just as implementing and operating them requires a different set of capabilities.</p><p>The comparison has obvious limits. A democratic government isn&#8217;t a business, citizens aren&#8217;t merely customers, and political authority cannot be reduced to a corporate management hierarchy. Elected representatives must remain accountable to the people, and the technical details of legislation often involve substantive choices about rights, costs, and competing values. But none of those distinctions eliminates the advantages of organizing specialized work around clearly defined responsibilities.</p><p>The separation also offers a way to examine how institutional changes are developed and approved. Engineers don&#8217;t merely solve the immediate problem presented to them. They are responsible for considering how a proposed change affects other parts of the system, whether it introduces new vulnerabilities, and how its performance can be evaluated after implementation. Product owners retain authority over the requirements and the approval of consequential changes, but they have specialists whose job is to investigate the design rather than simply make the current arrangement more convenient to operate.</p><p>Government already recognizes much of this principle. Congress relies on committees, professional staff, legislative counsel, the Congressional Research Service, the Government Accountability Office, and the Congressional Budget Office. Executive agencies employ scientists, lawyers, economists, administrators, and other specialists who develop and implement complex public programs.</p><p>The democratic division of labor is not a new idea. The difficult question is whether we&#8217;ve organized that labor so that the necessary work can be performed reliably, independently, and in the interests of the people government is supposed to serve.</p><p>Consider again the committees responsible for the Clean Air Act. Their accomplishments depended on staff resources, institutional knowledge, legislative procedures, and the willingness of lawmakers to devote sustained attention to a complicated problem. Those conditions mattered enormously, yet they were never guaranteed to persist.</p><p>According to the Congressional Research Service, House committee staffing fell by approximately 38 percent between 1977 and 2023, even as total House staffing increased slightly. Over that period, staff became more concentrated in members&#8217; personal offices and other institutional functions, rather than in committees performing collective legislative and investigative work. The shift doesn&#8217;t establish that congressional performance declined by the same amount, but it demonstrates that the distribution of institutional capacity can change substantially.</p><p>Congress also experimented with specialized analytical institutions that it later chose not to maintain. In 1972, it established the Office of Technology Assessment to help lawmakers understand the likely consequences of emerging technologies. The office produced hundreds of assessments and related publications over more than two decades, examining subjects that ranged from healthcare and energy to national security.</p><p>Then, in 1995, Congress eliminated its operating funding as part of a broader effort to reduce legislative-branch spending. The office closed, although the statute authorizing its establishment remained in place.</p><p>The details of that decision remain important. Critics had questioned the office&#8217;s usefulness, speed, costs, and perceived biases, while supporters argued that it provided valuable independent expertise. Its closure does not establish that lawmakers deliberately eliminated an institution because its findings were inconvenient. What it does establish is that a specialized analytical capability can exist within the formal structure of government and nevertheless become unavailable when the political institution responsible for sustaining it decides otherwise.</p><p>There is an unresolved dependency here. The people who need the expertise are also among those who determine whether the institutions providing it will have the resources and authority to continue working. That arrangement may function well under some conditions and deteriorate under others.</p><p>Restoring committee staff or rebuilding analytical offices could improve Congress&#8217;s capacity. But doing so would not, by itself, answer a more fundamental question: who bears continuing responsibility for investigating the design of government when that design itself becomes the problem?</p><p>The existing institutions perform many kinds of valuable work, but their mandates, clients, and methods differ. A budget office evaluates fiscal consequences. A research service assists legislators. An oversight agency examines programs and performance. Legislative counsel helps turn policy decisions into legal language. None of those responsibilities should be dismissed, yet the presence of all those functions does not automatically establish a dependable process for investigating how governing institutions themselves succeed, fail, or become vulnerable to exploitation.</p><p>The issue becomes especially important when the objects of investigation are the rules through which lawmakers exercise power. A committee may have the authority to investigate a problem, but its agenda and resources can be affected by the very institutional arrangements under examination. Legislators may improve procedures to address immediate difficulties while leaving the broader consequences of those changes unexamined. Over time, the accumulated arrangements can shape what representatives are able or willing to do.</p><p>To understand what&#8217;s missing, it helps to distinguish three different kinds of work that are often bundled together under a single word: policy.</p><h2><strong>What a policy actually contains</strong></h2><p>Suppose Congress decides to reduce air pollution. That decision involves political values, public priorities, and trade-offs that elected representatives are responsible for making. How much reduction should the country pursue? What costs are acceptable? What competing interests deserve consideration? These questions establish the objective and the boundaries within which government should act.</p><p>But deciding that the country needs cleaner air doesn&#8217;t determine how to achieve it. Lawmakers must choose among different mechanisms, each of which can produce different consequences. They might establish emissions limits, require particular technologies, create tradable allowances, authorize an agency to develop regulations, or combine several approaches. Those choices determine how the law interacts with the behavior of businesses, administrators, courts, and citizens.</p><p>Once an arrangement has been authorized, someone must put it into operation. Agencies develop rules within their authority, administer programs, monitor compliance, and enforce requirements. The outcomes depend not only on what lawmakers wanted or how the law was constructed, but also on what happens when institutions begin carrying out their responsibilities.</p><p>These are three distinct, though interconnected, components of public policy: <strong>mandate, architecture, and execution</strong>.</p><p>The mandate describes what government is supposed to accomplish and the political objectives and constraints that govern the effort. Architecture describes the mechanisms designed to fulfill that mandate: the authorities, rules, incentives, procedures, and safeguards through which the objective might be achieved. Execution is the implementation and operation of the authorized design.</p><p>Put simply, <strong>Policy = Mandate + Architecture + Execution</strong>.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!W-XQ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!W-XQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!W-XQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!W-XQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!W-XQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!W-XQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png" width="1200" height="850" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:850,&quot;width&quot;:1200,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:97216,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/i/222577705?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!W-XQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!W-XQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!W-XQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!W-XQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93eb9901-251e-4d76-bb7f-8be02102ebec_1200x850.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The distinction becomes useful when a policy produces an unexpected outcome. Imagine that an environmental program is failing to reduce pollution. An investigation might discover that the responsible agency hasn&#8217;t enforced rules that are already clear, making execution the immediate problem. Or it might discover that businesses are complying with the rules while exploiting provisions that undermine the law&#8217;s purpose, suggesting a defect in the architecture.</p><p>A third possibility is that the program is functioning exactly as authorized, but the public has come to reject the original objective or the trade-offs lawmakers chose. In that case, redesigning the administrative machinery might not address the disagreement. The mandate itself may need to be reconsidered through political deliberation.</p><p>The same distinction applies to Congress&#8217;s own procedures. Suppose a procedural change makes it easier for party leaders to determine which proposals reach the floor. The change may serve a legitimate objective, such as coordinating legislative business or reducing delays. But it may also alter the incentives facing individual representatives, affecting their willingness or ability to pursue alternatives, challenge leadership, or cooperate across party lines.</p><p>If those behaviors subsequently change, the explanation may not lie entirely in the character of the people elected to Congress. Some of the behavior may reflect the architecture under which they operate. An investigation would examine the mechanisms, the evidence for competing explanations, and whether different arrangements could better serve the institution&#8217;s authorized responsibilities.</p><p>The same disappointing outcome can therefore arise from different causes, each requiring a different kind of response. Changing elected officials may sometimes be appropriate, but it isn&#8217;t a substitute for knowing what actually failed. Nor does a failure to enact legislation necessarily indicate dysfunction; disagreement and the rejection of proposals can be legitimate outcomes of democratic decision-making. The question is whether the institution can reliably perform its responsibilities even when the people operating it disagree.</p><p>An institutional engineering function could make that investigation a continuing public responsibility. It would examine the mechanisms of government, study their performance, identify vulnerabilities, compare possible corrections, and explain the consequences of different designs. Its findings would inform the people and institutions authorized to decide what changes should be made, rather than becoming law simply because specialists recommended them.</p><p>One possible long-term implementation of that function is what I&#8217;ve called a Governance Design Agency: an independent, advisory institution dedicated to investigating and improving the architecture of government. The specifics of such an organization would require substantial work, but the central idea is more important than the particular agency proposed to carry it out.</p><p>It would also change the experience of an ordinary citizen who discovers that a government program or legislative procedure isn&#8217;t working. Instead of having to become an expert in the entire machinery of government to seek a correction, the citizen could bring evidence of a potential systemic failure to an institution equipped to investigate it. The inquiry might reveal an architectural defect, an execution failure, an unresolved political disagreement, or a misunderstanding of how the system is supposed to operate. Each result would help clarify which institution, if any, should act.</p><p>Of course, an institution responsible for investigating government would have vulnerabilities of its own. Its leadership might become politically dependent, its methods could reflect hidden assumptions, its investigations could be influenced by interested parties, and its funding could be threatened. The history of the Office of Technology Assessment demonstrates why the last concern deserves particular attention.</p><p>Those possibilities aren&#8217;t reasons to assume such an institution would be immune to failure. They are reasons to examine its design carefully. Public findings, reviewable evidence, procedures for challenging conclusions, rules governing conflicts of interest, protections for investigations, and alternative funding arrangements would all be subjects for evaluation.</p><p>An engineer encountering a predictable vulnerability doesn&#8217;t ordinarily conclude that engineering is impossible. The next step is to investigate how the vulnerability arises, under what conditions it matters, and which safeguards might address it without creating worse problems.</p><p>That&#8217;s a known failure mode. Design for it.</p><p>The principle applies just as well to Congress, the executive branch, and the institutions responsible for overseeing them. If officials can use a rule in ways that undermine its purpose, that possibility deserves investigation. If oversight depends on someone who benefits from preventing it, the dependency deserves scrutiny. If citizens must expend extraordinary resources to influence the laws governing them, the barriers deserve examination.</p><p>The task is not to make everyone behave as the system&#8217;s designers hoped. It&#8217;s to understand the behavior the system actually produces and consider whether its architecture can be improved.</p><p>And that brings us back to the people who designed the American government in the first place.</p><h2><strong>The manual we inherited</strong></h2><p>There is something remarkable about the way Americans remember the founding generation. We treat the Constitution as a foundational achievement, debate its meaning, and examine how its provisions apply to problems the Founders never encountered. Much of our political and legal culture is devoted to understanding what they wrote and what they intended.</p><p>But the Constitution wasn&#8217;t the only thing they left behind.</p><p>During the struggle over ratification, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay published a series of essays defending the proposed constitutional system. Their immediate purpose was to persuade Americans to adopt the Constitution, but the arguments they developed also preserved an extraordinary amount of reasoning about how political institutions work.</p><p>The essays we now call <em>The Federalist Papers</em> examined historical failures, competing forms of government, the problems of representation, the distribution of authority, and the dangers created by concentrated power. Their authors explained not only which institutions they proposed, but why they believed those arrangements would work and which difficulties they were intended to address.</p><p>Madison&#8217;s treatment of faction in <em>Federalist No. 10</em> is particularly revealing. He began with the observation that people naturally form groups around different interests, opinions, and attachments. Those groups can pursue objectives that conflict with the rights of others or the long-term interests of the community. He considered whether the causes of faction could be eliminated, then rejected that possibility as either incompatible with liberty or contrary to the realities of human thought and behavior.</p><p>His response was to examine how institutions might control the effects of faction instead.</p><p>The significance lies in the method. Madison wasn&#8217;t simply telling citizens to become less selfish or asking politicians to rise above competing interests. He was identifying a recurring feature of human behavior and examining which institutional mechanisms might account for it. His design choices were informed by historical experience, theories of representation, and assumptions about the ways political power would be exercised.</p><p>The constitutional framework that emerged from those debates was an initial implementation of an ambitious institutional design, constrained by the knowledge, experience, and political circumstances of the eighteenth century. Its architects could not have anticipated modern political parties in their eventual form, the scale of administrative government, global financial markets, digital communications, or the problems that arise when technological change transforms society faster than public institutions can adapt.</p><p>They also couldn&#8217;t observe how their arrangements would perform over the following two centuries. We can.</p><p>We have watched political parties develop, legislative procedures evolve, institutional authority shift, and new forms of economic and political influence emerge. We have accumulated extensive evidence about how organizations behave, how incentives shape decisions, and how complex systems produce consequences their designers never intended. We possess entire fields of knowledge that the founding generation could scarcely have imagined.</p><p>And we still possess much of the reasoning behind their original choices.</p><p>In modern engineering terms, we inherited both an initial implementation and a substantial body of design documentation. The <em>Federalist Papers</em> are not a literal specification for a future government agency, but they do something that makes them useful beyond the political controversy for which they were written. They show us what problems the architects were trying to solve, what assumptions they made, and why they believed particular mechanisms would work.</p><p>That documentation gives later generations something to examine against experience. We can ask whether the anticipated behavior occurred, whether the safeguards functioned as intended, and which conditions produced outcomes the designers could not foresee. We can investigate how new institutional arrangements interact with old ones and whether different mechanisms would serve democratic objectives more reliably.</p><p>Yet despite the extraordinary amount of experience we&#8217;ve accumulated, we have not established a dependable, continuing public responsibility for systematically applying that knowledge to the architecture of government itself. Institutions have been reformed repeatedly, but the work of institutional engineering remains dispersed among political bodies, administrative agencies, research organizations, and interested outsiders, each operating under its own mandates and constraints.</p><p>Meanwhile, the people working within those institutions continue modifying the rules and procedures that shape the behavior of their successors. Some changes solve genuine problems. Others may introduce new dependencies, concentrate power, or weaken safeguards. Their combined effects can be difficult to recognize because each modification becomes part of the environment in which the next generation of officials must operate.</p><p>When the resulting behavior disappoints us, much of our political conversation still revolves around finding leaders capable of making the existing system work as we believe it should. We search for people with Madison&#8217;s judgment, Washington&#8217;s character, and the extraordinary competence to navigate problems that neither man could have imagined.</p><p>But Madison had already warned us against making enlightened leadership a prerequisite for effective government. He understood that political institutions must account for the people who actually operate them, including those whose ambitions and interests conflict with the public good. He and his contemporaries developed their designs with the knowledge available to them, leaving behind not only the institutions they created but the arguments that explain why they created them.</p><p>Perhaps the most valuable part of that inheritance isn&#8217;t simply the government they built. It&#8217;s the example they set of investigating human behavior and designing institutions around what they discovered.</p><p>And perhaps the most faithful way to honor Madison isn&#8217;t to keep looking for another Madison.</p><p><strong>It&#8217;s to pick up the tools he left us&#8212;and continue building.</strong></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[An NTSB for Congress]]></title><description><![CDATA[We investigate plane crashes. Why not government failures?]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/an-ntsb-for-congress</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/an-ntsb-for-congress</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 12:12:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png" width="1456" height="511" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:511,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2656423,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/i/221907553?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Tl2u!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4911d9c6-1cce-4e9a-b861-00f18712eba2_2117x743.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The National Transportation Safety Board doesn&#8217;t simply investigate whether a pilot made a mistake. It investigates why the accident happened.</p><p>What did the equipment permit? What information was available? What procedures were followed? What incentives or organizational conditions contributed? Did multiple individually manageable problems combine into a catastrophic failure?</p><p>And crucially, the investigation distinguishes the actions of individuals from the conditions that made those actions possible or consequential.</p><p>An aviation accident investigation doesn&#8217;t end when investigators discover that a pilot made a mistake. It examines what led to that mistake, whether the equipment behaved as expected, whether the crew had the information and training they needed, and whether the procedures themselves contributed to what happened.</p><p>The NTSB follows the evidence through the system. Its purpose is to understand the causes of an accident well enough to recommend changes that could prevent similar accidents in the future.</p><p>And we benefit from that work every time we board an airplane.</p><h2>But what happens when government fails?</h2><p>When something goes wrong with our government, who investigates?</p><p>We have institutions that audit expenditures, investigate misconduct, evaluate programs, and oversee particular agencies. Yet there is no single institution whose general responsibility is to investigate whether the design of our government is producing the results it was supposed to produce.</p><p>If a law doesn&#8217;t accomplish its stated objective, who investigates whether the problem lies in the objective, the law itself, or the way it was implemented?</p><p>If Congress has the constitutional authority to check the president but repeatedly struggles to exercise it, who investigates the rules and institutional relationships that might explain why?</p><p>And when a citizen experiences the consequences of those failures, where does that information go?</p><p>In <em><a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/when-government-fails-you-where-does">When Government Fails You, Where Does That Failure Go?</a></em>, I explored that last question.</p><p>People encounter government failures in all sorts of ways. A benefit doesn&#8217;t reach the people it&#8217;s intended to serve. A regulation creates expenses without producing its expected benefits. An agency follows its prescribed procedures but fails to achieve the objective those procedures were supposed to accomplish.</p><p>People complain. They contact representatives, submit comments, appeal decisions, and sometimes organize to demand changes.</p><p>Some problems get resolved. Others become political controversies, disappear into administrative processes, or persist for years without anyone establishing why they keep happening.</p><p>And that&#8217;s an extraordinary amount of information about how our government actually performs.</p><p>Every complaint potentially tells us something about the difference between what an institution is supposed to accomplish and what people experience when they interact with it.</p><p>Not every complaint establishes that something is broken. People can disagree about policy objectives, and sometimes the government is doing exactly what the law requires.</p><p>But that&#8217;s precisely why an investigation would be useful.</p><p>Instead of assuming the complaint identifies the cause, we could investigate what produced the outcome.</p><h2>The accidents are already happening.</h2><p>There&#8217;s an important difference between aviation and government, of course. An airplane crash provides an identifiable event to investigate. Government failures can emerge gradually, sometimes through decades of institutional changes whose consequences are difficult to recognize.</p><p>But government also produces observable events with enormous consequences.</p><p>Venezuela. Iran. The tariffs.</p><p>The military operations, emergency declarations, and trade measures associated with these events have raised questions about executive authority, statutory interpretation, and Congress&#8217;s capacity to constrain presidential action.</p><p>People disagree about whether particular decisions were necessary, lawful, or wise. Those disagreements are political and legal questions that deserve serious consideration.</p><p>But underneath them are questions about the mechanisms through which government operates.</p><p>What authority did the executive invoke? Where did it come from? What conditions permitted its exercise? Who determined that those conditions had been satisfied? What limitations did Congress establish, and what happened when those limitations encountered other constitutional and statutory authorities?</p><p>These questions can be investigated without assuming that everyone must agree about the desired policy outcome.</p><p>And an investigation need not stop with the executive official who made the decision.</p><p>What did Congress authorize? Why was the authority written that way? Did lawmakers anticipate its possible applications? Were the safeguards capable of constraining its use? Did interactions between separate laws alter how those safeguards operated?</p><p>Those are questions about institutional design.</p><p>They are also the kinds of questions I&#8217;ve been exploring in <em>Intent Doesn&#8217;t Compile</em>, an investigation into the difference between what lawmakers intend their instructions to accomplish and what those instructions actually permit.</p><p>The same underlying distinction appears in software engineering. A programmer can intend for software to behave one way, but the computer executes the instructions that were actually written. When an unexpected result appears, understanding the programmer&#8217;s intent is useful, but it doesn&#8217;t explain what happened. You have to trace the behavior through the system.</p><p>Government is considerably more complicated because the people operating its institutions possess judgment, incentives, and discretion. Nevertheless, the distinction remains important.</p><p>What a law is intended to accomplish is not proof that its mechanisms will accomplish it.</p><p>And the existence of a constitutional safeguard does not, by itself, establish that the safeguard will operate effectively.</p><p>James Madison recognized this problem long before software engineering or modern aviation existed. In <em>Federalist No. 48</em>, he warned that constitutional boundaries could become mere &#8220;parchment barriers&#8221; without effective means of defending them.</p><p>In <em>Federalist No. 51</em>, he went further, explaining that the constitutional powers of government offices needed to be connected with the personal motives of the people occupying them.</p><p>Madison understood that the behavior of government depends on more than its stated intentions. It depends on the relationships among its institutions and the incentives of the people operating them.</p><p>Those relationships can change over time. And when they do, we ought to be able to investigate the consequences.</p><h2>So what would an investigation look like?</h2><p>Imagine that when people experience a government failure, there is an independent institution whose responsibility is to investigate it.</p><p>They could report what happened, describe its consequences, and submit whatever evidence they have.</p><p>Investigators could examine individual reports, identify recurring patterns, and determine which problems warrant a more extensive investigation.</p><p>They would draw on the accumulated knowledge of political science, economics, law, history, psychology, organizational behavior, and systems engineering to understand the institutions involved.</p><p>What was the government supposed to accomplish? How was the law designed to achieve that objective? What happened when the law was implemented? What other rules, institutions, and incentives influenced the result?</p><p>The investigation might reveal that the mandate was poorly specified, that the chosen mechanism could not reliably accomplish the objective, or that officials failed to carry out the adopted design.</p><p>It might reveal an unforeseen interaction between otherwise reasonable laws.</p><p>Or it might establish that the law worked as written, but the political decision that produced it did not reflect what affected citizens wanted.</p><p>Those are different findings, and they call for different responses.</p><p>The Governance Design Agency, or GDA, is my proposal to give the American people an independent institution capable of conducting those investigations.</p><p>Its work wouldn&#8217;t end with identifying a problem. The agency would examine possible solutions, evaluate their costs and tradeoffs, identify potential unintended consequences, and develop alternative institutional designs.</p><p>This is where the NTSB comparison becomes especially useful.</p><p>When the NTSB investigates an accident, it produces findings and safety recommendations. The Federal Aviation Administration and other responsible organizations retain their authority to establish and enforce the relevant rules.</p><p>The NTSB does not govern aviation. It supplies evidence and recommendations that help the institutions responsible for aviation make better decisions.</p><p>The GDA would have a comparable relationship with Congress.</p><p>Congress would retain its constitutional authority to establish laws and make political decisions. The GDA would investigate government failures, develop alternatives, and recommend changes.</p><p>And Congress&#8217;s own procedures would be subject to examination. If an investigation found that the way Congress organizes its work prevented members from effectively exercising their constitutional responsibilities, those institutional arrangements could be evaluated just like the architecture of any other government function.</p><p>The GDA wouldn&#8217;t take Congress&#8217;s powers away. It would provide the information necessary to understand whether those powers were functioning as intended.</p><h2>But the investigation belongs to the people.</h2><p>There&#8217;s another important dimension to this proposal.</p><p>The GDA wouldn&#8217;t investigate government simply to provide Congress with recommendations. Its findings would be published for the people whose government was being investigated.</p><p>And the public&#8217;s involvement wouldn&#8217;t end with filing a complaint.</p><p>Suppose an investigation found that a law was failing to accomplish its objective. The GDA might identify several possible solutions, each with different costs, benefits, risks, and consequences for the people affected.</p><p>Those alternatives would be available for public examination.</p><p>People could contribute additional evidence, challenge assumptions, raise concerns, and participate in shaping the designs being considered.</p><p>After all, technical expertise can help us understand which mechanisms are likely to produce particular results. It cannot independently determine which results the American people should value or what tradeoffs we ought to accept.</p><p>Those are democratic questions.</p><p>The GDA&#8217;s responsibility would be to make the evidence and design alternatives available, help people understand their implications, and provide opportunities for informed public participation.</p><p>Then Congress would make the political choice.</p><p>And importantly, the public would have a record of that choice.</p><p>The NTSB offers an interesting precedent here, too. Federal law requires the Secretary of Transportation to provide a formal written response to NTSB recommendations, explaining whether they will be adopted, adopted in part, or rejected.</p><p>The NTSB cannot force the adoption of a recommendation, but it can establish a public record of what it recommended and how the responsible institution responded.</p><p>A similar arrangement could require Congress to formally consider and respond to GDA recommendations while leaving legislative authority where the Constitution places it.</p><p>That would allow the public to see not only what the investigation found, but what their representatives chose to do with those findings.</p><h2>And that&#8217;s where accountability comes in.</h2><p>Consider the difference between three kinds of government failure.</p><p>Suppose Congress establishes a policy objective that many citizens oppose. The GDA could examine its consequences, but the decision about what government should accomplish belongs to elected representatives, accountable to their constituents.</p><p>Now suppose Congress establishes an objective the public supports, but the legislation contains a mechanism that cannot reliably accomplish it. The GDA could identify the defect, develop alternatives, and provide the findings to both Congress and the public.</p><p>Citizens could then examine the options, contribute to their development, and hold their representatives accountable for the choices they make.</p><p>Finally, suppose Congress adopts a sound design, but the executive branch fails to implement it as authorized. An investigation could distinguish defects in implementation from problems in the law itself, identifying the responsible officials and the available means of correction.</p><p>In each case, the problem is different. So is the appropriate remedy.</p><p>Today, these distinctions are frequently lost in arguments about which politicians deserve credit or blame.</p><p>But blaming someone for a failure and understanding how that failure occurred are not the same thing.</p><p>An investigation could establish what happened, what the evidence supports, which decisions contributed to the outcome, and who possesses the authority to change it.</p><p>The GDA would not decide who should be elected or which political objectives citizens ought to support.</p><p>It would give citizens a clearer understanding of the decisions being made in their names and their consequences.</p><p>And citizens would remain responsible for exercising the democratic authority the Constitution gives them: communicating with representatives, organizing, participating in public debate, and choosing who represents them.</p><h2>A more perfect Union.</h2><p>There&#8217;s a larger idea behind all of this.</p><p>We have spent centuries developing ways to understand the natural world and improve the systems we create.</p><p>We investigate transportation accidents, study the causes of diseases, evaluate engineering failures, and use evidence to improve technology and organizational practices.</p><p>We know that complex systems rarely improve simply because the people operating them have good intentions.</p><p>Improvement requires information about actual performance, methods for investigating failures, and the ability to change the conditions that produce undesirable results.</p><p>Government should be no different.</p><p>People experience the outcomes of government decisions. Their experiences provide evidence about how institutions function.</p><p>An independent investigative body could turn that evidence into a clearer understanding of what happened and why. It could develop possible improvements and give citizens opportunities to participate in evaluating them.</p><p>Elected representatives would retain responsibility for political decisions. Executive officials would remain responsible for implementing those decisions. Subsequent evaluations would reveal whether the changes worked, generating new evidence for the next round of improvements.</p><p>Over time, government could develop a more systematic way to learn from its failures, just as we have done in other complex fields.</p><p>The founders understood the importance of institutional design. They constructed a government intended to distribute authority, constrain abuses of power, and remain accountable to the people.</p><p>They also understood that the Constitution was the beginning of an ongoing political experiment, not a guarantee that every institution would always function as intended.</p><p>In the centuries since, our knowledge of economics, human behavior, institutions, and complex systems has grown enormously.</p><p>We can use that knowledge to examine the government we&#8217;ve inherited and improve the institutions through which we govern ourselves.</p><p>Not by transferring democratic authority to experts, but by making expertise available to the people whose authority government is supposed to exercise.</p><p>The Constitution begins with We the People declaring our intention to form a more perfect Union.</p><p>The Governance Design Agency would give us a practical means of investigating where our government falls short of that ambition, understanding why, and participating in the work of improving it.</p><p><strong>An NTSB for Congress.</strong></p><p>And ultimately, for We the People.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">We don&#8217;t need better politicians. We need better systems. Subscribe to The Statecraft Blueprint to explore what&#8217;s broken, why it fails, and what could be done to fix it.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Chapter 2: Observations]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Rules that Shape the Rules: Governance Science, in Principle]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/chapter-2-observations</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/chapter-2-observations</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 18:08:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you haven&#8217;t read the first chapter, you can read it <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/chapter-1-it-begins-with-why">here</a>.</p><div><hr></div><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png" width="1456" height="815" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ebm7!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F602777af-ce51-4ffd-b5ff-410c059f6554_2944x1648.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption"></figcaption></figure></div><p><span>Answering the question of whether Congress is doing its job can feel impossible. Selecting a bill and analyzing its path through Congress might seem like a good place to start. However, even if we manage to determine the reason a specific bill didn&#8217;t make it through Congress, that tells us a story. And a story is made of politics, motive, and personality &#8211; a deep pit with no pattern at the bottom.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">The Statecraft Blueprint is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>A single bill is a datapoint, but patterns aren&#8217;t found in a single datapoint. Analyzing multiple bills might reveal some patterns, but each bill would have its own story of motives, personalities, and politics to sift through and compare to all the other bills&#8217; stories. Extracting objective patterns from many stories would be difficult to say the least.</span></p><p><span>So rather than taking a &#8220;bottom up&#8221; approach of analyzing individual bills, I will take a &#8220;top down&#8221; approach of looking at things in aggregate, and drill down into the details as needed. To facilitate this, I am using metrics that are externally observable, can be measured over time, and indicate whether Congress is performing its responsibilities. Choosing those metrics well is the part that matters most. As much as possible we want to use objective data to infer how, or if, the system is functioning, instead of relying on what politicians and pundits tell us.</span></p><p><span>In the first chapter I talked about investigating aviation incidents. Those failures are real, and so are the failures you&#8217;ve witnessed in government, but the comparison breaks down when we start looking at the investigation that follows. NTSB investigators arrive after a single moment of impact and work backwards until they identify what about the system was faulty. On the other hand, when we see a &#8216;crash&#8217; from an act or omission of Congress, we look to our expert investigators&#8212;whatever politicians and political analysts we trust&#8212;and are surprised to learn that they don&#8217;t even admit there&#8217;s been a crash. If they do eventually admit that yes, there was a crash, they&#8217;ll ask us to consider if it wasn&#8217;t actually something good? The best possible result at least. </span><em><span>If </span></em><span>the experts admit the possibility that yes, it was a crash, and no, it wasn&#8217;t good, then they quickly pin the blame on a person or a group of people and demand that we hate them for the tragic accident.  At no point are the experts scrutinizing the framework that allowed the accident to occur. The system keeps running, lawmakers and staff show up, and they talk and talk.</span></p><p><span>Imagine if your doctor worked this way to diagnose a health condition. Doctor: &#8220;Well, I don&#8217;t think you did collapse on your treadmill. What, you have video showing that you collapsed? Then don&#8217;t you think that it&#8217;s probably for the best? Running takes a lot of time and you could really use that extra hour in your day if you stop. What, I told you last year that you should run for your health? Oh, then the treadmill company is to blame for this. I recommend seeing a lawyer immediately to start a lawsuit. Next patient, please!&#8221;</span></p><p><span>In our diagnosis of Congress let&#8217;s start with the basic question: Is Congress even functioning? If it were a heart, would it be pumping blood; if it were a kidney would it be clearing toxins from the bloodstream?</span></p><p><span>A doctor can&#8217;t diagnose a failing system from body temperature alone. A fever </span><em><span>suggests</span></em><span> something might be wrong, but not what, and not even for certain.  So she doesn&#8217;t reach for one test, she creates a panel. She might take vitals, order blood work, review images, and ask the patient where the pain is. She uses different instruments to get different kinds of evidence. She collects information about her patient, before working through the conditions that could produce them, eliminating the ones that fail to account for all her observations. This is what we are doing in this chapter, collecting information about Congress, so we can determine what condition it is in.</span></p><p><span>Just as elevated body temperature is a symptom of many health problems, a single measurement of Congress is consistent with too many explanations to settle anything, so we need to create our own panel of observations. And like our doctor, our observations need to be independent, otherwise they are just different versions of the same metric. Independence in observations is what allows us to cross-check them. A single metric can be &#8220;gamed&#8221; (artificially inflated or deflated), but a panel of metrics, drawn from separate sources, is much harder to fool. This method has a name: differential diagnosis, and it&#8217;s what I based this entire book on.</span></p><p><span>The list of observations and metrics that follow are not the only possible measures, but I believe these metrics, rudimentary as they are, are sufficient to answer the question of whether Congress is doing its job or not. My hope is that over time, the existing metrics can be improved, and new ones created to give us an even better understanding of the system.</span></p><p><span>As you read these observations, explanations may occur to you &#8212; maybe politicians are corrupt, maybe the districts are rigged, maybe the voters pulled apart, maybe it&#8217;s the money, maybe it&#8217;s the media. Some of these could be right. This chapter is about what has happened and what is happening, not about why the data is what it is. As much as you can, set any explanations aside, and focus on what the data is telling you. We will get to the whys, but the whys will be worth more if we first establish the whats.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Get future chapters delivered to your inbox!</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><h1><span>Observation 1: Fewer Societal Problems Are Being Addressed</span></h1><p><span>Congress&#8217;s defining responsibility is creating legislation, so looking at the volume of legislation passed is a natural place to begin. Legislation can be thought of as an attempt to solve a societal problem. Knowing whether a particular piece of legislation effectively solves a problem is nearly impossible to determine, but unpassed legislation certainly does not solve a problem. We can look at the simple count of legislation passed each session and see if it tells us anything:</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-5dj!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-5dj!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-5dj!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-5dj!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-5dj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-5dj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png" width="1456" height="1303" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/aed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1303,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-5dj!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-5dj!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-5dj!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!-5dj!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Faed865da-a428-4d93-9196-bdc265ed577f_1832x1639.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs01-legislative-decline/chart.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></em></p><p><span>The chart above shows Congress passed roughly 695 laws in the 91st Congress (1969-1970). In the 118th (2023-2024), it passed 274.</span></p><p><span>Is that good news or bad? Some constituents might say fewer laws is a positive because fewer laws mean smaller government and less overreach. But this chart can&#8217;t tell us whether the government got smaller or curbed overreach. It only tells us fewer bills were signed into law. Fewer laws and smaller government are not the same claim.</span></p><p><span>And we can check this easily by looking at the raw size of bills:</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!jZhw!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!jZhw!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!jZhw!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!jZhw!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!jZhw!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!jZhw!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png" width="860" height="644" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:644,&quot;width&quot;:860,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!jZhw!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!jZhw!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!jZhw!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!jZhw!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F73536ad1-2bbb-44bc-8eaf-a4659e719cd7_860x644.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs01-fewer-laws-more-pages/table.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></em></p><p><span>While the number of laws has trended down, the length of those laws increased, by an order of magnitude. And this table understates the situation: a modern page of legislation holds more text than a page did in the 1940s. That growth in length is the fingerprint of bundling, packing many separate measures into a single omnibus bill, and it&#8217;s one of two reasons David Mayhew argued, in </span><em><span>Divided We Govern</span></em><span>, that a raw count of laws isn&#8217;t an especially helpful measure. The other is importance: the count can&#8217;t tell a post-office renaming apart from the Affordable Care Act, though one is vastly more consequential than the other. A measure that misses both size and significance can&#8217;t tell us much.</span></p><p><span>Since the raw count doesn&#8217;t consider bill complexity or importance, we need a different metric. Ideally one that will tell us if the bills address our societal problems, regardless of how many bills are passed.</span></p><p><span>Thankfully, someone took the time to do exactly that. Sarah A. Binder of the Brookings Institution created a yardstick we can use to measure how many societal issues each Congress addressed. The yardstick is built of unsigned editorials published in the New York Times; once an issue drew enough editorials, it was added to the </span><em><span>national agenda</span></em><span>. The agenda built from the New York Times isn&#8217;t perfect, given the publication&#8217;s geographic focus and political slant, but it is independent of Binder&#8217;s personal opinions and lends itself to reproducibility.</span></p><p><span>This national agenda becomes a baseline to compare Congress&#8217;s actions against. Binder counts an issue as addressed, or &#8220;resolved&#8221;, if any bill passed mentions it. Trivial acts like renaming post offices don&#8217;t get many editorials, so they aren&#8217;t on the agenda and thus don&#8217;t get counted. If an omnibus package addressed half the issues in the agenda, then that would be reflected as an increase in the number of issues resolved. She used news media and congressional documents to judge whether Congress took legislative action &#8211; attempted to address the problem, not whether that attempt worked.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kvIH!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kvIH!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kvIH!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kvIH!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kvIH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kvIH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png" width="1456" height="983" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:983,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kvIH!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kvIH!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kvIH!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!kvIH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5d5ae17d-52ca-40c5-ba32-e091281427a5_1719x1160.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs01-unresolved-agenda/chart.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></em></p><p><span>Even with her very generous definition of resolved, the portion of the agenda that Congress acted on declined from almost three quarters in the late 1940s to about one quarter in the lowest dip. The last Congress (2021-22) for which there is data was unusually productive, and the Congresses since have been much less productive.</span></p><p><span>Let&#8217;s go back to the raw count for a moment. It showed the number of bills passed has declined over the last 50 years. The reality is worse than that. Congress is still passing legislation, by some measures, more than they did decades ago, but that legislation addresses less and less of our national agenda, and fewer of the problems facing our society.</span></p><p><span>We all have lived experience with this. Immigration. Social Security. The national debt. Education. Healthcare. The list goes on while politicians campaign on the same problems again and again and again, without actually resolving them once they&#8217;re in office.</span></p><p><span>Binder&#8217;s data is a strong signal that Congress leaves most of the national agenda unaddressed, and is therefore failing to do its job. But a single measure, however good, is still a single measure. The pattern only becomes undeniable if other, independent signals point the same way &#8212; so that&#8217;s what we go looking for next.</span></p><h1><span>Observation 2: Our Government Didn&#8217;t Used to Shut Down. Now It Does.</span></h1><p><span>Observation 1 indicates Congress is not passing new legislation to address the problems facing our country. This second observation measures whether Congress can do its most basic, non-optional housekeeping: funding the government it has already authorized. Failing to pass new laws is one thing. Failing to keep the lights on is a different, more fundamental kind of failure.</span></p><p><span>Here&#8217;s a short primer on government funding. Broadly, there are two kinds. &#8220;Mandatory&#8221; spending is authorized by permanent law and runs on its own &#8212; Social Security is the clearest example. &#8220;Discretionary&#8221; spending has to be reauthorized by Congress every single year, and covers most of what we think of as federal agencies: education, homeland security, national parks, food inspection.</span></p><p><span>Those annual bills don&#8217;t hand money to an agency. The money already exists. What the bills provide is </span><em><span>permission to spend it</span></em><span> &#8212; and that permission comes with an expiration date. This is the part that trips most people up, and it&#8217;s worth being precise about, because everything else in this observation depends on it. Agencies don&#8217;t run out of money when Congress misses a funding deadline. They run out of the legal authority to touch money that&#8217;s already sitting there.</span></p><p><span>When that authority lapses and Congress hasn&#8217;t renewed it, agencies are required to stop non-excepted work. Employees are furloughed. Services pause. A carve-out keeps anything tied to protecting human life or property running &#8212; the military, air traffic control, and so on &#8212;and Social Security checks keep arriving, because that money was never on the annual clock to begin with. But all non-excepted agencies that require Congress to give them the okay to spend the money already set aside for them grind to a halt.</span></p><p><span>That&#8217;s what we&#8217;re counting: the number of times, and for how long, Congress has failed to renew that permission on schedule.</span></p><h3><strong><span>Why the count starts in 1980</span></strong></h3><p><span>One thing has to be settled before the data means anything, because it&#8217;s the obvious objection to everything that follows.</span></p><p><span>Congress missed funding deadlines before 1980 &#8212; repeatedly, including six times between 1977 and 1980. Those lapses didn&#8217;t close anything. Agencies kept working on the understanding that Congress would sort it out and make them whole afterward, and that understanding was official, not informal: the government&#8217;s own top accountant, Comptroller General Elmer Staats, had told Congress in writing that federal agencies weren&#8217;t expected to close their doors over a lapse in appropriations.</span></p><p><span>In April 1980, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti overruled that reading. Interpreting an 1884 law called the Antideficiency Act, he concluded that spending without current authorization wasn&#8217;t merely irregular &#8212; it was illegal, and agencies had to stop. A second opinion the following year added the human-life-and-property exceptions described above. Within days of the first opinion, the Federal Trade Commission became the first agency ever closed by a funding lapse. It lasted one day.</span></p><p><span>So the honest reading of the chart is this: the </span><em><span>lapses</span></em><span> aren&#8217;t new. The </span><em><span>consequence</span></em><span> is. What 1980 changed is that a missed deadline stopped being an accounting problem and started being a shutdown which means this metric can&#8217;t tell us anything about whether Congress was better or worse at funding the government before 1980. It can only tell us what has happened since.</span></p><h3><strong><span>What the data shows</span></strong></h3><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cznZ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cznZ!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cznZ!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cznZ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cznZ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cznZ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png" width="1456" height="1507" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/b69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1507,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cznZ!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cznZ!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cznZ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cznZ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb69f4fa3-8d54-478a-b093-7c924e3d0565_1528x1582.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs02-government-shutdowns/chart.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></em></p><p><span>Two different things are visible.The first is frequency. Shutdowns exist at all, which they did not before 1980, and they recur.</span></p><p><span>The second is duration, and it&#8217;s the more telling of the two. Through the 1980s and early 1990s, shutdowns averaged about two days &#8212; most of them weekends, most of them invisible to anyone who didn&#8217;t work for the federal government. Then: 21 days in 1995&#8211;96. 16 days in 2013. 35 days in 2018&#8211;19. 43 days in 2025. As of this writing in 2026, the government has shut down twice in the last year, each time for over a month.</span></p><p><span>A two-day lapse and a six-week lapse are not the same event at different sizes. One is a scheduling failure. The other is a sustained interruption of federal operations &#8212; missed paychecks, halted services, contractors idled, whole agencies dark long enough for the effects to reach people who have no connection to the federal government at all. Somewhere in that progression, the thing being measured stopped being a procedural irregularity and became something else.</span></p><p><span>Why that happened is a question this chapter doesn&#8217;t answer. It&#8217;s a good question, and we&#8217;ll come back to it. For now the data supports a narrower claim: an event that didn&#8217;t exist before 1980, and barely registered for its first fifteen years, now recurs and lasts weeks.</span></p><p><span>Observation 1 showed Congress leaving most of the national agenda unaddressed. Observation 2 shows it increasingly unable to complete the one task it cannot decline &#8212; and failing at it for longer each time.</span></p><p><span>We now have two observations that measure two separate responsibilities of Congress. What else can we observe?</span></p><h1><span>Observation 3: Incumbents Almost Always Win &#8211; And Always Have</span></h1><p><span>In a functioning democracy, elections are the mechanism that lets voters replace officials who aren&#8217;t serving them. So it&#8217;s worth asking how often that replacement actually happens.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Xlxp!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Xlxp!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Xlxp!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Xlxp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Xlxp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Xlxp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png" width="1456" height="1319" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1319,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Xlxp!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Xlxp!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Xlxp!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Xlxp!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ad6de24-0c99-40ea-b1ee-58bc729a9e96_1640x1486.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs03-incumbency/chart.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></em></p><p><span>Since 1970, an average of 94% of House members who ran for reelection won. In 25 of those 28 elections, at least nine in ten kept their seats. The chart is drawn on a full scale, zero to one hundred, to give you a sense of how often we reelect the same people. Fifty-four years, and the line barely moves, the &#8220;waves&#8221; we hear about are small dips overall.</span></p><p><span>Three years are marked: 1974, 1992, 2010 &#8212; the three deepest dips in the series. Two of them are the elections people remember as the ones where voters threw the bums out, and they did shift real power. 1974 sent 49 additional Democrats to the House. 2010 gave Republicans a 63-seat gain and control of the chamber. Those are enormous political events, and they&#8217;re enormous for a specific reason: control of the House is decided at the margin. A relatively small number of seats changing hands determines which party runs the chamber.</span></p><p><span>Now look at what didn&#8217;t change. In 2010, the worst year for incumbents in the entire period, 85% of the members who ran were sent back. A wave election changes which party is in charge. It barely changes who is there.</span></p><p><span>One thing to keep in mind about what this number counts is that it includes only members who chose to run again. Members who retire, die, or leave to seek another office never enter the denominator, which means total turnover in the chamber is higher than this chart shows. That exclusion is deliberate, and it matters for what we&#8217;re measuring: retirement isn&#8217;t voters removing anyone, it&#8217;s members leaving on their own terms. What&#8217;s left is the thing we actually want to see &#8212; how often the electorate removes someone who asked to stay.</span></p><p><span>On its own, a high reelection rate proves nothing. Voters might simply be satisfied with their representatives. That&#8217;s a real possibility, and this observation can&#8217;t rule it out &#8211; this is simply data we can use later on.</span></p><p><span>Now, let&#8217;s examine how Congress is operating.</span></p><h1><span>Observation 4: Party-Line Voting Happens More Often Than Not</span></h1><p><span>I have talked to many people who tell me Congress has become more and more polarized. The term polarization can be difficult to define. When pressed for how they see/experience/observe this, the most common answers involve two phenomena: legislators don&#8217;t compromise, and politicians have become more extreme. Both of these can be quantified.</span></p><p><span>One way we can quantify &#8220;legislative compromise&#8221; is by looking at how often votes are bi-partisan versus along party lines. A bi-partisan vote is where the majority of Republicans and the majority of Democrats vote the same way. A party-line vote is when the majority of Republicans oppose the majority of Democrats.</span></p><p><span>A common misconception is that party-line votes are when members vote unanimously, or nearly unanimously, with their party. This illustration may help:</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rLmv!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rLmv!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rLmv!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rLmv!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rLmv!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rLmv!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png" width="1456" height="1111" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1111,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rLmv!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rLmv!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rLmv!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rLmv!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F91438161-206d-4a84-9fb1-72db49d4c8a9_1720x1312.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs04-explainer/chart.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></em></p><p><span>Now that we know what is meant by &#8220;party-line votes&#8221;, let&#8217;s look at the data:</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FwkQ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FwkQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FwkQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FwkQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FwkQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FwkQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png" width="1456" height="1417" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1417,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FwkQ!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FwkQ!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FwkQ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FwkQ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F9e431186-2ea9-46fd-a006-d18e85f33bb7_1640x1596.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs04-party-line-voting/chart.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></em></p><p><span>I&#8217;d like to draw your attention to the stats callouts: bipartisan votes have declined from 73% since we began recording votes, down to 15% last year, and the rate members break from their party has dropped by more than 75%. This measurement actually tells us two slightly different things. First, it tells us the parties, broadly as a whole, cannot agree on legislation. Second, it tells us that fewer members are reaching across the aisle.</span></p><p><span>Despite the small rise in bipartisan voting through the 1990s, the general trend (the red line in the chart) has gone down.</span></p><p><span>But party line voting is only one measure suggesting Congress has become more polarized.</span></p><h1><span>Observation 5: There are fewer moderate members of Congress</span></h1><p><span>The other phenomena referenced by people talking about polarization in Congress is that politicians are becoming more and more extreme, and there are less and less moderates. The reasons for why there seems to be fewer moderates in Congress can vary, but, again, we&#8217;re not looking for reasons and explanations &#8211; we are collecting data points.</span></p><p><span>Fortunately, data about this has been standardized and tracked for many years as the DW-NOMINATE</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a><span> dataset. Here&#8217;s a chart illustrating it:</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zvbm!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zvbm!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zvbm!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zvbm!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zvbm!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zvbm!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png" width="1456" height="1298" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1298,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zvbm!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zvbm!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zvbm!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!zvbm!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F28aa6079-7ec1-4d41-9f50-6ca279f1e5b5_1839x1639.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs05-moderate-decline/chart.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></em></p><p><span>This chart is a revealed-preference measure; it is based entirely on how members actually voted. It measures how close to the center a member has voted, not necessarily where they actually stand, or claim to stand on issues/policies.In other words this doesn&#8217;t tell us whether or not the legislators we elect are actually more ideologically extreme, but it gives us a measure of whether members vote moderately or not.</span></p><p><span>And the downward trend shows that members vote more and more in extreme positions, going from roughly 40% of House members who were considered moderates to less than 10% for the last decade, while Senate members have followed a similar trend.</span></p><p><span>These first five observations all measure things directly in Congress, but there are other indirect measures as well.</span></p><p><span>When people are unwell it&#8217;s not uncommon for them to report they are doing just fine while those close to them continue to see problems. If they consult a doctor there are a wide range of reasons why they might not be honest about their own condition. In these situations, doctors can gather information from the people around them, family, coworkers, or someone who witnessed an event. This is called </span><em><span>collateral history</span></em><span>.</span></p><p><span>Congress is not short on things to say about how Congress is doing. Politicians put on press conferences, give interviews and floor speeches about all the problems in Congress. Occasionally they will provide useful information (which we will discuss in later chapters), but generally it&#8217;s a lot of fingerpointing and bickering. Like the doctor with an unreliable patient, we collect a collateral history.</span></p><p><span>In this case, the people around the patient are us, the citizens of this country. Which means citizen observations are part of the record, not as opinion, but as evidence. Beginning with what Americans think of how Congress is doing&#8230;</span></p><h1><span>Observation 6: Constituents Don&#8217;t Approve of Congress</span></h1><p><span>On its own, poll data isn&#8217;t very useful most of the time, especially if you are trying to predict the future with it. But retrospective polls can be useful in identifying patterns. Gallup has been asking Americans for their opinions on how Congress is performing since 1974.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QmHW!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QmHW!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QmHW!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QmHW!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QmHW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QmHW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png" width="1456" height="1298" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/a9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1298,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QmHW!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QmHW!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QmHW!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!QmHW!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa9fa3369-e9fc-4a25-a6d9-05ce4a4fd185_1839x1639.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs06-approval-ratings/chart.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></em></p><p><span>These are snapshots of Americans&#8217; attitudes toward Congress, and generally they say the patient is not doing well. The only time it&#8217;s cleared 60% approval was in late 2001, just after 9/11. Over the last 15 years or so it has stayed below the historical average of 28%, indicating that constituents aren&#8217;t happy with the legislature.</span></p><h1><span>Observation 7: Constituents Perceive Legislators Don&#8217;t Care</span></h1><p><span>The Gallup Approval poll measures whether Americans like the job Congress is doing at the moment. Here&#8217;s another measure that&#8217;s very close, the American National Election Studies (ANES) data. Since the early 1950s they have asked Americans whether they agree or disagree with this statement:</span></p><blockquote><p><em><span>&#8220;Public officials don&#8217;t care much what people like me think&#8221;</span></em></p></blockquote><p><span>This is more specific than simply &#8220;do you approve or disapprove of Congress?&#8221; This question takes us from the overall theory of whether Congress is doing well to the specific of whether the person I helped elect cares about what I think. Let&#8217;s look at whether Americans think their elected representatives care about their interests; note that the chart shows the percent of people who </span><em><span>disagree</span></em><span> with the statement that public officials don&#8217;t care</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!thhf!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!thhf!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!thhf!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!thhf!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!thhf!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!thhf!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png" width="1456" height="1297" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/c4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1297,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!thhf!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!thhf!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!thhf!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!thhf!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc4dda439-bb9a-4d92-9785-16fa42fd0d05_1640x1461.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><em><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs07-political-efficacy/chart.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></em></p><p><span>From this chart we can reasonably conclude that as time goes on fewer Americans feel as though their elected representatives listen and care about their views. Despite a few spikes in sentiment, the line has clearly trended downward since the 1960s.</span></p><h1><span>Observation 8: Executive Orders Have Become &#8220;Heavier&#8221;</span></h1><p><span>The previous two metrics asked the people around the patient what they&#8217;ve been seeing. This one is different. When a body part stops doing its job, another body part will often compensate; the load on underdeveloped glutes gets diverted to lower back muscles, heart muscles thicken to compensate for a failing valve. This keeps the system up and running. At least until the compensating part becomes its own problem.</span></p><p><span>So, hypothetically, if Congress isn&#8217;t passing legislation (as indicated by observation 1), what is compensating?</span></p><p><span>Enter Executive Orders.</span></p><p><span>The use (or overuse) of executive orders is a topic that comes up in the media. Depending on who&#8217;s in charge of the Executive Branch and which media outlets are explaining them, Executive Orders (EOs) can either be a weakness, bypassing Congress, or a strength and necessity as a practical way to govern when legislation is difficult.</span></p><p><span>I&#8217;m not going to weigh in on whether they are a strength or a weakness, but will simply present data showing if and how they&#8217;re used. EOs aren&#8217;t legislation in the sense the laws created by Congress are, they are formal directives issued by the President to manage how the federal agencies (executive branches and officials) will operate. They are inherently fragile; the next administration can revoke/replace them quickly. Also, because they are written by the President, they don&#8217;t have to pass through the normal legislative process. Again, this can be good or bad, depending on the context.</span></p><p><span>Counting executive orders has the same weakness as counting laws. A proclamation renaming a federal building and an order restructuring an agency both count as one. It&#8217;s the same problem we ran into with the bill count in observation 1.</span></p><p><span>Political scientists solved this the careful way. Kenneth Mayer and Kevin Price, then at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, built a measure of which executive orders were significant. Their test was, essentially: did anyone who mattered treat this order as if it mattered? They looked for press coverage and reaction from political actors (particularly the president), Congressional hearings and legislation, citations by legal scholars, and litigation. The final criteria is the only criteria examining the order itself &#8211; whether it created a new institution, changed private rights, or broke sharply from existing policy&#8211;the others measure attention. And attention is exactly the thing that fades, shifts, and depends on who&#8217;s looking.</span></p><p><span>Then I went looking for the current numbers, and there aren&#8217;t any. Their work stopped at the end of the 1990s. I wrote to Professor Mayer, now emeritus, and asked for two things: the coded list with whatever intermediate notes survived, and the operational details of how they&#8217;d applied their criteria. He replied the next morning saying &#8220;I am afraid that data has been lost to a combination of computer crashes and upgrades over the last 30 years.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>He was generous about it, and pointed me toward three other scholars who had independently coded executive orders using different criteria: Will Howell, Lawrence Rothenberg, and Adam Warber. I wrote to all three, but none responded.</span></p><p><span>I had the published classification flagged by Mayer and Price, but no coding notes and no operational rules for how to apply the criteria. The list was essentially frozen; it can be read, but not extended. If someone sat down today with a different set of 149 orders from the same period, there would be no way to know which of them was classifying them correctly. This is not a flaw in their work, it&#8217;s what expert classification is: the judgments come from the experts making them, and when the experts move on, so do their judgements, and by extension, their method.</span></p><p><span>Those who know me best will attest that I&#8217;m not very good at letting things go. I believed the last 30 years of executive orders was an important piece of the puzzle, but the existing data is 27 years out of date and can&#8217;t be updated.</span></p><p><span>So I built a different methodology.</span></p><p><span>As I reflected on Mayer &amp; Price&#8217;s paper, my initial thinking was about how to make it more reliable. But as I pored over their paper I stumbled over this: &#8220;this process involved subjective judgments.&#8221; A major hurdle in reproducibility is subjectivity &#8211; the more subjective a process is the more difficult it is to reproduce the results.</span></p><p><span>And given my area of focus, governance structures, I&#8217;m far less interested in what the politicians and media say is important, and more interested in the impacts legislation and orders have on citizens, businesses, and most importantly, the government system itself.</span></p><p><span>Then it hit me. I already had the answer, I had developed it months earlier in my Church Bells project. The Church Bells project applies eleven fixed questions to legislative text. Does the text name a specific official or leave actors unidentified? Is every operative clause anchored to a statute? Is there an expiration date? Is there independent or review? Does it defer to judicial review?</span></p><p><span>Anyone can apply those eleven rules. Two people scoring the same order should land in the same place, and unlike a judgement call about significance, it&#8217;s a claim you can actually test. So I constructed a scoring system for Executive Orders and tested it. In a blind score against Mayer &amp; Price&#8217;s classification across 298 orders, the rules recover 78% of the discriminating information in their expert judgement. Seventy-eight percent is a significant overlap, giving us confidence in the measure, but the ~20% is what is more interesting.</span></p><p><span>All of this work is public &#8211; the rules, the code, the validation, every order scored: </span><a href="https://github.com/The-Statecraft-Blueprint/eo-structural-weight/tree/main"><span>https://github.com/The-Statecraft-Blueprint/eo-structural-weight/tree/main</span></a></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N_ht!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N_ht!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N_ht!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N_ht!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N_ht!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N_ht!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png" width="1456" height="1378" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/fefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1378,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N_ht!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N_ht!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N_ht!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!N_ht!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffefc4534-196a-4806-a6f9-efe155a16797_1608x1522.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://the-statecraft-blueprint.github.io/tsb-assets/book/obs08-eo-structural-weight/chart.html"><span>Interactive version</span></a></p><p><span>This chart shows how many executive orders were written each year (blue shaded area) along with the average &#8220;structural weight score&#8221; (red line).</span></p><p><span>A simple executive order, such as Ford&#8217;s E.O. #11785 which dismantles the Attorney General&#8217;s list of subversive organizations scores a 0.0%, because it doesn&#8217;t deploy any new governance machinery, it constrains governance. Carter&#8217;s E.O. #12139 deploys significant governance machinery, but it names specific officials, every operative clause is anchored to statute, and anything beyond the statutory exceptions requires going to court (judicial backstop), resulting in the same 0.0% score.</span></p><p><span>That last order illustrates the difference between the significance score and the structural weight score. E.O. #12139 implemented FISA, the foundational surveillance-oversight statute, and one of the orders Mayer &amp; Price flagged as most consequential. And yet, the structural score is zero. In this case, both things are true: the order was enormously consequential, </span><strong><span>and</span></strong><span> it was built with restraint. A measure that sorts into &#8220;significant&#8221; and &#8220;not&#8221; can&#8217;t capture this additional information.</span></p><p><span>E.O. #9066, FDR&#8217;s Japanese American internment authorization, does not show up on the list of significant orders, but has a structural weight score of 77.27%. To me, an order that defines no criteria for exclusions, no independent review, no expiration, and relies on one official&#8217;s judgement applied to &#8220;any or all persons&#8221; is a significant expansion of executive authority.</span></p><p><span>The number of orders issued each year can vary drastically. Overall the number (except for most recently) has stayed flat, or perhaps gone down. But over the same period of time, the orders have gotten heavier on average.</span></p><p><span>The metrics so far have shown that over the past few decades Congress is solving fewer and fewer societal issues, has become more polarized, works more in extremes, has a consistently decreasing approval rate from its constituency, and is being superceded by the Executive Branch in the form of Executive Orders.</span></p><p><span>The astute reader may be wondering about two topics of Congress that are frequently discussed, but haven&#8217;t been presented. And there&#8217;s a good reason: there&#8217;s no reliable data.</span></p><h1><span>Observation 9: Revolving Door (Honorable Mention)</span></h1><p><span>Let&#8217;s begin with lobbying. Regardless of your feelings on it, lobbying is a part of our government; the First Amendment gives every citizen the right to &#8220;</span><a href="https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-7-13-5/ALDE_00013494/"><span>petition the government for a redress of grievances.</span></a><span>&#8221; If you want to understand lobbying in more depth, there have been many books written about it.</span></p><p><span>In a nutshell, it&#8217;s an old, informal practice that got layered with disclosure requirements starting in 1946 and has been upheld by the courts as compatible with the right to petition. More recently Congress added a registration requirement and tightened the disclosure requirements in the wake of scandals.</span></p><p><span>What this means for us is, there is a dearth of data about lobbying for us to draw on. The requirement to register went into effect in 1996, but OpenSecrets&#8217; online searchable database only goes back to 1998. Before that the data is only as reliable as what lobbyists and members disclosed.</span></p><p><span>One aspect of lobbying that would be especially interesting to examine is how often and how seriously members of Congress become lobbyists themselves. Some efforts have gone into researching this. Lazarus, McKay, and Herbel published &#8220;Who Walks Through the Revolving Door? Examining the Lobbying Activity of Former Members of Congress,&#8221; Interest Groups &amp; Advocacy, Vol. 5, Issue 1 (2016), pp. 82&#8211;100. Lazarus, et al. examined departing members of Congress to identify those who began lobbying after leaving office. Their research showed:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Before 1980, roughly 2% of Senators and 4% of Representatives engaged in lobbying after leaving office</span></p></li><li><p><span>The overall average from 1976 to 2012 was 29% of Senators and 25% of Representatives engaged in lobbying after leaving office</span></p></li><li><p><span>The 2012 cohort of departing Senators and Representatives was 60% and 50% respectively</span></p></li></ul><p><span>Those numbers tell us that it has become common practice for members of Congress to leave office and become lobbyists. But the numbers before 1996, and especially before 1980 are almost certainly understated since they relied on lobbyists disclosing their activities.</span></p><p><span>Alternatively, Public Citizen published two reports:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>2005 (</span><a href="https://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/10858"><span>https://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/10858</span></a><span>) showed 43% of members who left 1998-2004 became registered lobbyists</span></p></li><li><p><span>2019 (</span><a href="https://www.citizen.org/article/revolving-congress/"><span>https://www.citizen.org/article/revolving-congress/</span></a><span>) showed that of the members who left the 115th Congress, 59% took a position built to influence policy, and most of those went straight to registered lobbying.</span></p></li></ul><p><span>This illustrates how little data we have about an important aspect of our political system, making a murky, grey area even murkier and even greyer. Making things worse, the numbers we do have likely understate what&#8217;s actually happening. The Lobbying Disclosure Act sets the registration bar at $3,000 a quarter and at least 20% of a person&#8217;s time spent lobbying for a single client, anyone under that threshold isn&#8217;t required to register at all. This was brought to light when it was discovered former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle spent years doing just that.</span></p><p><span>But the numbers we do have are not worthless. Two independent research efforts, using different methods and different date ranges, agree on the direction: the revolving door continues to swing wider. We just don&#8217;t have the precision here that we do for the previous observations. Think of this as an instrument with limits: trustworthy in direction, but not in magnitude. Like our doctor with an imprecise reading, we can note the imprecision, add the reading to our panel, and move onto the next test.</span></p><h1><span>Observation 10: Personal Wealth Accumulation</span></h1><p><span>One particular area of Congressional dysfunction I&#8217;ve had my eye on for a very long time is Congress members accruing personal wealth while in office. It&#8217;s a regular topic in the media, and with good reason.</span></p><p><span>Members of the government are privy to sensitive information, information that can move markets. If the government is preparing to crack down on a public corporation, that corporation&#8217;s stock price is going to take a major hit. This is valuable, privileged information posing a real temptation to use it for personal gain.</span></p><p><span>So when reports like &#8220;Marjorie Taylor Greene: $700,000 to $25 million since joining Congress,&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a><span> or &#8220;Nancy Pelosi&#8217;s family turned $30 million into $278 million trading stocks&#8221;</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a><span> are published, they spread like wildfire. And why wouldn&#8217;t they? They use our confirmation bias and tunnel straight to the amygdala triggering anger and righteous indignation.</span></p><p><span>But if you read beyond the headline, the reports themselves tell a less damning story. MTG&#8217;s $700,000 is real, but it&#8217;s her stock portfolio alone, not her $25 million net worth which includes real estate and her family&#8217;s construction business she owned years before running for office, and was disclosed on her pre-Congress disclosure statement. Pelosi&#8217;s data is similar: the underlying report points out these aren&#8217;t before and after numbers, but the same balance sheet read two ways, on the same day. The $30 million is the stock and options portfolio sitting inside a $278-280 million dollar net worth which includes real estate and decades old holdings.</span></p><p><span>Moving past the media articles and digging into data doesn&#8217;t yield better results. Ballotpedia&#8217;s Personal Gain Index</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a><span> says: &#8220;top 20 members gain an average of 422% per year.&#8221; The data itself stops in 2012 (published in 2014), and their methodology notes say the net worth changes behind it &#8220;may include changes from assets gained through marriage, inheritance, changes in family estates and/or trusts, changes in family business ownership, and many other variables unrelated to a member&#8217;s behavior in Congress.&#8221; And their own top 20 average excludes one member, Rep. Chellie Pingree, whose gain is 73,039%, specifically because that gain came from marriage, not trades. The same dataset&#8217;s far less quoted number: across the whole of Congress, median net worth rose 1.55% a year over that period compared with 0.94% median decline for American households over the same years.</span></p><p><span>None of this is to say wealth accumulation by members of Congress is not a real thing. Corruption happens, Senator Bob Menendez was convicted in 2024 on all sixteen felony counts against him after investigators found $480,000 in cash hidden around his home and thirteen gold bars in a closet. That corruption is real, proven in court, but it is the exception, not the rule. A criminal conviction tells you one member broke the law and the system to catch corruption works, but doesn&#8217;t tell us if there is a pattern.</span></p><p><span>The real question is about stock trading: is it a problem, or is it not? If your knowledge of the top stops at news articles (particularly the headlines), it seems like an open and shut case. But once again, diving into data muddies the picture. Two peer-reviewed studies found senators&#8217; stock purchases beat the market by roughly 11% per year, using data from 1993-98</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a><span>, and a companion study found House members beat it by roughly 6% a year using 1985-2001 data</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a><span>. But both predate the STOCK Act of 2012 which required members to disclose their trades within 45 days.</span></p><p><span>The most careful attempt to check the disclosed trades showed the average member&#8217;s portfolio did worse than a plain index fund: $100 invested the way the average member of Congress invested it returned $69 versus an index fund&#8217;s return of $80.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a><span> Individual members can, and do, beat the market in a given year, but &#8220;Congress beats the market&#8221; as a general claim is an overstatement.</span></p><p><span>I spent a significant amount of time and energy trying to pin down some solid numbers on the issue, but all the data I could find failed even modest scrutiny. So what can we take away from this? Sadly not much. There could be a systemic problem, but the information we currently have is at best contested. It lands as an inconclusive test on our panel.</span></p><p><span>Why am I including an inconclusive result on the panel? It is meant as a demonstration of the methodology. Evidence that doesn&#8217;t hold up is noted to provide a more clear picture of the situation.</span></p><h1><span>Conclusion</span></h1><p><span>Whew, that was a lot. Eight independent metrics, each measuring a separate part of our government, along with one imprecise test, and one inconclusive result. Just like our doctor can evaluate her patient&#8217;s condition using multiple measures, we can finally evaluate our patient: U.S. Congress.</span></p><p><span>So what does our panel say about whether Congress is able to fulfill its responsibilities? Let&#8217;s review:</span></p><p><strong><span>Observation 1: Negative</span></strong><span> - Congress continues to pass legislation, but less and less of it actually solves problems facing our society</span></p><p><strong><span>Observation 2: Negative</span></strong><span> - Government shut downs have become an issue</span></p><p><strong><span>Observation 3: Neutral</span></strong><span> - Incumbency has remained high the entire time</span></p><p><strong><span>Observation 4: Negative</span></strong><span> - Party line voting has increased significantly</span></p><p><strong><span>Observation 5: Negative</span></strong><span> - There are fewer moderate members in Congress</span></p><p><strong><span>Observation 6: Negative</span></strong><span> - Citizens give low approval ratings</span></p><p><strong><span>Observation 7: Negative</span></strong><span> - Citizens feel their representatives don&#8217;t care</span></p><p><strong><span>Observation 8: Negative</span></strong><span> - Executive orders carry more structural weight</span></p><p><strong><span>Observation 9: Negative</span></strong><span> - Legislators increasingly turn to lobbying after their terms</span></p><p><strong><span>Observation 10: Inconclusive</span></strong><span> - We can&#8217;t say for sure or how much legislators use their position for personal gain</span></p><p><span>Nearly all observations are negative, which strongly suggests our patient, U.S. Congress, is not in good condition. Our legislature is failing to fulfill its responsibilities, pass legislation and keep the lights on, while members work together less and executive orders have increasingly contained more governance.</span></p><p><span>I doubt anyone would be surprised to hear Congress isn&#8217;t fulfilling its responsibilities; this is something most of us have long suspected. But we can&#8217;t evaluate a system based on suspicions, we need independent, empirical data so we can formulate explanations and develop solutions.</span></p><p><span>And that&#8217;s what we will do in the next chapter.</span></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>DW-NOMINATE (&#8221;Dynamic, Weighted NOMINATE&#8221;) is a statistical method developed by political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal that estimates each member of Congress&#8217;s ideological position from their roll-call voting record alone, not from self-reported views. It places every member on a scale from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative) based on the pattern of who votes with whom across tens of thousands of votes, and &#8212; critically for comparisons over time &#8212; anchors those scores in a common scale so a member&#8217;s score in 1971 is directly comparable to a member&#8217;s score in 2025. Data: Voteview (voteview.com), maintained by UCLA&#8217;s Department of Political Science.</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Rudro Chakrabarti, &#8220;Marjorie Taylor Greene&#8217;s stock portfolio jumped 476% since joining Congress,&#8221; </span><em><span>Moneywise</span></em><span>, Dec. 1, 2025, </span><a href="https://moneywise.com/news/investing/marjorie-taylor-greenes-stock-porfolio-jumped-476-since-joining-congress"><span>https://moneywise.com/news/investing/marjorie-taylor-greenes-stock-porfolio-jumped-476-since-joining-congress</span></a><span>; &#8220;Marjorie Taylor Greene hits out at net worth claims: &#8216;Go to hell,&#8217;&#8221; </span><em><span>Newsweek</span></em><span>, </span><a href="https://www.newsweek.com/marjorie-taylor-greene-net-worth-claims-insider-trading-2111774"><span>https://www.newsweek.com/marjorie-taylor-greene-net-worth-claims-insider-trading-2111774</span></a></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Joel South, &#8220;Nancy Pelosi&#8217;s Family Turned $30 Million Into $278 Million Trading Stocks. Congress Just Voted to Ban It During Her Final Term.,&#8221; </span><em><span>24/7 Wall St.</span></em><span>, July 23, 2026, </span><a href="https://247wallst.com/investing/2026/07/23/nancy-pelosis-family-turned-30-million-into-278-million-trading-stocks-congress-just-voted-to-ban-it-during-her-final-term/"><span>https://247wallst.com/investing/2026/07/23/nancy-pelosis-family-turned-30-million-into-278-million-trading-stocks-congress-just-voted-to-ban-it-during-her-final-term/</span></a></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>"Changes in Net Worth of U.S. Senators and Representatives (Personal Gain Index)," </span><em><span>Ballotpedia</span></em><span>, </span><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>https://ballotpedia.org/Changes</span></a><em><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>in</span></a></em><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>Net</span></a><em><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>Worth</span></a></em><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>of</span></a><em><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>U.S.</span></a></em><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>Senators</span></a><em><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>and</span></a></em><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>Representatives</span></a><em><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>(Personal</span></a></em><a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_Net_Worth_of_U.S._Senators_and_Representatives_(Personal_Gain_Index)"><span>Gain_Index)</span></a></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Alan J. Ziobrowski, Ping Cheng, James W. Boyd, and Brigitte J. Ziobrowski, &#8220;Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate,&#8221; </span><em><span>The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis</span></em><span>, vol. 39, no. 4, 2004, pp. 661-676, </span><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/i30031877"><span>https://www.jstor.org/stable/i30031877</span></a></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Alan J. Ziobrowski, James W. Boyd, Ping Cheng, and Brigitte J. Ziobrowski, &#8220;Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives,&#8221; </span><em><span>Business and Politics</span></em><span>, vol. 13, no. 1, April 2011, </span><a href="https://digitalcommons.lindenwood.edu/faculty-research-papers/240/"><span>https://digitalcommons.lindenwood.edu/faculty-research-papers/240/</span></a></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Andrew C. Eggers and Jens Hainmueller, "Capitol Losses: The Mediocre Performance of Congressional Stock Portfolios," </span><em><span>The Journal of Politics</span></em><span>, vol. 75, no. 2, April 2013, pp. 535-551, </span><a href="https://andy.egge.rs/papers/EggMueller_capitol_losses_jop_2013.pdf"><span>https://andy.egge.rs/papers/EggMueller</span></a><em><a href="https://andy.egge.rs/papers/EggMueller_capitol_losses_jop_2013.pdf"><span>capitol</span></a></em><a href="https://andy.egge.rs/papers/EggMueller_capitol_losses_jop_2013.pdf"><span>losses</span></a><em><a href="https://andy.egge.rs/papers/EggMueller_capitol_losses_jop_2013.pdf"><span>jop</span></a></em><a href="https://andy.egge.rs/papers/EggMueller_capitol_losses_jop_2013.pdf"><span>2013.pdf</span></a></p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Law That Nobody Could Check]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Governance Design Agency: Specification v4.0]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/a-law-that-nobody-could-check</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/a-law-that-nobody-could-check</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 20:33:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2026 Utah began requiring that every customer&#8217;s ID be electronically scanned at every alcohol purchase. The law does not say what the scanning is for. The closest thing to a statement of purpose anywhere in the enactment is the title of the bill.</p><p>The equipment it mandates is defined, by administrative rule, as technology that verifies proof of age. That rule never mentions interdicted persons &#8212; the people the law was about. The check for them is still a human being looking at a red banner on a license, exactly as it was before the law passed.</p><p>A year later the legislature scaled the law back. It did so on <strong>burden</strong>, because burden was the only signal the system could produce. The sponsor of the rollback said of the original: <em>&#8220;This was never the intent of the bill.&#8221;</em></p><p><strong>Nobody ever had to show that the mandated design served the purpose the law was for, because no purpose was stated to show it against.</strong></p><p>That is not an unusual law. It is an ordinary one.</p><h2><strong>The failure mode</strong></h2><p>Every law contains three decisions. They are usually made by the same people, at the same time, and recorded as one thing.</p><p>The <strong>mandate</strong> &#8212; what outcome is sought. A values question, and the legislature&#8217;s. The <strong>architecture</strong> &#8212; the design intended to achieve it, which can be checked against the mandate. The <strong>execution</strong> &#8212; whether what was built matches what was designed.</p><p>American statutes are written as procedures: <em>what shall be done</em>. They rarely state what doing it should <em>achieve</em>, in terms that would let anyone determine afterward whether it worked. When a procedure occupies the mandate slot, only compliance and burden are measurable, and whether the law achieved anything becomes unanswerable by construction &#8212; not because the question is hard, but because nothing was written down to answer it against.</p><p>And when something does fail, the failure cannot be located. Everyone points at everyone else, and nobody is definitionally wrong, because no one&#8217;s responsibility was ever established.</p><h2><strong>What this specification proposes</strong></h2><p>Not, in the first instance, an agency. <strong>A function that no institution currently performs:</strong> converting a democratic mandate into implementation architecture, and then evaluating the result against that mandate.</p><p>Pieces of it already exist. Performance-based building codes have separated the objective from the means, in binding law, for decades. Switzerland&#8217;s constitution carries a duty to evaluate whether federal measures work. New Zealand made the separation nationally in 1991, did not build the verification loop, and got the leaky homes crisis &#8212; remediation in the billions. Three of the four existing attempts skip the same half.</p><p>The <strong>Governance Design Agency</strong> &#8212; a professional body that designs the <em>how</em> while elected officials decide the <em>what</em> &#8212; is one way to house that function. It is not the only way, and this document says so. Moe and Howell reach the same diagnosis about congressional capacity and propose routing the design function to the presidency instead. That is a rival architecture with different trade-offs, not an opponent, and the specification states both sides of the comparison.</p><p><strong>What the body cannot do is the part most often misread.</strong> A published design has no legal force. Any institution may decline it, in full, without penalty, and owes no one a legal explanation. It binds only where a legislature chooses to reference a specification in a statute &#8212; per statute, revocably, never forced. The single enforceable duty runs the other way: any person may report that something in government is not working, and the body must receive that report, classify it, and account for it on a public record.</p><p>Every legal obligation runs toward citizens. None runs from this body to compel any branch.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png" width="1456" height="2821" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/ea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:2821,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:999017,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/i/213913972?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NkU0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fea316e51-0558-448e-93dc-69de8033ee6e_2400x4650.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h2><strong>What this document does about its own weaknesses</strong></h2><p>It states its own mandate first, so that whether the design satisfies it is something a reader can check rather than take on trust.</p><p>Then it fails one of its own criteria in public. The funding arrangement it derives cannot satisfy the constraint that mandate sets &#8212; and neither can any other option, at the statutory stage. That is stated rather than managed, because it is the argument for the constitutional endpoint rather than a defect hidden inside it.</p><p>It names five findings that would show the framework is wrong.</p><p>It marks which of its own sections have been derived from the mandate and which are still positions inherited from earlier work, because a reader should be able to tell the difference without being told.</p><p>And the mandate itself is a <strong>candidate</strong> &#8212; the text a legislature would adopt, amend, or reject. Written by a citizen, published for contest. Contest is the point rather than a courtesy.</p><div><hr></div><p><em>The full specification follows. Part 0 states the mandate. Part I is the distinction everything else depends on. Parts II and III are the diagnosis; IV through VI the institution and the derivations behind it; VII the boundaries, including what the framework does not fix; VIII adoption, on an honest timeline; and IX the list of what remains unsolved, sorted by the kind of work each item needs.</em></p><p><em><a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-governance-design-agency">Earlier published work on the GDA describes a body that </a><strong><a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-governance-design-agency">certifies</a></strong><a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-governance-design-agency"> architectures.</a> That mechanism was dropped in July 2026. This is the current model, and it is the first version of this specification to be published.</em></p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Chapter 1: It Begins with ‘Why?’]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Rules that Shape the Rules: Governance Science, in Principle]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/chapter-1-it-begins-with-why</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/chapter-1-it-begins-with-why</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 11:25:53 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png" width="1456" height="815" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!3mbo!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbdf71ce1-c239-4368-bded-224b3bce4444_2944x1648.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><h1><span>Introduction</span></h1><p><span>We have been told our entire lives that the way to improve government is by engaging with democracy. At the lowest level, that is casting your ballot every few years. At the highest level it is running for office. [note: &#8220;the highest level&#8221; is deliberate here. Because even political scientists and activists don&#8217;t shape our democracy nearly as much as the people who write the rules. ]</span></p><p><span>But that is a myth.</span></p><p><span>Take getting elected to the next logical step. Freshly elected members of Congress arrive charged up with ideology [again, deliberate, once you know what campaigns select for versus what governance demands] and ready to fight like hell for their constituents.</span></p><p><span>But not much else. They have no institutional knowledge, no political capital, no access, and no influence. [I can see there being pushback on this] When it comes to making things happen in Washington D.C., they are at square one.</span></p><p><span>To earn any of this, to be able to make a difference at all to those people that elected you, you&#8217;re going to have to work within the system.</span></p><p><span>That&#8217;s what this book is about. That&#8217;s the system we need to understand.</span></p><p><span>What are the rules that shape the rules?</span></p><p><span>I am writing this book for people who want to understand how the institutions that dictate a large portion of their lives operate, but have felt ill-equipped to participate in the conversations. The politicians, political scientists, scholars, attorneys, and economists currently in the conversation about government use language and frameworks that feel oracular. They deliver pronouncements with confidence, sounding authoritative and profound, but the explanations are circular, and vague enough that they can&#8217;t be checked against reality. The explanations can feel true in the moment, but never really seem to elucidate what we witness happening in our government. We&#8217;re left with the feeling that we&#8217;ve been invited to a dinner where only imaginary food is being served and are told to dig in and enjoy. We wonder why we&#8217;re still hungry when voices are clamoring that we should be full.</span></p><p><span>For those of us who see through the illusion, a natural reaction is to want to get involved with the cooking and the serving, to hopefully make it better. But we&#8217;re told that engaging with our democracy requires dedicating an enormous amount of time, energy, and resources. We&#8217;re told that if we want to be involved in shaping the society we live in, we need to devote our lives to it: run for office, organize communities, volunteer. The perceived expectation is that we&#8217;ll study specialized fields like political science, history, economics, foreign policy, technology, and climatology just to be qualified to evaluate candidates or comment on legislation.</span></p><p><span>This is a heavy burden that can make us feel inadequate and push us to disengage from politics. But we can&#8217;t disengage from politics and government. I have tried. They touch nearly every aspect of life. We&#8217;re going to have to pay taxes, acquire licenses, and have myriad other interactions with the government, just to live. Government and politics are inescapable. We&#8217;re seated at the table whether or not we like what is being served, or not served. And whether or not what we&#8217;re tasting, or not tasting, is reflected in the menu.</span></p><p><span>The mismatch between what we are told about how our government functions in theory, and how it actually functions in practice is bewildering. We are taught of democratic accountability, checks and balances, political parties that aggregate voter preferences, and politicians who advocate for those preferences and their constituents. Yet, in my lived experience, and I imagine yours as well, it&#8217;s fleetingly rare to witness it operating as advertised. </span></p><p><span>We are told that our government functions one way, but can&#8217;t see that reflected in what actually happens. When we try to get answers from the people in the system, we are told that it&#8217;s our problem, that we&#8217;re the problem, that we need to devote more to it. More time. More energy.</span></p><p><span>But what if we, the people, are not actually the problem? What if the people in the system aren&#8217;t even the problem? What if the dysfunction we witness in politics and government is the natural consequence of the rules the system operates by?</span></p><p><span>My goal with this book is to introduce a new framework and vocabulary to understand how our government functions, if it is functioning, and how we could implement changes that actually matter.</span></p><h1><span>Chapter 1: It Begins with &#8216;Why?&#8217;</span></h1><p><span>What do </span><em><span>you</span></em><span> think is wrong with our government? Not what you&#8217;ve heard is wrong. Not what your preferred party, politician, or pundits say is wrong. What have you actually observed?</span></p><p><span>Have you been affected by government shutdowns? Do you see the increasing use of executive orders in place of proper legislation? And when legislation is created, does it actually solve the problem it was supposed to? Or does it cause more problems?</span></p><p><span>Whatever government failures you have witnessed or experienced, that is a debris field to be investigated, not ignored because the mess is overwhelming. Recurring crises and broken political promises have become the norm, and for many of us, a government that could actually solve problems instead of creating them seems like an idealist&#8217;s unrealistic dream.</span></p><p><span>I started this project because I believe our government should not fail over and over again.</span></p><p><span>A disturbing, but increasingly common viewpoint is that U.S. democracy is beyond salvation, and a revolution is the only way to change it. I do not hold that view. I do not believe that, with the foundation we already have, a revolution is required to create a government that serves its citizens. My hope is that by the end of this book, you also will think our country&#8217;s government can be repaired. I&#8217;m not saying it is trivial. It won&#8217;t be easy; the U.S. government is a massive system that touches virtually every part of our lives, but that&#8217;s all the more reason to fix it, rather than burn it down and rebuild it.</span></p><p><span>That may seem inconceivable in a world that is so divided and chaotic, but humankind has learned to solve exceptionally difficult and complex problems.</span></p><h2><span>The Method of Inquiry</span></h2><p><span>The aviation industry is well known for transporting people and goods around the world safely and reliably; most of us complain about legroom before we worry about dying.</span></p><p><span>But the aviation industry wasn&#8217;t always like this. The old aviation adage cheekily says &#8220;any landing you can walk away from is a good landing; any landing where you can reuse the airplane is a great one.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>Before aviation became the ultra-safe industry we know today, the skies were defined by debris fields. For decades, investigators methodically combed through wreckage, tracing catastrophic failures back to their root causes to build policies that prevented the next disaster. Consider United Airlines Flight 173. In 1978, the aircraft circled over Portland, burning through its final drops of fuel while the crew troubleshot a landing gear malfunction. The captain became dangerously fixated on the gear mechanism. Though the co-pilot and flight engineer realized their fuel reserves were critically low, they failed to effectively convey the urgency of the situation.</span></p><p><span>The plane crashed, killing ten people. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation initially zeroed in on the mechanics: a corroded part had caused the landing gear to drop too quickly, preventing the cockpit indicator light from confirming it was locked. Officially, the probable cause was stamped as human error&#8212;the captain&#8217;s ultimate failure to monitor his fuel.</span></p><p><span>But investigators pushed deeper. They looked at the cockpit dynamic, identifying a rigid hierarchy where a captain&#8217;s authority was absolute, and subordinate crew members routinely avoided direct confrontation.</span></p><p><span>This tragedy forced the aviation industry to realize that safety wasn&#8217;t just about structural engineering; it was also about human communication. In response, United Airlines launched the first Crew Resource Management (CRM) program to transform how flight crews communicate, make decisions, and work as a team. Today, CRM is a global standard credited with saving thousands of lives.</span></p><p><span>Instead of demanding better, flawless people, we redesigned the system. We diagnosed the problem (a communication breakdown), isolated the root cause (a steep power imbalance), deployed a structural solution (standardized communication protocols), and measured the results.</span></p><p><span>We can see this method at work in the fields of medicine, construction, and the automotive industry, in skin care products, food preservation and treatment of athletic injuries&#8212;every case resulting in measurable improvements.  Humanity has spent centuries refining this relentless method of inquiry &#8212; it isn&#8217;t perfect, but it builds systems that continuously improve. Wouldn&#8217;t we want to use what has been proven to work in the field that affects us the most?</span></p><h2><span>Governance Science</span></h2><p><span>This book proposes applying this method of inquiry to our government: methodically tracing poor outcomes to a root cause, and modifying the system to alter or eliminate the root cause in order to prevent repeating the poor outcome.</span></p><p><span>The approach, applied to government, is what I term &#8220;governance science.&#8221;</span></p><p><span>Politics is the contest over who holds power and what policies they pursue. It&#8217;s the debate about what government should do for society. And it&#8217;s inherently contentious because reasonable people disagree about values and priorities.</span></p><p><span>Government, on the other hand, is the machinery through which those decisions get made, laws get written and implemented, and institutions operate. It sets the rules of the contest, the field it&#8217;s played on, and the mechanisms that process the political decisions into actual outcomes.</span></p><p><span>One way to think about it is: politics decides where society goes, governance science studies how we actually get there.</span></p><p><span>For example, if you want to take your family on a trip somewhere, there are many, many places to go; some may seem better than others, but that is entirely subjective. Different people are going to prefer Disneyland over Las Vegas.</span></p><p><span>But when it comes to actually planning the trip, your choice in transportation and route can produce a better or worse outcome. If you only have one week of time off from work, and you live in North Carolina, driving to Vegas or Disneyland is, objectively, going to produce a poor outcome. Especially if you have children and the destination is Disneyland. If you have three weeks of time off, and in addition to Disneyland you are going to tour other parts of the country, driving may be the better option.</span></p><p><span>Politics asks &#8220;Do we go to Las Vegas or Disneyland?&#8221; Governance science asks &#8220;Given the constraints we are facing, how do we get there?&#8221;</span></p><p><span>It asks how political decisions get made, how legislation gets written, how laws get implemented, and how those implementations ripple through citizens&#8217; lives, businesses, the economy, and the environment. And in order to answer the how, governance science asks </span><em><span>why</span></em><span>.</span></p><p><span>Unlike the frameworks you&#8217;ve probably encountered previously, this one produces predictions you can check. Given specific behavioral laws operating through specific structural rules, you can say in advance what outcomes you&#8217;d expect to observe, and then look to see if they do. If the predictions don&#8217;t hold, the framework is wrong. This makes the framework falsifiable. That falsifiability is what distinguishes science from doctrine.</span></p><p><span>The first step toward solving a problem is asking the right questions. When investigating Flight 173 it wasn&#8217;t helpful to criticize mechanics or personnel. A different mechanical problem on a different plane with a different pilot could have had the same outcome. It wasn&#8217;t enough to ask, &#8220;Why did the plane crash?&#8221; Answering that question was easy, but not helpful: the landing gear stuck and the pilot wasn&#8217;t paying attention to the fuel gauge. But neither the landing gear malfunction nor the pilot&#8217;s inattentiveness were the root cause of the disaster; with both of these problems unresolved the plane would have had a good chance of landing safely if there had been what we now call Crew Resource Management. To get to an actually meaningful reform, investigators had to ask questions about the system the crew was working within.</span></p><p><span>Saying &#8220;Government is broken!&#8221; doesn&#8217;t help. Broken how? Broken in what way? What specifically is broken? What is it failing to do?</span></p><p><span>A government&#8217;s most fundamental purpose is solving societal problems. Solving societal problems involves, among other things, creating laws, enforcing laws, and adjudicating laws. Accordingly, our Constitution divides those responsibilities across three branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial, respectively.</span></p><p><span>Which branch do we investigate first? The legislative branch seems like a logical place to start. The other two branches operate on the laws Congress produces; without legislation, they would have no laws to enforce or adjudicate.</span></p><p><span>The first question we need to investigate is: Is Congress fulfilling its responsibilities to produce legislation that serves the citizens of The United States? And if not, why not?</span></p><p><span>To answer that honestly, we need data, but not just any data. Subjective data like certain bills not getting passed pulls us into the realm of policy and politics; there&#8217;s a slew of reasons a bill might not pass. We need quantifiable and empirical data.</span></p><p><span>And we collect that data through observations&#8230;</span></p><div><hr></div><p>You can read chapter 2 <a href="https://open.substack.com/pub/thestatecraftblueprint/p/chapter-2-observations">here</a>.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Get future chapters straight to your inbox</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Manufacturing Compliance]]></title><description><![CDATA[Vote Attribution, Party Discipline, and the Limits of Electoral Reform]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/manufacturing-compliance</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/manufacturing-compliance</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 23:25:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l7mf!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febb4084a-db8f-42f9-bfba-283e8af53810_500x500.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>1. The Anomaly</strong></h2><p>Over the past two decades, American reformers have pursued nearly every lever available to change who gets elected to Congress, on a shared assumption: that better people, once in office, will produce better legislative behavior on their own. Campaign finance restrictions, independent redistricting commissions, ranked-choice voting, open and nonpartisan primaries, term-limit proposals, structural proposals to expand the House of Representatives toward a ratio of population to representation closer to the framers&#8217; original design &#8212; each targets who gets elected, or how directly voters can hold them accountable. None targets what happens to a member once they arrive.</p><p>Across the same two decades, by nearly every observable measure, Congress has not become less dysfunctional. Legislative productivity has declined. Party-line voting has increased. Government shutdowns in the modern operational sense were not a regular consequence of appropriations lapses before 1980 &#8212; funding gaps occurred, but agencies generally continued operating on the assumption that Congress didn&#8217;t intend otherwise, until Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti&#8217;s 1980&#8211;81 opinions supplied the stricter legal interpretation that made actual shutdowns the norm. Through most of the 1980s they remained a footnote, typically lasting a day or two before funding was restored. Since the 1990s they have become an available legislative tool &#8212; not scheduled or routine, but reliably reached for whenever political conflict runs high enough to make one worth the cost. The number of competitive, cross-pressured districts able to produce genuinely independent-minded members has fallen. If the standard theory were correct &#8212; that dysfunction is fundamentally an input problem, correctable by improving who runs, how they are elected, or how directly they are held accountable at the ballot box &#8212; at least some of these reforms should have produced measurable improvement in these outputs. Yet these reforms, where adopted, have not been shown to reverse the core congressional outputs at issue here: declining legislative productivity, rising party-line voting, shutdown brinkmanship, and the weakening of cross-pressured legislative independence.</p><p>This is the anomaly this paper addresses. It does not follow from the anomaly that electoral reform is worthless &#8212; some of the proposals above may well be necessary. It follows that something else is also true: that there is a mechanism operating between the time a member is elected and what actually emerges from Congress, one that electoral reform does not reach because it does not operate at the ballot box at all. That mechanism is the subject of this paper.</p>
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Five Bridges]]></title><description><![CDATA[Why the reform playbook isn&#8217;t working, and what would]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/five-bridges</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/five-bridges</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 12:33:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WiSf!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F717249f7-ecae-45c0-a1b7-a79a3363858d_2944x1648.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WiSf!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F717249f7-ecae-45c0-a1b7-a79a3363858d_2944x1648.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WiSf!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F717249f7-ecae-45c0-a1b7-a79a3363858d_2944x1648.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WiSf!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F717249f7-ecae-45c0-a1b7-a79a3363858d_2944x1648.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WiSf!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F717249f7-ecae-45c0-a1b7-a79a3363858d_2944x1648.png 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WiSf!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F717249f7-ecae-45c0-a1b7-a79a3363858d_2944x1648.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WiSf!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F717249f7-ecae-45c0-a1b7-a79a3363858d_2944x1648.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WiSf!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F717249f7-ecae-45c0-a1b7-a79a3363858d_2944x1648.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!WiSf!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F717249f7-ecae-45c0-a1b7-a79a3363858d_2944x1648.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div><hr></div><p>Later this year, as we do every few years, we will participate in a predictable national ritual. We head to the ballot box and change some of the personnel of Congress, ushering in new majorities, celebrating wave elections, or backing anti-establishment insurgencies. Yet the foundational patterns under the hood&#8212;the endless gridlock, the performative shouting matches, the inability to pass basic legislation, and a system that answers to big donors over everyday constituents&#8212;remain completely untouched.</p><p>At some point, we have to look at this recurring pattern and admit that if the road itself is fundamentally broken, simply swapping out the driver won&#8217;t get us to our destination.</p><p>The standard playbook from traditional reform movements tells us that we simply haven&#8217;t found the right people yet, or that we just need to fight harder to get them elected. The prescription is always the same: fix elections, improve representation, build better grassroots movements, and get the right leaders in charge so that better results will naturally follow. While character and values certainly matter at the margins, this diagnosis fails to explain why the broader system refuses to budge. If personnel were the main problem, outcomes would change when the people do, but they don&#8217;t. Instead, we see highly rational, well-intentioned people enter an irrational system and produce the same old disappointing results. They aren&#8217;t inherently corrupt; rather, the underlying rules of the game systematically reward bad behavior and punish constructive leadership, no matter who is sitting in the seats.</p><p>To see past this cycle, we need to cross five conceptual bridges. These aren&#8217;t about shifting your partisan leanings; they are about changing how you see the political machinery itself. Once you cross them, the political landscape looks entirely different.</p><h2>Bridge 1: Rules don&#8217;t just reflect power. They create it.</h2><p>The fact that political dysfunction survives across different legislative majorities tells us that institutional rules are doing a lot more heavy lifting than we realize.</p><p>The conventional view is straightforward: powerful interests write the rules to serve themselves. In this view, the system breaks because bad actors are pulling the levers. While it is undeniably true that concentrated wealth and entrenched party machinery shape rules to protect their turf, treating this as a one-way street misses half the story.</p><p>Rules don&#8217;t just reflect who has power today; they actively dictate who can accumulate power tomorrow. They establish the structural terrain of politics. By changing the rules, you fundamentally alter what behaviors are rewarded and what strategies are even possible.</p><p>The congressional reforms of the 1970s are a perfect example of this dynamic backfiring. Well-intentioned reformers wanted to fix a real problem: powerful, independent committee chairs were cutting unaccountable deals in smoke-filled back rooms. The reformers believed that making individual votes completely transparent to the public would act as a disinfectant.</p><p>However, they failed to anticipate that real-time visibility would hand party leadership and mega-donors a highly efficient targeting system. To make matters worse, the reforms also introduced new party discipline tools, stripping power away from those independent committee chairs and centralizing it in the hands of leadership. Suddenly, any member who stepped out of line could be instantly identified, denied resources, and punished before the next election cycle. Independent judgment collapsed into rigid partisan obedience because the new terrain punished cooperation and rewarded compliance. The architecture outlasted the intentions of the people who built it.</p><p>Rules and power exist in a continuous feedback loop. Rules shape the terrain, the terrain determines who wins power, and those winners write the next generation of rules. Because they are locked in this cycle, simply swapping out the players while leaving the structural terrain intact guarantees that the new personnel will eventually be reshaped by the very system they were elected to break.</p><h2>Bridge 2: Government isn&#8217;t complicated. It&#8217;s complex.</h2><p>To understand why standard democracy reform consistently fails, we have to recognize <a href="https://kevinguiney.substack.com/p/the-unfinished-question-on-complexity">the difference between a system that is merely </a><em><a href="https://kevinguiney.substack.com/p/the-unfinished-question-on-complexity">complicated</a></em><a href="https://kevinguiney.substack.com/p/the-unfinished-question-on-complexity"> and one that is truly </a><em><a href="https://kevinguiney.substack.com/p/the-unfinished-question-on-complexity">complex</a></em>.</p><p>A complicated system has a lot of moving parts, but those parts can be separated, analyzed on their own, and put back together. The whole is just the sum of its pieces. An airplane engine is complicated. It has thousands of intricate components, but a skilled mechanic can isolate a single broken valve, replace it, and the engine will return to functioning exactly as intended. The repair is isolated and predictable; fixing the valve doesn&#8217;t cause the fuel line or the exhaust pipe to suddenly alter their behavior in protest.</p><p>A complex system, like a forest or an economy, is a completely different beast. It is an interdependent ecosystem where every part constantly interacts with every other part. If you change one element in a complex system, you trigger a ripple effect that alters the behavior of everything else around it in ways you could never predict by looking at that single element in isolation.</p><p>Most political reform treats government like a complicated machine. Activists target campaign finance in one election, ethics rules in the next, and term limits down the road, treating them like separate items on an isolated checklist. But because government is a complex ecosystem, these fixes constantly trigger severe, unintended side effects.</p><p>Take term limits, which remain an incredibly popular idea across the political spectrum. The logic feels entirely intuitive: career politicians lose touch with everyday folks, focus entirely on self-preservation, and become part of a permanent political class. The thought is that if you limit their time in office, they will focus on public service instead of re-election.</p><p>But look at how power actually flows when you run this experiment in the real world. A rapid, forced rotation of lawmakers creates a legislature full of freshman members who are highly ideological&#8212;fresh off the campaign trail&#8212;but entirely stripped of institutional knowledge. Because they don&#8217;t know how the internal machinery works, lack deep relationships, and have no political capital, the only lifeline available to them is the centralized party leadership. New members quickly default to rigid party-line voting just to survive. Meanwhile, the one group in Washington with no term limits at all&#8212;professional lobbyists&#8212;retains all the historical memory and procedural expertise. Term limits accidentally hand immense structural influence straight to the exact special interests the reform was supposed to weaken.</p><p>We see the same blind spots with &#8220;democracy vouchers,&#8221; a public campaign financing system designed to shift funding from wealthy donors to everyday citizens. The goal is noble, but in a complex political ecosystem, campaign spending behaves like a positional arms race where relative advantage is the only thing that matters. Because premium advertising space is limited, pumping massive amounts of public cash into the system simply drives prices up, often forcing candidates to hunt for even more private money to keep their competitive edge. Furthermore, it empowers organized interest groups, who can direct their members and supports to send their vouchers where they want. The interest groups no longer have to donate their dollars, the vouchers represent public dollars, our tax dollars, now being managed by political directors. This effectively allows these interest groups to aggregate campaign dollars across districts and direct them to candidates. We have a name for these organizations: Political Action Committees (PACs). The exact organizations the voucher program was intended to replace.</p><p>Even our most protective structural rules carry hidden loads we rarely notice until they are gone. Consider the judiciary. In early 2026, Supreme Court Justices Gorsuch and Barrett ruled against the administration in the high-stakes Learning Resources tariff case, drawing sharp public attacks from the executive branch. While critics often focus on the personal character of the justices, this moment actually proved that the institutional architecture was doing its job. You don&#8217;t publicly attack an institution you have successfully captured. The structural safeguards of lifetime tenure and salary protection mean that justices have no future professional career to protect, removing the electoral and financial levers that typically compromise Congress.</p><p>Yet, a leading reform proposal seeks to replace lifetime tenure with staggered 18-year terms to encourage democratic rotation. Trace the power-flow here: a justice with a hard end date suddenly has a post-Court professional future to worry about&#8212;lucrative speaking circuits, prestigious law school deanships, or foundation roles. By introducing a finite term, the reform accidentally restores the exact external career calculations that lifetime tenure was engineered to eliminate. Rather than lowering the stakes, predictable vacancies would allow political parties to align their fundraising and mobilization efforts around known court openings, making confirmation battles even more volatile while dismantling the precise safeguard currently resisting political capture.</p><p>Before we change any institutional rule, we have to ask: what hidden, load-bearing function is this rule currently performing, and what will break if we pull it out?</p><h2>Bridge 3: Campaigns filter out the people we actually need.</h2><p>When confronted with a broken system, our collective instinct is to double down on finding better leaders&#8212;individuals with the rare integrity and patience required to resist systemic pressures and change the rules from within. But this overlooks a brutal design flaw: the modern campaign process is specifically engineered to weed those exact qualities out of the candidate pool long before they ever get to Washington.</p><p><a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-patient-leader">The traits required to redesign a complex governance system</a> are intellectually demanding and temperamentally rare. They include the ability to absorb harsh public criticism without getting defensive, the patience to wait years for structural reforms to show visible results, the honesty to admit uncertainty, and the flexibility to change direction when confronted with new evidence.</p><p>Now, look at the behaviors a modern political campaign actively rewards. Winning a campaign demands absolute, unwavering certainty, the promise of immediate and simplistic fixes, and high emotional drama. A candidate who demonstrates intellectual honesty by saying, &#8220;We are studying multiple approaches to this problem because the systemic interactions are highly uncertain,&#8221; will be crushed by an opponent who projects supreme confidence, even when that confidence is entirely misplaced. Changing your mind based on new data is instantly weaponized as weak-willed flip-flopping, and admitting that a real solution will take a decade of unglamorous work is a surefire way to lose a primary.</p><p>This isn&#8217;t a moral failing of individual candidates; it is an architectural reality. The system requires patient, evidence-based builders, but the selection process systematically rewards performers. While structural electoral reforms like ranked-choice voting or independent redistricting can shift who wins, they don&#8217;t change the fact that winning an adversarial campaign and designing an interdependent governance architecture are entirely different skills. The current system treats them as the same, leaving us with a legislature filled with highly talented campaigners who lack the technical discipline required for institutional design.</p><h2>Bridge 4: What we want is a democratic question. How we get it is a design question.</h2><p>This mismatch between campaign skills and governance skills exposes an uncomfortable truth: if our political system is a complex ecosystem, and campaigns filter out the temperament required to manage it, who is actually qualified to design the operating rules of our democracy? Right now, the answer is nobody, because we have committed a fundamental category error. We treat the structural plumbing of our legislature as an ordinary political debate.</p><p>When Congress passes environmental legislation, nobody expects elected officials to personally calculate the precise parts-per-million thresholds for industrial pollutants. We rely on the technical capacity of an agency to execute those standards. The democratic process does its job by setting the overarching goal&#8212;we want cleaner air&#8212;while the technical execution is left to a specialized body that can translate that goal into reality without triggering catastrophic economic side effects.</p><p>Yet, when it comes to the rules that govern the legislature itself&#8212;floor procedures, committee structures, and calendar control&#8212;we completely abandon this logic. These internal regulations are the foundational operating system of our democracy, dictating whether the public&#8217;s will can ever be translated into legislative action. They are engineering specifications for how power moves through an institution. Yet, we treat these rules as ordinary political footballs to be written, altered, and weaponized by the politicians themselves through the standard partisan process.</p><p>We have confused the democratic determination of our goals with the technical architecture required to achieve them. Deciding whether we want a more representative, responsive, multi-party legislature is a profoundly democratic question that belongs entirely to the citizens and their representatives. But determining which specific blend of procedural rules, committee jurisdictions, and voting mechanisms will actually route power toward that destination&#8212;without causing the system to be captured by special interests&#8212;is an architectural engineering problem. It has objectively better and worse answers that can be modeled and analyzed against real-world data. By treating the design of the machinery as a mere extension of partisan politics, we ensure that our democratic values are continuously betrayed by the broken mechanics of the vehicle carrying them.</p><h2>Bridge 5: A diverse monopoly is still a monopoly.</h2><p>Because traditional reform movements fail to recognize this category error, they consistently focus on the right anxieties in the wrong places. The primary goal of democracy reform has long been to diversify the candidate pool, open up elections, and bring more varied voices into the legislative process. While representation is vital, this framework leaves the most dangerous monopoly in American politics completely untouched: the self-refereeing monopoly.</p><p>Congress currently maintains absolute control over both the policy outcomes it pursues and the structural rules that govern its own internal operations. The players on the field are entirely responsible for writing, interpreting, and enforcing the rules of their own sport. This is an inescapable, systemic conflict of interest. When human beings are given total authority over the regulations that dictate their own professional survival, they will inevitably shape those regulations to protect themselves, regardless of their political party or personal character.</p><p>The fate of the STOCK Act of 2012 provides a definitive look at this conflict in action. Passed overwhelmingly in a rare moment of public consensus, the bill was designed to prevent insider trading among members of Congress by requiring strict transparency for financial transactions. Just one year later, however, leadership in both chambers quietly gutted the core components of the law using an expedited procedure that required no public debate, no roll-call vote, and occurred in a virtually empty room. Today, the penalty for failing to disclose a major stock trade is a negligible two hundred dollars, and no member has ever been meaningfully prosecuted under its framework. The self-refereeing system encountered an external constraint, recognized it as a threat to its own comfort, and seamlessly re-engineered its internal rules to neutralize the threat.</p><p>A more diverse legislature that continues to write its own operating rules does not solve this problem; it simply creates a more inclusive monopoly. The core vulnerability is structural, not demographic.</p><p>Whenever it is suggested that we must strip Congress of this self-refereeing monopoly, critics immediately raise the alarm of technocracy, warning that handing rule-making authority to an independent body removes democratic accountability. But this objection is rooted in a profound misunderstanding of how our government actually operates today. We already live in a system where unelected actors dominate the design of our political institutions, but they do so in the shadows. Because members of Congress lack the time, structural incentives, and specialized expertise to design complex institutional procedures, the task of drafting legislative language has been defaulted to corporate lobbyists, entrenched party staffers, and invisible bureaucratic networks. The real choice before us is not between a perfectly accountable democratic legislature and a cold, technocratic elite; the choice is between a hidden, captured, and fundamentally unaccountable architecture and a <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/when-government-fails-you-where-does">visible, professional, and publicly auditable design discipline</a>.</p><p>To make this discipline real, we don&#8217;t have to invent a far-off, utopian concept. We just have to look at how we handle safety and structural integrity everywhere else in the real world.</p><p>Think of how we manage commercial aviation. When a plane suffers a mechanical failure or a near-miss on the runway, we don&#8217;t hold a public vote to determine what went wrong, nor do we let the airline executives quietly rewrite the safety manual in secret. Instead, we rely on the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)&#8212;an independent, transparent body of structural experts whose sole job is to investigate failures, map black box data, and identify the deep defects and flaws in the machinery. The NTSB doesn&#8217;t write FAA policy, nor does it audit airlines for regulatory compliance&#8212;those governing decisions belong entirely to the FAA. The NTSB simply uncovers the structural failures and makes authoritative recommendations, providing the unassailable, data-driven map that forces the policy-makers to act.</p><p>Our democracy needs that exact same diagnostic oversight: <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-governance-design-agency">a dedicated, independent body tasked with identifying the fundamental flaws in our democratic machinery and producing recommendations to fix them</a>. This would function like an NTSB for our political infrastructure.</p><p>When the internal rules of Congress generate paralyzing gridlock, systematic responsiveness to special interests, or rampant insider trading, this body would be institutionally obligated to run stress tests, isolate the structural defects, and publish transparent, auditable recommendations. Just as the NTSB&#8217;s independent findings expose flaws and pressure the FAA to update its policies under the lens of public scrutiny, this body would strip politicians of the ability to hide behind a self-refereeing monopoly. It leaves the ultimate policy-making and enforcement power exactly where it belongs&#8212;in the hands of the democratic process&#8212;but introduces an open, professional discipline that ensures the rules of the legislature actually route power toward the values defined by the public.</p><h2>The Shift</h2><p>When we look at our broken political system from the old perspective, it looks like a moral drama populated by villains to be unseated and heroes to be elected. We treat institutional rules as mere reflections of whoever happens to hold power, assuming that if we can just mobilize enough resources to elect better people, those leaders will naturally create a better government. We approach reform like mechanics working on a simple machine, operating under the illusion that we can fix campaign finance today, implement term limits tomorrow, and patch up the judiciary next year without ever worrying about how those pieces collide.</p><p>Crossing these bridges requires a fundamental shift in perspective. It means realizing that rules are not passive reflections of power, but the active conduits that generate and sustain it. It means recognizing that government is a sensitive, complex ecosystem where isolated, well-meaning interventions like term limits frequently backfire. And it means confronting the reality that the modern campaign trail acts as a filter that systematically weeds out the exact traits required to fix a broken system.</p><p>Ultimately, this journey brings us to a single, liberating conclusion: if a bridge is structurally unsound, you don&#8217;t solve the problem by hunting for a better driver to cross it. You have to reinforce the pillars. We must move past the naive hope that the next election cycle will finally deliver the savior who can single-handedly overcome a captured environment. Instead, we must demand a professional, transparent, and publicly accountable design discipline tasked with the continuous maintenance of our democratic machinery&#8212;ensuring that the rules of our society finally route power toward the true will of its citizens.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Subscribe to learn what a 21st century democracy looks like in American</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[When Government Fails You, Where Does That Failure Go?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Increasing government accountability and repairing the broken feedback loop]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/when-government-fails-you-where-does</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/when-government-fails-you-where-does</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 12:04:31 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qveB!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F54b139ce-6f89-4b6a-a628-aba8ab03913c_2944x1648.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qveB!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F54b139ce-6f89-4b6a-a628-aba8ab03913c_2944x1648.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qveB!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F54b139ce-6f89-4b6a-a628-aba8ab03913c_2944x1648.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qveB!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F54b139ce-6f89-4b6a-a628-aba8ab03913c_2944x1648.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!qveB!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F54b139ce-6f89-4b6a-a628-aba8ab03913c_2944x1648.png 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class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div><hr></div><p>Think about the last time a government program didn&#8217;t work the way it was supposed to &#8212; a benefit that never reached the people who needed it, an agency too broken to do its job, a regulation that produced the opposite of what it intended. For most people, the response to that failure has always been the same: acceptance. Not out of apathy, but because there was nothing else to do. You could vent to someone behind a counter, write a letter, or complain to your congressperson&#8217;s office. Unless you had a close relationship with a member of Congress, nothing was coming of it.</p><p>When private institutions fail, we have built public channels for recourse. Investors can report securities fraud. Consumers can report unsafe products, deceptive practices, contaminated food, and unlawful business conduct. Entire agencies exist to receive complaints, investigate patterns, enforce rules, and build public records. The system is imperfect, but the premise is established: private failure can trigger public response. We have accepted the idea that private failure should be reportable, investigable, and sometimes enforceable through public institutions.</p><p>For government failures, that institution has never existed. It isn&#8217;t that we built one and it broke down. We never built it.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Voting Doesn&#8217;t Fix It</h2><p>The default instinct is to vote them out. If the machine is broken, change the operator.</p><p>But voting puts people in office. It doesn&#8217;t fix the rules those people operate under. A new representative walks in, inherits the same broken system, and the failure continues. The ballot box is the right tool for choosing who serves &#8212; it was never designed to fix how the institution functions. And even if it were, election cycles are measured in years while governance failures compound daily.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Why the Failures Stay Hidden</h2><p>When something goes wrong in aviation, the NTSB&#8217;s job is to investigate, identify the root cause, and propose fixes to prevent recurrence. The investigation is mandatory, the findings are public, and someone is responsible for the fix.</p><p>When something goes wrong in government, that institution doesn&#8217;t exist. The details required for implementation are often incomplete or missing entirely &#8212; who is responsible, how success is measured, what happens when something breaks down &#8212; sometimes left vague deliberately, sometimes simply never worked out. Decisions about how things actually function get quietly delegated to agency staff with no clear record of who decided what. When something fails, everyone points at everyone else, and nobody is definitionally wrong, because nobody&#8217;s responsibility was ever clearly established. Without a clear owner, nothing is designed to change.</p><div><hr></div><h2>How Accountability Could Work Differently</h2><p>What if you could file a bug report about your government?</p><p>Not a complaint letter that disappears into a form processing system, but an actual report &#8212; this thing isn&#8217;t working, here&#8217;s what happened, here&#8217;s who was affected &#8212; submitted to an institution with a legal obligation to investigate, identify what&#8217;s broken, and propose a fix, whose response becomes part of a public record.</p><p>This is how software gets better. When users identify bugs, developers investigate, identify root cause, and ship a fix. The process isn&#8217;t perfect, and not every defect can be remedied, but there is a process &#8212; someone owns the problem, someone is responsible for the solution, and the record of both is auditable. Over time, that process can drastically improve how a product functions.</p><p>Government could work the same way &#8212; not as a courtesy, but as an institutionalized promise, a constitutional obligation to the citizens of this country. The institution wouldn&#8217;t treat every report as a full investigation; it would look for patterns across reports, prioritizing breakdowns that affect large numbers of people over isolated incidents, a kind of triage that modern tools make increasingly tractable. But the guarantee would be real: report what isn&#8217;t working, and someone with authority is required to respond.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The GDA Would Be That Institution</h2><p>The Governance Design Agency is The Statecraft Blueprint&#8217;s proposed solution to that gap. We have designed it as an independent constitutional institution &#8212; not another executive agency, not a congressional committee, and not a court, but a standing body with one job: close the feedback loop between government failure and institutional repair.</p><p>One boundary matters enough to name directly. The GDA would not make policy, and it would not take complaints about policy. Whether the minimum wage should be higher, whether we should spend more on defense &#8212; those are policy questions, and the right place to take them is your elected representatives. The GDA&#8217;s lane is narrower: does the implementation of existing law actually work for the people it&#8217;s supposed to serve? When it doesn&#8217;t, the GDA would be the institution required to investigate why, identify who owns the failure, and propose a fix. The record of all of it would be public, and if an agency received a recommendation and ignored it, that would be documented too.</p><p>Making the GDA part of the Constitution isn&#8217;t an accident of ambition &#8212; it&#8217;s a design requirement. An agency can be defunded, an executive order reversed, a congressional committee reorganized. Anything short of constitutional status is too easy to dismantle the moment the feedback loop starts producing inconvenient results. The failure between government and the people it serves has persisted this long because nothing has ever been structurally required to fix it.</p><p>We know a constitutional amendment is the heaviest lift in American politics &#8212; a generational project, not a legislative session. We think the failure is baked deep enough to require it, because a coat of paint won&#8217;t fix a structural problem. None of this exists yet. This is what we are building toward.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Who Does the GDA Answer To?</h2><p>Citizens &#8212; and not just as a design philosophy, but as a legal and constitutional fact.</p><p>If the GDA fails to respond to documented failures within defined timeframes, citizens can seek a court order compelling it to act. The constitutional amendment itself is what makes this mechanism available &#8212; by explicitly granting citizens standing and defining the GDA&#8217;s duty as specific and measurable, it lowers the bar that makes such orders possible. Courts wouldn&#8217;t need to become governance science experts to evaluate whether the GDA fulfilled its duty. They would ask the same kind of question they ask in other technical domains: did the institution follow a defined professional process, apply its own methodology, document its reasoning, and fulfill the duty the Constitution assigns to it? The accountability relationship runs to citizens not as a preference but as enforceable law.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Bottom-Up, Not Top-Down</h2><p>The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) took its input from executive preference. Someone in the executive branch decided what needed to change, and change happened. The accountability ran upward &#8212; to the executive, not to citizens.</p><p>The GDA&#8217;s input would be citizen-reported failure. Something isn&#8217;t working for people, they report it, and the GDA would be constitutionally obligated to respond. The accountability would run back to the people the government is supposed to serve.</p><p>There is another difference worth naming. The GDA would not impose changes &#8212; it would produce recommendations that other institutions must either adopt or formally reject with documented reasons. An agency can say no, but it has to say why, on the record. Over time, a pattern of rejected recommendations creates its own accountability signal: if a particular department&#8217;s failure reports keep accumulating while every GDA recommendation gets turned away, that record becomes the evidence Congress needs to act. The GDA makes the problem visible and attributable. What happens next remains the responsibility of the democratic institutions the GDA serves.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What If It Fails?</h2><p>No institution is capture-proof, and we won&#8217;t claim this one would be. The GDA would be designed with structural safeguards against the failure modes we can identify, along with tripwires &#8212; early warning mechanisms intended to surface hollowing out or capture before it becomes critical.</p><p>But there are failure modes no institutional design can fully protect against: an independent judiciary, enforcement of court orders, the constitutional order itself, a functional enough information environment that facts still cut through the noise. If those foundations fail, the GDA would fail with them &#8212; and that isn&#8217;t a flaw specific to the GDA. Those are the foundational assumptions of any constitutional institution. The Supreme Court has the same dependencies. The Fed has the same dependencies. If those foundations collapse, no institution survives, not because it was designed poorly, but because it was designed for a constitutional democracy that no longer exists.</p><p>What the GDA would offer that the current system doesn&#8217;t is a failure mode that&#8217;s visible, specific, and owned &#8212; the kind that can actually be fixed.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Feedback Loop, Closed</h2><p>For as long as the government has existed, citizens experiencing government failure have had the same options: accept it, write a letter, or know someone powerful enough to make it matter.</p><p>Here is what the current system produces in practice. Responsibility for implementation is undefined, so when something fails, there is no clear owner. Decisions get quietly delegated to agency staff with no public record of who decided what, and when failures surface, the response is fingerpointing &#8212; which works precisely because nobody&#8217;s responsibility was ever formally established. The people experiencing the failure have no mechanism to force a response, and because nobody is required to investigate, nobody does. The failure gets absorbed and the system moves on unchanged.</p><p>The GDA would change each of those things. Citizen failure reports would create a formal record. The GDA would be constitutionally required to investigate and respond within defined timeframes, making inaction a legal failure rather than a political choice. Recommendations would be public, so if an agency ignored one, that fact would be documented. The owner of each failure would be identifiable, and the record of whether the failure was addressed would be auditable by anyone at any time &#8212; not bundled into an election result, not dependent on a journalist picking up the story, not contingent on knowing the right person.</p><p>That feedback loop between government and the people it serves has never existed. The GDA would be where it begins, and where policy goes when it stops working.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Designing American Democracy for the 21st century</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Well Compensated Pawns]]></title><description><![CDATA[Let's talk about Congressional corruption]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/well-compensated-pawns</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/well-compensated-pawns</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 23:02:10 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png" width="1456" height="819" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:819,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1591122,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/i/197279048?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!ICXM!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4c3474fd-3fe1-4f02-a383-0f4b2513e419_1672x941.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>The idea that lawmakers are bought is pervasive. It&#8217;s a nice picture... lunch at a fancy restaurant, white table cloths, linen napkins, a legislator and a lobbyist discussing some upcoming legislation that will affect a client. Allusions and inferences bouncing back and forth, never explicit, the suggestion of a donation implying which way the client would like the lawmaker to vote.</p><p>I&#8217;m not saying vote buying doesn&#8217;t happen, in fact I&#8217;m quite certain it does, but not in that manner.</p><h2>Buying Votes</h2><p>Let&#8217;s explore how vote buying works.</p><p>Imagine for a moment that your employer stops by your desk. After some chitchat they mention there&#8217;s a ballot initiative in the upcoming election that won&#8217;t be good for the company. They pull an envelope out of a stack, strongly suggest you vote against it, and then they move on.</p><p>You just got handed some cash to go vote a certain way. But that&#8217;s not vote buying. On election day you are still free to choose whether to vote for or against the initiative. And you already got the cash.</p><p>But it&#8217;s not very smart on the employer&#8217;s part, they&#8217;re handing out cash (i.e. making an &#8216;investment&#8217;) and there&#8217;s no way to make sure of a return on that investment.</p><p>Let&#8217;s change the calculus: this time when your employer stops by, there is no stack of envelopes. In this scenario you have to prove you voted against the ballot initiative. Much smarter. Now the employer only has to pay for compliance.</p><p>But there&#8217;s a problem. What counts as proof? A picture or video of the voting machine? Not in today&#8217;s world. Anyone could use AI to have it show whatever they want. You could vote for the initiative, snap a pic, run it through AI, voila, it shows you voted against the initiative. Your employer is probably too smart to accept that.</p><p>This is why we as constituents have private ballots, aka &#8220;Australian&#8221; ballots. They were introduced in the late 1800&#8217;s to combat these exact types of situations. Private ballots are the reason this doesn&#8217;t happen. A rational person isn&#8217;t going to throw money at someone just in the hopes they vote a certain way if they can&#8217;t verify they did.</p><p>Back to Congress. In the early 1970&#8217;s Congress changed their voting procedures. Before that most legislative votes weren&#8217;t recorded, and this created a problem for constituents. When some lousy legislation gets passed, how are you supposed to know if your members voted for or against it? The solution is straightforward: record the votes and publish them.</p><p>Based on what we already talked about, you should already be seeing the problem... These recorded votes are what enable the situation I described at the beginning. The lobbyist waits for lawmakers to vote on the bill, pulls the voting record, verifies the lawmaker voted &#8220;correctly&#8221; and initiates the donation. That one seemingly minor rules change is what made the corruption, dysfunction, and gridlock we witness possible.</p><p>For the lawmaker, their choice boils down to: vote for constituents (and receive nothing extra), or vote for the lobbyist&#8217;s client (and get a payday). This is how most people envision the corruption in D.C. -- very quid pro quo. And why citizens view politicians as immoral, unethical, bought, etc. -- because they are putting special interests over constituents.</p><p>Vote buying isn&#8217;t the only way voting records can be used.</p><h2>A More Cost Effective Approach</h2><p>Back at your desk, imagine your employer tells you that you need to vote against the ballot initiative or you lose you job. This is coercion, compelling someone to act against their own will through threats. In today&#8217;s world, you would effectively lose your job, because, as we discussed above, you can&#8217;t prove you voted against the initiative.</p><p>It&#8217;s a different story for lawmakers, their vote is public record. Everybody can access it. Not just voters. Think tanks. Lobbyists. And their bosses: party leadership. Your boss can&#8217;t punish you for your vote, but party leadership can punish legislators. That&#8217;s another thing the 1970&#8217;s reforms added. More powerful tools for members who dissent from the majority view of the party. If you don&#8217;t toe the party line, you will be punished.</p><p>The punishments can vary widely, from loss of access or appointments, committee positions, to blocking their legislation from the floor, or, in what has become more and more common, funding a primary challenger. If a legislator loses support of the party come election time and goes up against a party backed candidate, it&#8217;s nearly impossible to get re-elected. In other words, they&#8217;re out of office.</p><p>Breaking from the party means they can&#8217;t do anything for constituents, AND they&#8217;re out of a job. What is accomplished by voting against the party? On the votes that matter, healthcare, immigration, checking executive power, votes are reliably along party lines. Not because all the members of the party agree, but because the cost of dissent on those votes is highest, precisely when the stakes are the highest.</p><p>Lawmakers are pawns in the system. And just like pawns in a chess match, they are the cannon fodder. Watch. You&#8217;ll see it. Here&#8217;s the easiest one: if you see a member get labeled &#8220;RINO&#8221; they&#8217;re not long for the political world.</p><h2>Combat Pay</h2><p>It&#8217;s no secret that lawmakers accumulate personal fortunes while in office. Most people assume it&#8217;s lobbying. That&#8217;s the obvious read. But we could ban lobbying entirely tomorrow and the wealth accumulation would continue.</p><p>Members of Congress have access to privileged information before the public does &#8212; information that moves markets. In 2012, Congress passed the STOCK Act 96-3 to address exactly this. Obama signed it in a public ceremony. One year later, on a Friday afternoon before a congressional recess, both chambers quietly gutted it. No debate. No recorded vote. Empty room. The fine for failing to disclose a trade today is $200. No member has ever been prosecuted.</p><p>That was 2013. Here&#8217;s what&#8217;s happened since:</p><p>The TRUST in Congress Act &#8212; Chip Roy and Abigail Spanberger, bipartisan, 70+ co-sponsors, reintroduced every session since 2020. Never gets a committee hearing.</p><p>The HONEST Act &#8212; passed the Senate Homeland Security Committee 8-7 in July 2025. Senate Majority Leader Thune has not allowed it to reach the floor.</p><p>The Stop Insider Trading Act &#8212; co-sponsored by Speaker Mike Johnson himself. Passed committee in January 2026. Still awaiting a floor vote.</p><p>The pattern is the same every time. Bills get introduced for good press. A handful pass committee so members can tell constituents they &#8220;support&#8221; reform. Then leadership &#8212; in both parties &#8212; refuses to schedule the floor vote. In the House, the Majority Leader controls what reaches the floor. In the Senate, the Majority Leader does the same. No floor vote means no recorded vote. No recorded vote means no accountability. The bill dies quietly while everyone claims to support it.</p><p>The one bill that did pass? The Prediction Market Act &#8212; which bans betting on prediction markets. It doesn&#8217;t touch stock trading. Senator Hawley called it a distraction bill designed to make Congress look busy while leaving their portfolios untouched.</p><p>At the 2026 State of the Union, Trump called on Congress to pass the Stop Insider Trading Act. Both sides stood and cheered. The bill still hasn&#8217;t reached a floor vote.</p><p>Trump supports it. Seventy bipartisan co-sponsors support it. The public overwhelmingly supports it. It goes nowhere. Because the floor vote is a recorded vote &#8212; and a recorded vote is exactly what leadership controls.</p><p>The retention bonus survives. Every time.</p><p>The Statecraft Blueprint has developed fixes for both the recorded votes and the floor scheduling, so the legislation our country needs, won&#8217;t end up in a &#8216;dark corner.&#8217;</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Start seeing the system for what it is</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Toll Booth]]></title><description><![CDATA[Congress is not failing to follow the rules. It is obeying the road.]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-toll-booth</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-toll-booth</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 17:26:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png" width="1456" height="819" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:819,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2899611,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/i/196918776?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Vli8!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1bc43b1b-d9ed-46ac-853a-0ba6eef482bc_1672x941.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Most people view rules as constraints. Cross this line, hop this fence, and you will face a consequence. That&#8217;s the mental model most of us carry around without ever examining it.</p><p>That&#8217;s not how I see the world. Let me take you on a road trip.</p><div><hr></div><p>I live in Utah &#8212; high desert, semi-arid steppe. Mountains with trees, but a lot of it is wide, flat terrain where you can see for miles without obstruction. Outside of metropolitan areas, Interstate speed limits run at 80 mph. Don&#8217;t drive in the left lane at that speed, though. You&#8217;re going to get passed.</p><p>There&#8217;s a reason for that, and we&#8217;ll get to it.</p><p>A few years ago I traveled to Switzerland. Dramatically different. There are very few wide, flat places in the Swiss Alps. The mountains are steep, the valleys narrow. Roads wind back and forth, up and down, and sometimes directly through the mountains. You have to be on your toes while driving there. I actually found the posted speed limits to be artificially high.</p><p>The physical differences are stark. Utah: long straight highways, wide shoulders, obstructions set far back from the road. Switzerland: narrow or nonexistent shoulders, trees and rocks and buildings right against the road.</p><p>These feel different when you&#8217;re driving. In Utah, you can spot something in the distance and it seems to take forever to reach it. In Switzerland, you have no idea what&#8217;s waiting over the next hill or around the next bend &#8212; and because obstructions crowd the road&#8217;s edge, you can <em>feel</em> your speed in a way Utah never demands.</p><p>That uncertainty changes how you drive. You slow down &#8212; not because a sign told you to, but because the environment demands it. Driving back to Geneva I passed through Chamonix, France, came around a blind bend, and found a car that had struck a rock face and careened sideways into the road. It was still sliding when I came around the corner.</p><p>Nobody posted a sign for that. The road taught me.</p><div><hr></div><p>Here&#8217;s what this road trip illustrates &#8212; and it requires a subtle distinction most people miss.</p><p>When someone in Utah drives 84 mph, a lot of people would say: that&#8217;s a law-breaker. And technically, they&#8217;re right. But here&#8217;s the more interesting question: how fast would they be driving without the speed limit sign? Probably faster. The sign <em>shaped</em> their behavior. They weighed the risk of a ticket against the open road ahead and settled at 84.</p><p>That&#8217;s not a constraint. That&#8217;s a calculation.</p><p>A true constraint would be a speed limiter &#8212; a device built into the car that <em>prevents</em> exceeding a set speed. The car physically cannot go faster. The behavior isn&#8217;t shaped. It&#8217;s blocked.</p><p>The speed limit sign doesn&#8217;t block anything. It changes the environment just enough to alter the calculus. The driver still chooses. The rule just changed what the choice costs.</p><p>This distinction &#8212; between rules that <em>shape</em> behavior and mechanisms that <em>constrain</em> it &#8212; is the foundation of everything at The Statecraft Blueprint.</p><p>In Utah, the rule is fighting the environment. The road says <em>go fast</em> &#8212; wide lanes, flat terrain, long sight lines, everything your instincts tell you is safe. The sign says <em>slow down</em>. They&#8217;re in conflict. So the rule has to be enforced externally. Hence the Highway Patrol. You&#8217;re not slowing down because the environment shaped your behavior. You&#8217;re slowing down because you&#8217;re calculating the risk of a ticket.</p><p>In Switzerland, such conflicts are fewer. The road and the rule are the same thing. The environment already communicates what safe behavior looks like. The speed limit sign isn&#8217;t fighting anything &#8212; it&#8217;s just confirming what the road already told you.</p><p>This is how I see every rule. Is it a posted sign fighting the environment? Or is it a description of an environment someone deliberately designed? One requires enforcement. The other just works.</p><p>Sometimes the rule is a sign. Sometimes it is a guardrail. Sometimes it is a toll booth placed directly in front of the road everyone claims to want people to take.</p><p>The question I always ask &#8212; whether I&#8217;m looking at a speed limit, a piece of legislation, or a Congressional procedure &#8212; is: <em>which one is this?</em> First: what is the desired behavior? Second: what behavior does this actually produce?</p><div><hr></div><p>Road trip over. We&#8217;ve arrived at the destination.</p><p>This is why a former software engineer keeps going on and on about obscure, archaic procedural rules in Congress.</p><p>I know. What. A. Weirdo.</p><p><em>&#8220;I guess some of the ideas are &#8216;interesting,&#8217; but aren&#8217;t there bigger problems facing our society?&#8221;</em></p><p>I tried to address this with my last essay, <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/every-other-reform-will-fail">Every Other Reform Will Fail</a>. I laid out exactly how Congressional rules punish lawmakers for voting against their party. After publishing, a thoughtful reader left this comment:</p><blockquote><p>&#8220;I would add that somewhere along the way the incentive system stopped rewarding compromise in order to get things done and move the country forward.&#8221;</p></blockquote><p>He even used the word <em>incentive</em>. And that showed me where I had failed: he still saw the rules and the incentive system as separate things.</p><p>The rules I was describing <em>are</em> the incentive system. That&#8217;s what I hadn&#8217;t yet figured out how to communicate.</p><p>So I started thinking about what I was missing. I&#8217;m neurodivergent. My brain processes the world differently &#8212; I see rules as messages, not fences. Someone put this here. Someone wanted a behavior. My first question is always: what is the desired behavior? My second question: what behavior does this actually produce?</p><p>Most people are taught to stop earlier. The rule says don&#8217;t cross the line. So the question becomes whether to obey or disobey.</p><p>But governance doesn&#8217;t fail because people disobey rules. It fails because rules often produce the exact behavior they were supposed to prevent.</p><div><hr></div><p>Let&#8217;s apply this to Congress.</p><p>Congress&#8217;s job, by its very nature, requires compromise. You have 535 members representing wildly different constituents, different regions, different priorities. Legislation that actually serves the country means those members have to negotiate, give ground, find common cause. That&#8217;s not a bug. That&#8217;s the design.</p><p>Before the 1970s, when a bill passed, constituents had no reliable way of knowing how their specific legislator had voted. They had to take the member&#8217;s word for it.</p><p>The problem with that is obvious: democratic accountability requires voters to know what their representatives are doing.</p><p>The fix seemed equally obvious: record the votes and make them public. <em>Sunshine as a disinfectant</em>, they said &#8212; hence the Sunshine Acts. Now when bad legislation passes, voters can see exactly who supported it.</p><p>Reasonable. Sensible. Necessary, even.</p><p>None of this means the transparency reforms were stupid or malicious. They solved a real accountability problem. But they also changed the operating environment in ways the reformers did not fully account for.</p><p>Daniel Schuman from <a href="https://firstbranchforecast.substack.com/">The First Branch Forecast</a> helped me understand the missing layer: transparency didn&#8217;t only empower voters. Combined with the 1970s committee reforms, it also empowered parties.</p><blockquote><p><em>The 1970s committee reforms made committee chairmen more accountable to committee members and more crucially to the party, which gained new powers to appoint and remove them. Transparency created political consequences for committee chairs who said they supported one action but took another. It also brought increased disciplinary tools for party members who dissented from the majority view of the party.</em></p></blockquote><p>In other words, the reforms didn&#8217;t merely let voters see more. They also let parties punish more.</p><p>A vote is no longer just a vote. It becomes a record. The record becomes a weapon. The weapon becomes discipline.</p><p>Now return to the road.</p><p>The reforms succeeded in one regard: they built a road to constituent service and democratic accountability &#8212; voters finally able to see what their members were doing, finally able to hold them accountable. But the disciplinary tools added a toll booth manned by party leadership. And the price of the toll? Your political career.</p><p>Most members look at that booth and turn around. Not because they don&#8217;t want to serve their constituents. Because the price is too high.</p><p>This is why election reform, term limits, etc. are dead on arrival. No matter who shows up, if the only road to serving constituents runs through that toll booth, their career is over the moment they try to use it.</p><div><hr></div><p>This is why members of Congress don&#8217;t compromise.</p><p>This is why votes fall along party lines.</p><p>This is why anyone who steps out of line gets demoted, marginalized, and all too often, removed.</p><p>Not corruption. Not cowardice. Not moral failure.</p><p>Rational human beings responding to the environment they&#8217;re in. If you put a statesman in a system that punishes compromise, you get a politician who stops compromising. It&#8217;s not a character flaw. It&#8217;s physics.</p><p>No mystery. No villains required.</p><div><hr></div><p>So what do we do about it?</p><p>We have a fifty-year-old road that almost nobody has used, because the cost of using it has always been too high. The solution is not to send different people to stand at the toll booth and make the same calculation their predecessors did. TSB&#8217;s solution is simpler: remove the toll booth.</p><p>The transparency reforms solved one problem &#8212; voters couldn&#8217;t see what their legislators were doing &#8212; while creating another: the moment a vote is cast, it becomes a disciplinary weapon available to party leadership in real time. That&#8217;s the toll booth. That&#8217;s what turned a risk calculation into a wall.</p><p><a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/this-is-what-were-building">The Statecraft Blueprint&#8217;s proposal</a> doesn&#8217;t eliminate transparency. It restructures <em>when</em> transparency happens.</p><p>Votes are still recorded. Members are still fully accountable for every vote they cast. But individual vote attribution isn&#8217;t made public until just before an election. Think of it as a legislative report card delivered when voters are actually preparing to grade their representative &#8212; the full record available before the election, when accountability matters most, but not available in real time as a weapon during the governing process itself.</p><p>The road is still monitored. Consequences still exist. But now it&#8217;s a risk calculation &#8212; not a toll booth. Some members will take the road. Some won&#8217;t. But for the first time in fifty years, the option exists.</p><p>And it restores something even more fundamental than compromise.</p><p>Congress&#8217;s constitutional role is to check executive power. That function has effectively been disabled &#8212; not by bad people, but by the road. Whatever one thinks of Liz Cheney, the mechanism matters: she deviated publicly, and the system punished the deviation. Any member who breaks with the party to check a president from their own side faces immediate, public, career-ending consequences.</p><p>How might the impeachment votes have gone if members had the option of voting their conscience without instant retaliation? How might the votes on war powers and the Iran conflict have gone?</p><p>We don&#8217;t know. Because right now, that option doesn&#8217;t exist.</p><p>Delayed attribution doesn&#8217;t guarantee members will use that space. But it gives them the option. And sometimes, having the option is the difference between a functioning constitutional republic and the performance we&#8217;ve been watching.</p><div><hr></div><p>That is why this is not a civility problem. It is not a messaging problem. It is not a &#8220;send better people&#8221; problem.</p><p>It is a road-design problem.</p><p>And if the road is producing the wrong behavior, the answer is not another sign.</p><p>The answer is to remove the toll booth.</p><p>Every other reform eventually enters the same institution. And every one of them requires members to pay the toll to pass. One member paying the toll isn&#8217;t reform &#8212; they&#8217;re just gone, replaced by someone who won&#8217;t make that mistake. You&#8217;d need an overwhelming number paying simultaneously, enough that the party discipline apparatus can&#8217;t pick them off one by one. How many is that? Nobody knows. But it isn&#8217;t nominal.</p><p>Why would any individual member vote for reform when they could play it safe and let someone else go first? The tallest blade of grass gets cut. Everyone knows it. So everyone waits. And nobody moves.</p><p>Five hundred and thirty-five members &#8212; different parties, different districts, different values, different self-interests &#8212; coordinating a simultaneous act of collective career risk. Not impossible. But vanishingly unlikely.</p><p>Until we remove the toll booth, every reform faces the same problem: an overwhelming collective action problem, layered on top of a game theory problem, layered on top of a coordination problem that 535 people with different values and interests have never once solved voluntarily.</p><p>That is what The Statecraft Blueprint exists to change.</p><p>&#128260; &#128260; &#128260; &#128260; &#128260; &#128260; &#128260;</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Help us tear down the toll booth  &#128260;</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div><hr></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Every. Other. Reform. Will. Fail.]]></title><description><![CDATA[I&#8217;m sorry. This is the only one that matters.]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/every-other-reform-will-fail</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/every-other-reform-will-fail</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 22:40:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7EAH!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc61f1b12-5c99-4051-9cd0-19b99d643c44_1672x941.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7EAH!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc61f1b12-5c99-4051-9cd0-19b99d643c44_1672x941.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7EAH!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc61f1b12-5c99-4051-9cd0-19b99d643c44_1672x941.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7EAH!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc61f1b12-5c99-4051-9cd0-19b99d643c44_1672x941.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7EAH!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc61f1b12-5c99-4051-9cd0-19b99d643c44_1672x941.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7EAH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc61f1b12-5c99-4051-9cd0-19b99d643c44_1672x941.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7EAH!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc61f1b12-5c99-4051-9cd0-19b99d643c44_1672x941.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7EAH!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc61f1b12-5c99-4051-9cd0-19b99d643c44_1672x941.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7EAH!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc61f1b12-5c99-4051-9cd0-19b99d643c44_1672x941.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7EAH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fc61f1b12-5c99-4051-9cd0-19b99d643c44_1672x941.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>This morning I was driving my daughter to school, talking about my work &#8212; which, ask anyone who knows me, is pretty much all I talk about. I was explaining how the system of checks and balances we&#8217;re all taught about in school isn&#8217;t actually working. That it&#8217;s broken.</p><p>She didn&#8217;t miss a beat. &#8220;I get told a lot of things at school that aren&#8217;t true.&#8221;</p><p>A flash of pride &#8212; I&#8217;ve raised a critical thinker. Then she moved on to the problems that actually worry her. Climate change. Racism. Sexism. Unaffordable housing. Healthcare that costs more than people can pay. Food that keeps getting more expensive. Real problems. Urgent problems. The problems her generation is inheriting.</p><p>&#8220;I don&#8217;t understand why you&#8217;re concerned about that problem,&#8221; she said. &#8220;Those other things are the problem.&#8221;</p><p>I&#8217;ve been thinking about that conversation all day. Not because she&#8217;s wrong about the problems. But because she&#8217;s wrong about what&#8217;s underneath them.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Government Is the Operating System</h2><p>Let me ask you something.</p><p>What do the following have in common?</p><p>The road you drove to work on this morning. The reason the food at your grocery store won&#8217;t kill you. The reason your neighbor can&#8217;t build a factory next to your house. The contract that makes your mortgage legally binding. The firefighters who show up when your house is burning. The reason the pilot of your flight had to prove they could fly before they were allowed to carry 200 people through the sky.</p><p>One thing: <em>government</em>.</p><p>Not government as ideology. Not government as a political team you root for or against. Government as infrastructure. As the operating system that society runs on.</p><p>Every problem my daughter named requires that operating system to solve. Not because government is perfect. Not because it&#8217;s efficient or trustworthy or free from corruption. But because it is the only institution on earth with the scale, the authority, and the democratic mandate to address problems that affect everyone.</p><p>Markets can&#8217;t do it. Markets are accountable to capital, <strong>not citizens</strong>. They solve problems that are profitable to solve and ignore the rest. Affordable housing might be profitable, but more expensive housing is more profitable, and renting is even more profitable still. A health insurance market is designed to make healthcare profitable. Whether we want healthcare to be profitable is a policy question. But left to their own incentives, <em>markets optimize for profit</em>. When that aligns with people's needs, markets work beautifully. When it doesn't, profit wins. Every time.</p><p>Private organizations can&#8217;t do it. They <strong>lack the authority</strong> and the reach.</p><p>Individuals can&#8217;t do it. No matter how heroic, <strong>no individual has the mandate to act on behalf of 330 million people</strong>.</p><p><em><strong>Only government has that mandate. That&#8217;s what government is for.</strong></em></p><div><hr></div><h2>The Reagan Problem</h2><p>I can already hear the objection.</p><p>&#8220;Government IS the problem.&#8221;</p><p>Ronald Reagan said it in 1981 and a generation of Americans absorbed it as if it were a law of physics. Government bad. Markets good. Get out of the way and let people be free.</p><p>It&#8217;s a seductive idea. And it&#8217;s not entirely wrong &#8212; government can be inefficient, captured, corrupt, and counterproductive. Reagan wasn&#8217;t wrong about the dysfunction.</p><p>He was wrong about the alternative.</p><p>Because there is no alternative at scale. The question was never government or no government. Every functioning society has government. The question has always been: what kind of government? And: accountable to whom?</p><p>When Reagan said government is the problem, he never answered those questions. He gestured at markets and called it freedom. But markets are not democracies. Markets do not represent you. Markets represent whoever has the most capital.</p><p>This isn&#8217;t an argument for bigger government. Even a small government conservative wants a bridge that doesn&#8217;t collapse and a court system that enforces contracts. When the operating system is broken, it doesn&#8217;t matter whether you wanted the lite version or the pro version. It is useless to everyone.</p><p>The dysfunction Reagan identified was real. The system he pointed to as the solution has the same problem, just less visibly.</p><p>If you want the problems my daughter named to get solved &#8212; if you want any large-scale societal problem solved &#8212; you need a <em><strong>functional government</strong></em>. There is no other institution capable of doing it.</p><p>So the question becomes: do we have one?</p><div><hr></div><h2>On Paper, the System Works</h2><p>The foundational idea of American government &#8212; the one we all learned in school, the one that supposedly sets the United States apart &#8212; is checks and balances.</p><p>No single branch gets total control. Congress makes the laws. The president executes them. The courts interpret them. Each branch checks the others. Power is distributed. Accountability is built in.</p><p>And if you look at the Constitution, it&#8217;s all there. The mechanisms exist. On paper, the system works.</p><p>The problem is that paper mechanisms only function if the people operating them can actually use them &#8212; without being destroyed for doing so.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What Happens When Someone Tries</h2><p>Consider Liz Cheney.</p><p>In January 2021, she voted to impeach Donald Trump following the attack on the Capitol. She believed it was her constitutional duty. She voted her conscience, upheld her oath, and represented what she genuinely believed her role required.</p><p>The paper mechanisms worked exactly as designed. A member of Congress exercised independent judgment to check executive conduct. That is precisely what the founders intended.</p><p>What happened next is what they didn&#8217;t intend.</p><p>She was removed from her leadership position. Party resources backed her primary challenger. She lost her seat by a landslide.</p><p>Now ask yourself: who faced consequences for that?</p><p>Not the party. In conservative circles, Liz Cheney is the villain. The traitor. The one who broke ranks. The Republican Party &#8212; the apparatus that orchestrated her removal, withdrew its support, and signaled to the entire conference that dissent would be punished &#8212; faced almost none of the heat. It stayed offstage. The mechanism stayed intact.</p><p>That is not an accident. That is how the system protects itself. The member absorbs the consequences. The party absorbs none.</p><p>Just to be clear: this is not a Republican problem. Cheney is the clearest recent example because the punishment was visible, fast, and unmistakable. But Democratic members face their own version of the same machinery &#8212; committee pressure, donor pressure, leadership pressure, activist pressure, and primary threats. Senator John Fetterman has faced his own version from the other side of the aisle &#8212; breaking with Democratic leadership on several issues brought donor backlash, media attacks from within his own coalition, and calls to primary him. The names change. The architecture does not.</p><p>And that is why members of both parties put the party first. The calculus is not complicated. It is completely one-sided.</p><p>Break with the party: <strong>you absorb everything.</strong> The primary challenge, the funding withdrawal, the public backlash, the career consequences. All of it lands on you personally. The party walks away clean.</p><p>Stay with the party: <strong>the party protects you.</strong> Funds you. Promotes you. Gives you committee assignments, access, influence, and the machinery of reelection.</p><p>There is no scenario where the party pays a price for disciplining you. And there is no scenario where you escape the cost of defying them.</p><p>That is not a choice between conscience and expedience. That is a system that has systematically eliminated conscience as a viable option.</p><p>Liz Cheney answered yes when she asked herself whether she was willing to end her career for this. Most members, faced with that question every single day on every single vote, make the rational choice. They choose survival.</p><p>We direct our anger at those members. At the cowardice, the cynicism, the careerism. But the party &#8212; the entity that designed and operates the punishment mechanism &#8212; stays out of frame.</p><p>We are angry at the people the system produces. We never look at the system producing them.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Here&#8217;s the System</h2><p>In 1970, Congress passed the Legislative Reorganization Act. The intent was genuinely democratic. Powerful committee chairs were making deals behind closed doors. Citizens couldn&#8217;t see how their representatives were actually voting. Organized interests &#8212; lobbyists, party leaders, wealthy donors &#8212; were always in the room, whispering in ears, shaping outcomes before any public vote was cast.</p><p>The fix seemed obvious: make it public. Record the votes. Sunlight as disinfectant. Transparency as accountability.</p><p>The reformers knew that organized interests would be watching. That was part of the point &#8212; drag the backroom dealing into the light where everyone could see it.</p><p>What they didn&#8217;t foresee was how catastrophically the timing would play out.</p><p>Before the reforms of the early 1970s, many congressional decisions were harder for outside actors to monitor in real time. Recorded votes existed, but they were more cumbersome, less comprehensive, and less immediately usable as political data. The reforms changed the operating environment. Congressional behavior became easier to track, score, and punish on a scale that hadn&#8217;t been possible before.</p><p>The problem wasn&#8217;t that the public could see. It&#8217;s that the public doesn&#8217;t watch every committee vote &#8212; but lobbyists do. The transparency meant to empower the citizen in the armchair handed a systematized weapon to the special interest with the spreadsheet.</p><p>And even if citizens watched every single vote &#8212; which they don't and can't &#8212; they would still have no recourse until the next election. Two to six years away. The special interest with the spreadsheet acts tomorrow. </p><p>Not because anyone planned it that way. Because that&#8217;s what the incentive structure produced, automatically, once the mechanism was in place.</p><p>What the reforms created &#8212; without intending to &#8212; was the infrastructure of party discipline that Liz Cheney ran into fifty years later. The machine that destroyed her career wasn&#8217;t built to destroy her specifically. It was built to make every member of Congress legible to organized power on every vote, every day. Parties, donors, lobbyists, advocacy groups, and primary challengers could now monitor legislative behavior with far greater precision. She just happened to be the one who refused to comply.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Question Nobody Asked</h2><p>The reforms made members of Congress more accountable to their parties. That part was intentional. It was even celebrated &#8212; finally, a way to hold legislators to account, to create consequences for backroom dealing, to connect votes to outcomes.</p><p>But nobody asked the next question: who are the parties accountable to?</p><p>The official answer &#8212; the civics class answer, the answer the political establishment still argues &#8212; is that parties are accountable to voters. Parties aggregate citizen preferences, compete for votes, and the winning party governs. Accountability flows from citizens through parties to government. That&#8217;s the theory.</p><p>Here&#8217;s the problem with the theory.</p><p>Parties respond to many voices &#8212; activists push platforms, media ecosystems shape narratives, primary electorates can unseat incumbents. Those forces are real. But they all operate within a binding constraint: <em>money</em>. Parties need it to survive. To recruit candidates, run campaigns, build infrastructure, fund the machinery of modern politics. And the people with the most money to give are not ordinary citizens. They are corporations, wealthy individuals, and organized interests.</p><p>When activist pressure conflicts with donor interest, donor interest tends to win. Activists shape the platform. Donors set the floor. And ordinary constituents &#8212; the people the whole system is supposed to serve &#8212; enter the process after the menu has already been decided.</p><p>This is not a conspiracy. Nobody needs to issue orders. Nobody needs to make phone calls with explicit instructions. The influence is structural and implicit. A party that consistently disappoints its major donors finds its funding dries up &#8212; not because of any single decision, but because money flows naturally toward parties and candidates that advance donor-friendly positions. No bribery required. No explicit quid pro quo. Just the predictable behavior of capital seeking favorable conditions.</p><p>We have watched enormous sums flow into both parties for decades. It has happened right in front of us. We just never connected the dots.</p><p>The reforms of the 1970s didn&#8217;t just strengthen parties. They created a direct line from concentrated wealth to legislative outcomes &#8212; without anyone having to bribe a single member directly. The party became the intermediary. Clean, efficient, and nearly invisible.</p><p>So the actual accountability chain looks like this:</p><p>Members are accountable to parties. Parties are accountable to the coalitions that keep them alive &#8212; donors above all, but also activists, media ecosystems, and primary electorates. Ordinary citizens enter the process late, after the menu has already been shaped.</p><p>That is not democracy. That is a system that wears democracy&#8217;s clothes.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Compounding Problem</h2><p>This would be serious enough on its own. But there is a second force making it worse.</p><p>Our voting system &#8212; single-member districts, plurality elections, winner-take-all outcomes &#8212; strongly pressures politics toward two dominant parties. This is not just a cultural habit. It is a structural tendency of the rules themselves. Third parties cannot gain a foothold. Voters who might prefer a different option vote strategically for the lesser of two evils &#8212; because in a winner-take-all system, a vote for a third party isn&#8217;t really a choice. It&#8217;s a math problem with a bad answer.</p><p>The result: 330 million people with genuinely diverse values, priorities, and beliefs are forced into a binary choice.</p><p>You are not really voting for what you want. You are voting against what you don&#8217;t want.</p><p>Even the wealthy are caught in this trap. They didn&#8217;t design the binary any more than the rest of us did. They simply navigate it &#8212; funding whichever party is least threatening to their interests, sometimes both simultaneously as insurance. The system shapes their behavior too. Nobody is outside it.</p><p>And when only two parties exist, and both are accountable primarily to donors rather than constituents, the diversity of a nation disappears into a forced choice that represents almost no one fully.</p><p>This is what gridlock looks like from the inside. Not two parties fighting to solve problems. <strong>Two parties fighting for dominance &#8212; because in a binary system, dominance is the only prize that matters.</strong> When one party controls Congress, the presidency, and the judiciary, the primary check on executive power &#8212; the one the framers designed Congress to provide &#8212; renders itself meaningless. Because <em>party loyalty trumps all.</em></p><p>We were not supposed to end up here.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Why Every Other Reform Will Fail</h2><p>You have a favorite reform.</p><p>Campaign finance. Term limits. Ranked choice voting. Insider trading bans. Ethics enforcement. Anti-corruption legislation. Transparency requirements.</p><p>These are not bad ideas. Some of them are genuinely good ideas. This is not an argument against any of them.</p><p>This is an argument that none of them will fix the actual problem.</p><p>The actual problem is that the system incentivizes party loyalty above institutional duty &#8212; and that reduces checks and balances from safeguards to speed bumps. The mechanisms still exist on paper. But when the same partisan incentives dominate every branch, the guardrails stop acting like guardrails.</p><p>Campaign finance reform passes. Members still face the same party loyalty calculus on every vote. </p><p>Term limits pass. Fresh faces arrive and within weeks learn the same calculus every member before them learned. </p><p>Ranked choice voting passes. Voters may get better choices at the ballot box &#8212; but unless it changes the incentives members face once in office, party discipline reasserts itself. </p><p>A fully enforced insider trading ban passes &#8212; one with real teeth, real penalties, real prosecution. The next morning every member still faces the same choice: vote with the party or end your career.</p><p>Think for a moment, about what that means.</p><p>When party discipline is total &#8212; when every member faces the same calculus, the same consequences, the same survival logic &#8212; the individual characteristics of the member stop mattering. It doesn't matter if they're brilliant or mediocre, principled or cynical, a thirty-year veteran or a first-term freshman. The machine processes them all the same way. You are not sending a representative to Washington. <strong>You are sending a placeholder for a party position.</strong> The seat matters. The person in it, less than we'd like to think.</p><p><strong>None</strong> of those reforms touch the incentive structure. They are constraints on the edges. The core remains intact.</p><p>Even if a reform miraculously makes it to the floor and miraculously passes the vote, it&#8217;s still not going to fix the thing that matters.</p><p>We know this because we have watched it happen. Congress passed landmark legislation to prevent members from trading on insider information. Both parties. Celebrated. The political pressure was real and Congress responded to it.</p><p>A year later, Congress quietly narrowed the law&#8217;s disclosure requirements. Enforcement remained weak. The penalties for violations remain nominal. Criminal enforcement has been vanishingly rare.</p><p>But here is the part that gets missed: even a fully enforced version of that law would not have changed a single party-line vote. It is a constraint on personal enrichment. It has nothing to do with <strong>the calculus that destroyed Liz Cheney&#8217;s career</strong>. Nothing to do with the incentive structure that makes <strong>gridlock the system&#8217;s default output</strong>. Nothing to do with <strong>the gap between what citizens want, nay need, and what Congress produces</strong>.</p><p>The machine absorbed the reform. Incorporated it as a minor constraint. And kept running.</p><p>This is what the system does. Public pressure builds. Congress passes something. The pressure dissipates. The machine restores its preferred state. For decades.</p><p>Could the parties decide to fix this themselves? In theory. But they have shown no inclination to do so. Quite the opposite. The incentive structure rewards them for not trying.</p><p>There is no other reform on this list that opens the door to<strong> checking executive power.</strong> There is no other reform that creates the conditions for the kind of compromise that<strong> ends gridlock and prevents government shutdowns.</strong> There is no other reform that gives members the genuine option to <strong>represent their constituents over their party.</strong></p><p><a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/this-is-what-were-building">The only fix that matters is the one that changes the incentive structure itself. That gives members the deliberative space to check executive power, to compromise, to pass legislation that can actually solve the problems our country faces &#8212; without surrendering their career as the price.</a></p><p>That is not one reform among many. That is the precondition for any other reform to mean anything.</p><p>That is what The Statecraft Blueprint is here for.</p><p>To restore the system of government the framers designed. To restore the checks and balances that are supposed to set America apart.</p><p>And maybe the next time my daughter is told how her government works &#8212; it might actually be true.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">The Statecraft Blueprint publishes structural analysis of American governance &#8212; diagnosing what is broken and designing what should replace it.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div><hr></div><p><em>Updated Thu May 7 2026, added &#8216;party discipline is total&#8217;</em></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Machine Runs on Failure]]></title><description><![CDATA[Solved Problems Don&#8217;t Fundraise]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-machine-runs-on-failure</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-machine-runs-on-failure</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 18:09:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png" width="1456" height="813" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cINC!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5c58d38-63b3-411c-9190-f3ee60fe736a_2752x1536.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>In 2024, Senator James Lankford of Oklahoma spent four months in closed-door negotiations on a bipartisan border security bill. Lankford was no liberal border dove &#8212; he was a conservative Republican who had long supported stricter border measures. He emerged with a deal that included major provisions Republicans had demanded for years: tougher asylum rules, more border agents, faster deportation proceedings. Before the bill text was even public, his own state party had condemned him for negotiating. Donald Trump, then the presumptive Republican nominee, urged Republicans not to give President Biden a border deal in an election year. The bill was politically dead before the Senate ever had a real debate over it. Lankford had done exactly what we tell politicians to do. The system made the lesson unmistakable: a solved problem is one less campaign issue.</p><p>In January 2016, Representative David Jolly of Florida introduced a bill called the STOP Act. Jolly was a Republican in a chamber controlled by his own party, with Paul Ryan as Speaker. His bill was simple: members of Congress should not be allowed to personally solicit campaign contributions. He&#8217;d seen why firsthand. Shortly after his election in 2014, party leadership had explained that his most important job was to raise $18,000 every day toward his reelection. Not legislate. Not serve constituents. Raise money. He called the party&#8217;s fundraising operation &#8212; the windowless rooms across the street from the Capitol where members sat in cubicles dialing donors &#8212; a &#8220;cult-like boiler room&#8221; and &#8220;a sweatshop.&#8221; His bill attracted a handful of co-sponsors. It never received a committee hearing. Leadership made clear it was not going anywhere. Jolly lost his seat in November 2016. The bill disappeared. The call centers kept running.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">The Statecraft Blueprint is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>In 2012, after years of reporting about members of Congress trading stocks in industries they regulated, public outrage finally produced action. The STOCK Act passed 96 to 3 in the Senate. Both parties. The president signed it in a public ceremony. Most people assumed the problem was solved. That&#8217;s how the cycle works: the outrage produces a vote, the vote produces coverage, the coverage produces the sense that something was done, and everyone moves on. Congress has learned to rely on that cycle. One year later, on a Friday afternoon before a congressional recess, both chambers used unanimous consent &#8212; no recorded vote, no real public debate &#8212; to quietly eliminate much of the searchable, online public-access system that had made the reform meaningful. The president signed the revision in private. No member of Congress has ever been prosecuted for insider trading under the STOCK Act. The fine for failing to disclose a trade is $200. The system had quietly fixed itself. The fix was undoing the reform.</p><p>In January 2021, Representative Liz Cheney of Wyoming voted to impeach President Trump following the January 6th attack on the Capitol. Cheney was the third-ranking Republican in the House &#8212; not a backbencher, not a gadfly. She made the kind of institutional judgment representatives are supposed to be free to make: that her obligation to the constitutional system outweighed her obligation to party discipline. That is the theory of checks and balances everyone learns in school &#8212; representatives are supposed to be capable of saying no, even when their own side demands yes. Four months later, House Republicans voted to remove her from her leadership position. She joined the House select committee investigating January 6th, served as its vice chair, and pursued the investigation. The Republican National Committee censured her. In August 2022, she lost her primary to a Trump-backed challenger by 37 points. Every Republican member of Congress watched what happened to her. The message required no translation.</p><p>Do you see it?</p><div><hr></div><p>Before we name it, let&#8217;s rule out the obvious explanations.</p><p>Corrupt politicians? Lankford wasn&#8217;t corrupt. He was doing exactly what we ask politicians to do &#8212; negotiate, compromise, solve the problem. The system punished him for it.</p><p>The wrong party in charge? The STOCK Act passed 96 to 3. Both parties gutted it on a Friday afternoon when nobody was watching.</p><p>Not enough good people? Cheney was the third-ranking Republican in the House. Jolly was willing to sacrifice his own career to name the problem. Good people keep running into the same wall.</p><p>Voters not paying attention? Voters demanded the STOCK Act. Public outrage produced the vote. Congress passed it &#8212; then dismantled it the moment the cameras turned away. Which tells you something important about who Congress actually answers to.</p><p>Each explanation dissolves. Something else is happening here.</p><div><hr></div><p>Here&#8217;s the pattern.</p><p>The system did not malfunction. It followed its incentives.</p><p>A solved border crisis is one less campaign issue. A working ethics law is one less press release. A fundraising ban threatens the machinery that keeps members in power. A procedural rule meant for deliberation becomes a weapon when the incentives reward obstruction.</p><p>Congress does not merely fail to solve problems. It often benefits from keeping them alive.</p><p style="text-align: center;"><em><strong>Solved problems don&#8217;t fundraise.</strong></em></p><p>Lankford didn&#8217;t fail because he negotiated badly. He failed because a resolved border crisis is a dead campaign issue. A retired base-activation tool. A fundraising email that never gets sent. A 30-second ad that never gets made. The system punished him for succeeding, because his success cost everyone else a weapon.</p><p>Jolly&#8217;s STOP Act didn&#8217;t fail because the idea was bad. It failed because the fundraising machine isn&#8217;t a bug &#8212; it&#8217;s the operating system. Fixing it would dismantle the infrastructure that keeps everyone in power. Nobody with the authority to schedule a committee hearing had any incentive to let that bill breathe.</p><p>The STOCK Act didn&#8217;t get weakened because lawmakers are uniquely corrupt. It got weakened because the reform had done its job &#8212; produced good press, demonstrated responsiveness &#8212; and the quiet Friday afternoon revision was the system returning to equilibrium. No drama required. No fingerprints. The unanimous consent procedure left no record of who made it happen.</p><p>Cheney wasn&#8217;t destroyed because she was wrong. In the current system, institutional duty loses when it collides with coalition discipline. She treated the institution as more important than the coalition. Every member who watched understood the lesson: act accordingly.</p><p>This isn&#8217;t about corrupt politicians. The machine is working. It&#8217;s just not working for us.</p><p>If you want to understand why this happens to every person who walks into that building &#8212; saint or sinner &#8212; <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/same-gravity">Same Gravity</a> lays out the wiring in detail. This essay is about something more specific: why it happens to every reform too.</p><div><hr></div><p>Now here&#8217;s the part that&#8217;s harder to sit with.</p><p>The machine did not only train politicians. It trained the rest of us too.</p><p>It taught us to treat compromise as betrayal. It taught us to treat solved problems as lost leverage. It taught us to expect reform theater instead of reform. It taught us that nothing really changes, so the only rational move is to make sure our side wins the next fight over the same unsolved problems.</p><p>That is not a moral failure. It is what broken systems do. They don&#8217;t just shape the people inside them. They shape the expectations of everyone watching.</p><p>We say we want politicians who compromise. Then the system teaches us to treat compromise as betrayal &#8212; and we absorb the lesson without noticing.</p><p>We say we want representatives who put country over party. Then the system punishes the ones who do, and we watch it happen and move on.</p><p>We say we want accountability. Then Congress guts the STOCK Act on a Friday afternoon, and by Monday the country has found something else to be outraged about.</p><p>We say we want problems solved. Then we keep rewarding the people who make sure certain problems stay available for the next campaign.</p><div><hr></div><p>Before you take that personally &#8212; it isn&#8217;t an accusation. It&#8217;s a structural observation.</p><p>You did not choose this system. You were handed a broken tool and told the problem was you &#8212; that you were not engaged enough, informed enough, or voting hard enough.</p><p>The tool is broken.</p><p>And unlike the weather, tools can be fixed.</p><p>But first we have to stop asking the tool to do something it isn&#8217;t designed to do.</p><div><hr></div><p>Every election cycle, reformers show up with solutions. And every cycle, those solutions run into the same wall.</p><p>Ranked choice voting sends better candidates to Washington. Once they arrive, they face the same fundraising treadmill, the same leadership pressure, the same scorecard industry monitoring every vote. Better candidates. Same machine.</p><p>Term limits replace experienced members with inexperienced ones who are even more dependent on leadership and lobbyists to understand how anything works. Greener hostages.</p><p>Campaign finance reform &#8212; the money finds new pipes. It always does. McCain-Feingold passed in 2002. Citizens United arrived in 2010. The money didn&#8217;t disappear. It moved.</p><p>Ethics laws get $200 fines and no prosecutions. The STOCK Act got gutted on a Friday afternoon. Reform theater: the appearance of accountability without the function.</p><p>These aren&#8217;t bad ideas. Some of them are genuinely good ideas. But every single one accepts one assumption without questioning it:</p><p><em>The fix comes from inside Congress.</em></p><p>That assumption is the wall. Every reform runs into it. Every reform gets absorbed by it. The machine doesn&#8217;t fix itself. It fixes the fix.</p><div><hr></div><p>The missing reform is not another rule written inside the same incentive structure. The missing reform is a rulemaking process outside it.</p><p>Congress has written its own rules, subject to constitutional constraints, since 1789. Almost every reform movement leaves that assumption intact. It&#8217;s so old we barely notice it anymore. But it is a choice &#8212; not a law of nature.</p><p>France made a narrower but important different choice. Its parliament still writes its own procedural rules &#8212; but those rules must survive mandatory review by an independent constitutional body before they can take effect. External check. Not external takeover &#8212; but outside eyes, with real authority, before the rules go live.</p><p>The United States has nothing equivalent. Which means Congress has written its own rules, in its own interest, without meaningful external check, for over two centuries.</p><p>That&#8217;s what The Statecraft Blueprint is here to change. <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/this-is-what-were-building">We&#8217;ve laid out exactly what we&#8217;re building and why.</a></p><p>Not by electing better people. Not by hoping the right reformers accumulate enough votes. By building enough public pressure that Congress adopts rules it didn&#8217;t write and wouldn&#8217;t choose &#8212; because the alternative is facing constituents who finally understand what&#8217;s actually broken and what actually fixes it.</p><p>Yes, better elections can send better people to Washington. Alaska has shown that electoral reform can change who gets elected and how a legislature behaves. But right now, the better people we send to Congress can&#8217;t improve things. Not because they&#8217;re weak or corrupt. Because the rules of the building work against them the moment they walk in.</p><p>Fix the rules. Then the people matter.</p><div><hr></div><p>Before the next election, we have to ask ourselves an honest question. Not about them. About us.</p><p>Do we want a government that actually solves problems? Or have we gotten so used to the performance that we&#8217;d rather hear our side repeat the right lines than watch the wrong people compromise?</p><p>Because the system will give us exactly what we&#8217;re willing to accept.</p><p>If you want something different, there&#8217;s one place to start. Not donate to a campaign. Not vote for the right candidate &#8212; though do that too. Tell Congress directly, on the record, that you know what&#8217;s broken and you know what fixes it.</p><p><strong><a href="https://forms.gle/jGev59JrduGCbVBn7">Tell Washington</a></strong></p><p><strong>Subscribe.</strong></p><p><strong>Share.</strong></p><p>The machine runs on failure. It will keep running as long as we keep feeding it.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Fix the Rules. Then the People Matter.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[This Is What We’re Building]]></title><description><![CDATA[A Manifesto for the Statecraft Blueprint]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/this-is-what-were-building</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/this-is-what-were-building</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 18:24:30 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png" width="1456" height="971" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:971,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2490895,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/i/193809148?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vgGt!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a5df90d-083a-4c16-af45-e296336aa341_1535x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><div><hr></div><p>We have written about budgets. About leadership. About shutdowns, Wall Street, education, trade policy, and the quiet collapse of institutional norms. We have analyzed executive orders, mapped how legislation interacts with existing architecture to produce harm nobody intended, and traced the wiring behind a hundred different policy failures.</p><p>We have been writing about a lot of different things.</p><p>But the thing is &#8212; we haven&#8217;t. We&#8217;ve been writing about one thing, from a hundred different angles.</p><p>Here it is.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Problem</h2><p>Every dysfunction you&#8217;ve ever felt from your government &#8212; the gridlock, the broken promises, the policies that help no one, the crises that recur like clockwork &#8212; traces back to the same structural failure.</p><p><em><strong>The government has stopped serving its citizens.</strong></em></p><p>Not because the wrong people are in charge. Not because we elected the wrong party. Not because democracy is failing.</p><p>Because the machinery of governance &#8212; the rules, the processes, the incentive structures, the institutional architecture &#8212; has evolved into something that insiders navigate far more easily than ordinary citizens. Whatever its original aspirations, the system as it now functions is not legible, accountable, or responsive to the people it is supposed to serve. It rewards those who know how to work it. Everyone else gets the outputs.</p><p>The result: policies get made in separate silos with no institutional requirement to ask how they interact. Trade decisions produce economic consequences nobody tracked. Undefined statutory terms get handed to agencies that define them however the loudest lobby prefers. The budget process was designed to fail, so that when it does, nobody has to take responsibility.</p><p>These aren&#8217;t separate problems. They&#8217;re the same problem, viewed from different angles.</p><p><strong>A government that doesn&#8217;t serve its citizens produces a different broken outcome every time you look at it.</strong></p><p>The question is how a system designed to represent citizens became so difficult for citizens to see, understand, and direct. The answer is not a single cause. But one major part of it lies in how Congress reorganized itself.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Subscribe &#8212; a functional government is worth building</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div><hr></div><h2>Where It Broke</h2><p>The First Branch is where it starts. Congress is the most powerful institution in American government &#8212; the branch from which everything else flows. Executive power, agency authority, judicial jurisdiction: all of it ultimately derives from what Congress enables, funds, and permits.</p><p>Which is why it matters that Congress has been systematically stripped of the conditions required for deliberation.</p><p>This wasn&#8217;t inevitable. It wasn&#8217;t accidental. It has a starting point.</p><p>In 1970, the Legislative Reorganization Act restructured how Congress operates. Three provisions &#8212; <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/public-law-91-510-legislative-reorganization">sections 120 and 121</a> and <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/public-law-91-510-legislative-reorganization-26b">section 104</a> &#8212; rewired the incentive architecture of the First Branch in ways that concentrated power in party leadership, reduced the independence of individual members, and began the slow transfer of legislative authority to the executive and to the organized interests that learned to navigate the new system.</p><p>This was not the only inflection point, and the dysfunction it accelerated has many other causes &#8212; campaign finance, media fragmentation, party sorting, the growth of the administrative state. But the 1970 Act rewired the core incentive architecture of the First Branch in ways that made most of what followed more likely. The polarization and divisiveness. The voting along party lines. The gridlock. The leadership coercion. The lobbyist capture. The members who arrive in Washington genuinely wanting to govern, and discover they are not permitted to.</p><p>We are not here to attack Congress. We are here to restore it.</p><p>The people you elect cannot do their jobs under the current rules. The rules have to change before anything else can &#8212; and we know exactly which rules.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Uneven Playing Field</h2><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLPJ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLPJ!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLPJ!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLPJ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLPJ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLPJ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png" width="1456" height="971" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:971,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2338967,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/i/193809148?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLPJ!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLPJ!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLPJ!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!lLPJ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7a168bfb-ce31-439a-bc26-9e6d0921c5a2_1536x1024.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Here is what those rules produced &#8212; and why it matters for you directly.</p><p>Right now, party leaders and lobbyists can hold lawmakers accountable in real time. Voting records are available immediately. Scoring systems track every vote, in committee and on the floor, and translate them into campaign finance decisions, primary threats, and leadership punishment &#8212; all before the next election, all while the legislative session is still underway.</p><p>You, as a citizen, are stuck waiting until Election Day.</p><p>That asymmetry is not an accident. It is the direct consequence of the 1970 rules. Organized interests with resources, infrastructure, and permanent presence in Washington can apply continuous pressure throughout a legislative term. Citizens can only respond at the ballot box &#8212; every two years for House members, every six for Senators &#8212; with imperfect information, after the damage is done.</p><p>This is why your representatives don&#8217;t represent you the way you expect. It isn&#8217;t that they don&#8217;t care. It&#8217;s that the system applies far more immediate and concrete pressure from organized interests than it ever will from constituents. Rational actors respond to the incentives they face. The incentives are broken.</p><p>Changing this is what the TSB legislative text is designed to do. Delay the release of voting records until the electoral window &#8212; when citizens can actually act on the information. Organized interests will still have advantages of wealth, access, and permanence. But their timeline for coercion gets compressed. The continuous pressure loop gets disrupted. The playing field doesn&#8217;t become level, but it becomes less tilted.</p><p>This is where we start.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What We&#8217;re Building</h2><p>Democracy shouldn&#8217;t require heroic effort.</p><p>You shouldn&#8217;t need to be a lawyer to understand how a policy was made, a PhD to read the federal budget, or a watchdog organization behind you to hold your representative accountable. We don&#8217;t design other systems this way &#8212; we build structural safeguards, hire engineers, create accountability mechanisms with real teeth. We have never done this for governance itself.</p><p>A real democracy meets its citizens where they are. It conforms to them. They don&#8217;t conform to it.</p><p>The Statecraft Blueprint exists to fix the design. Not the policies. Not the personnel. The design.</p><p>We are building toward a government where citizens can:</p><ul><li><p><strong>See how their government spends money</strong> &#8212; through financial statements that meet the same comprehensibility standards we require of public companies</p></li><li><p><strong>Trace how a policy was made</strong> &#8212; the upstream forces, the lobbying, the leadership coercion, the committee process, the floor scheduling &#8212; not as an investigative project, but as a matter of routine transparency</p></li><li><p><strong>Understand what a law will do before it takes effect</strong> &#8212; including how it interacts with existing architecture, what second and third-order effects it will produce, what it leaves undefined and who gets to fill those gaps</p></li><li><p><strong>Identify quickly when the system starts to drift</strong> &#8212; so accountability doesn&#8217;t require years of effort to establish what should have been visible from the start</p></li></ul><p>That is the long-term architecture. It is what the Governance Design Agency would make permanent &#8212; professional institutional design, separated from political cycles, systematically serving the public interest.</p><p>The goal is not to make citizens into specialists. The goal is to build a government that doesn&#8217;t require them to be.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What We Are Releasing</h2><p>Here is the first practical release.</p><p>For 250 years, Congress has written its own rules.</p><p>The results are in.</p><p>The legislative text we are releasing targets the specific provisions &#8212; LRA 1970 Sections 104, 120, and 121 &#8212; that created the coercion surface described above. The Church Bells briefs provide the structural analysis: how these provisions interact with existing architecture, what the fix produces, what it doesn&#8217;t yet address.</p><p>Neither document is final. They will need refinement. We need lawyers, scholars, and practitioners to stress-test them, find the gaps, and improve them. That is part of the process.</p><p>But we have a starting place. And starting places matter.</p><p>We are presenting this in three layers:</p><p><strong>For citizens:</strong> A plain-language explanation of what each provision means for your life, your community, your ability to hold your representatives accountable. You do not need to read the legislative text. You need to understand what it does &#8212; and decide if you want it. Start with the <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-rules">rules-only instrument</a> and the <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-section">Section 104 companion amendment</a>.</p><p><strong>For the analytical reader:</strong> The Church Bells briefs provide the structural analysis &#8212; how these provisions interact with existing architecture, what the fix produces, what it doesn&#8217;t yet address. Read the analysis of the <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-rules">rules-only instrument</a> and the <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/deliberative-privacy-in-committee">Section 104 companion</a>, alongside the original briefs on <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/public-law-91-510-legislative-reorganization">Sections 120 &amp; 121</a> and <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/public-law-91-510-legislative-reorganization-26b">Section 104</a>.</p><p><strong>For lawyers, legislators, and policymakers:</strong> The legislative text itself &#8212; the <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-rules">rules-only instrument</a> and the <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-section">Section 104 companion statutory amendment</a>. Read it. Critique it. Propose alternatives. The point is not that our specific design is the only possible design. The point is that we need a design &#8212; and institutions are poorly positioned to redesign the systems that currently empower them. Self-reform has proven, repeatedly, too partial and too reversible to hold.</p><p>This is the first step. There are many others.</p><p>Once the coercion loop is disrupted and lawmakers are free to deliberate, the next work begins: formalizing the kind of structural analysis the Church Bells briefs demonstrate &#8212; so that before legislation passes, its impacts are evaluated as a matter of institutional requirement, not individual effort. The burden shifts back onto Congress to show its work. To demonstrate that harms have been considered and diminished.</p><p>That is where this is going. But first, the playing field has to be leveled enough for the other work to matter.</p><div><hr></div><h2>This Is Different</h2><p>You&#8217;ve heard this before. Every election cycle, someone promises to fix Washington. Every reform movement says this time is different.</p><p>They weren&#8217;t.</p><p>Here&#8217;s why this is.</p><p><strong>Most reform efforts target outcomes, not the machine.</strong></p><p>Term limits. Campaign finance reform. Ranked choice voting. These are all attempts to produce different results from the same broken system. Swap out the players. Change how money flows. Adjust the voting math. But the machine &#8212; the rules that govern how Congress actually operates &#8212; stays intact. And the machine keeps producing the same outcomes, with different faces attached.</p><p>TSB is targeting the machine.</p><p><strong>Most reform efforts ask Congress to act against its own interests.</strong></p><p>&#8220;Elect better people.&#8221; &#8220;Hold them accountable.&#8221; &#8220;Primary the bad ones.&#8221; All of these require individual politicians to voluntarily sacrifice their own power and security for the public good. Some do. Most don&#8217;t. The system selects against the ones who try.</p><p>We&#8217;re not asking Congress to be better people. We&#8217;re changing the incentive structure so that the rational move &#8212; the self-interested move &#8212; aligns with the public interest. When the coercion loop is disrupted, voting your conscience becomes safer. We&#8217;re not appealing to virtue. We&#8217;re redesigning the environment.</p><p><strong>Most reform efforts are vague.</strong></p><p>&#8220;Drain the swamp.&#8221; &#8220;Get money out of politics.&#8221; &#8220;Fix the system.&#8221; These are feelings, not proposals. Even serious reform efforts &#8212; congressional ethics legislation, campaign finance overhaul &#8212; tend to stay general. High principles, light on mechanism.</p><p>TSB is hyper-specific. We have identified the exact provisions &#8212; 1970 LRA Sections 104, 120, and 121 &#8212; that created the coercion surface. We have written the legislative text. We have analyzed the structural consequences. We have named the mechanism, designed the fix, and published both.</p><p>The what. The how. The why. All of it, in plain language, available for anyone to read and critique.</p><p>That&#8217;s not normal. But it should be. And it requires no hero inside the building to make it happen.</p><p>TSB&#8217;s first move is outside pressure. Citizens telling Congress &#8212; directly, specifically, in writing &#8212; what rules they are going to follow. Not asking. Telling.</p><p>The Constitution reserves this power to the people. We have always had it. We have rarely used it this precisely.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Pushback</h2><p>We expect resistance. We welcome it.</p><p>To those who will say this is unrealistic: we are in the 2026 midterm season. Look at the candidates. Read their platforms. Identify the one who is going to walk into Washington and fix the structural architecture of the First Branch. We will wait.</p><p>To those who will say this overreaches: the alternative is what you have now. If you have a better proposal, publish it. We will read it seriously.</p><p>To those who will say citizens shouldn&#8217;t write the rules for Congress: the Constitution disagrees. Congress governs at our consent, not the other way around.</p><p>This is your system. We are not building it for you. We are building it with you.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What We Need From You</h2><p>There is one more thing that makes this different from every political movement you have ever been part of.</p><p>Every other approach asks you to trust someone else.</p><p>Vote for this candidate &#8212; and hope they mean it. Donate to this organization &#8212; and hope they spend it well. Support this reform &#8212; and hope the right people in Washington decide to act on it. The ask is always the same: hand your power to someone else, and wait.</p><p>This is not that.</p><p>We are not asking you to find the right hero and send them to Washington. We are not asking you to hope that someone, somewhere, will decide to sacrifice their own interests for yours. We have spent enough time waiting for that to happen.</p><p>This is your opportunity to put your voice directly behind a specific demand. Not a candidate. Not a party. A document. A mechanism. A set of rules, written in plain language, that you can read yourself.</p><p>We The People, telling politicians &#8212; in no uncertain terms &#8212; exactly what we want and exactly how we want it done.</p><p>That is not a petition. That is not a protest. That is citizens exercising the authority the Constitution always gave them, with enough specificity that no one can pretend they didn&#8217;t understand the ask.</p><p>You don&#8217;t have to trust us. You don&#8217;t have to trust Congress. You just have to decide whether you want a government that works &#8212; and then say so, loudly, to the people whose job it is to build one.</p><p>The machinery of governance responds to pressure. It always has. The question is whether the pressure comes from citizens or from the organized interests that are already inside the building.</p><p>We are building the outside pressure. We are naming the structural failure, proposing the structural fix, and asking you to stand behind it &#8212; not because you trust us, but because you can read it yourself.</p><p>The standard we are proposing is not complicated: a government that serves its citizens, that can be held accountable by them, that does not require heroic effort just to understand.</p><p>That is not a radical demand. It is the original promise.</p><p>This is the revolution: We The People calmly, but firmly, telling Congress not just to change the rules &#8212; but which rules to change, and how to change them.</p><p>Do you want a functional government that serves you?</p><p>Don&#8217;t tell us.</p><p><strong><a href="https://forms.gle/jGev59JrduGCbVBn7">Tell Washington.</a></strong></p><p>Then tell everyone else. Share this with one person who is as frustrated as you are. Post it. Forward it. The outside pressure only builds if more people know it exists.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Count me in</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div><hr></div><p><em>A note on language: Throughout these writings we have used &#8220;we&#8221; rather than &#8220;I.&#8221; This is deliberate. The Statecraft Blueprint is one voice, but it is not one person&#8217;s voice and not one person&#8217;s movement. The demand for a government that serves its citizens belongs to every citizen. The &#8220;we&#8221; in these pages is We The People &#8212; in the oldest and most literal sense of that phrase.</em></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Deliberative Privacy Reform — Section 104 Companion Statutory Amendment]]></title><description><![CDATA[Amendment to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-section</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-section</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 02:45:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l7mf!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febb4084a-db8f-42f9-bfba-283e8af53810_500x500.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Committee Proceedings Vote Attribution: Electoral-Calendar Design</h2><p><em>TSB Legislative Project | Restoring Deliberative Space</em> <em>Version 1.8 &#8212; April 2026</em></p><div><hr></div><p>Close but not quite a paste &#8212; a few things need to change for this document specifically.</p><p>&#8220;This is the first piece of corrective legislation&#8221; is no longer accurate &#8212; the rules instrument was first. This is the second.</p><p>&#8220;What follows is the rules-only instrument &#8212; a proposed amendment to House Rule XX and a companion Senate Standing Order&#8221; needs to describe this document instead.</p><p>And this bill is actually harder to explain than the rules instrument because it has the ministerial custodian architecture, which is a more novel design element. Worth a sentence on that.</p><p>Here&#8217;s the adapted version:</p><div><hr></div><p><em><strong>What you&#8217;re looking at, and why it matters</strong></em></p><p><em>Over the last couple of weeks, Church Bells published structural vulnerability briefs on <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/public-law-91-510-legislative-reorganization">Sections 120 and 121</a> and <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/public-law-91-510-legislative-reorganization-26b">Section 104</a> of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 &#8212; the provisions that created the information architecture organized interests now use to score, target, and coerce members of Congress during the legislative term. For the details of this problem, <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/legislative-servitude">Legislative Servitude</a> is the place to start.</em></p><p><em>The diagnosis: transparency, captured and weaponized, became a coercion tool more powerful than any lobbyist&#8217;s phone call.</em></p><p><em>Here&#8217;s what that looks like in practice. A member who breaks with their party on a single amendment vote gets singled out &#8212; the deviation is logged, scored, and used. A lobbyist conditions a PAC donation on a member&#8217;s voting record: how much are you going to give if you can&#8217;t verify the member voted in your interests? And increasingly in the last decade, members who vote to hold executive officers accountable face organized backlash specifically designed to punish that vote. The mechanism is always the same: real-time individual attribution feeds a targeting system, and the targeting system feeds a coercion loop.</em></p><p><em>The result is lawmakers are never free to vote for their constituents or their country, and face an impossible choice: vote with party leaders and organized interests, or lose your job. This isn&#8217;t corruption in the traditional sense &#8212; no laws are broken. It&#8217;s the system working exactly as designed. Party leaders and lobbyists benefit from the current architecture, and that benefit flows downstream into every other area of governance. The dysfunction you see in Congress is not a character problem. It is an output of this design.</em></p><p><em>Two weeks ago, we published the first piece of corrective legislation &#8212; the rules-only instrument, which addresses real-time individual attribution on the House and Senate floor. This is the second.</em></p><p><em>Committee markup votes are where legislation actually takes shape. Amendments get written, provisions get stripped, deals get made &#8212; all before a bill reaches the floor. The same coercion mechanism that operates on floor votes operates here, often more consequentially. Floor-only reform creates a displacement incentive: organized interests shift targeting upstream to the committee level, where real-time individual attribution remains fully available. This instrument closes that gap.</em></p><p><em>Designing a fix is genuinely hard. This is a complex systems problem, not unlike computer security &#8212; you can&#8217;t just eliminate the vulnerability without breaking something else. We need to protect deliberative space and preserve accountability at the same time, and those goals are in tension. Citizens vote by secret ballot precisely because public voting enables coercion. But elected officials aren&#8217;t private citizens &#8212; constituents have a legitimate right to know how their representatives vote. We can&#8217;t resolve that tension by pretending it doesn&#8217;t exist. We have to engineer around it.</em></p><p><em>The timing mechanism is how we do that. Aggregate vote totals and party breakdowns are immediate and always public &#8212; the outcome of every vote is visible the moment it happens. Individual member attribution is held and released before every primary and every general election, when constituents can actually use it to make decisions. Yes, organized interests can still exploit the release window. But the timelines are compressed, the real-time scoring infrastructure stops working, and the between-session coercion that has hollowed out deliberative capacity for fifty years loses its primary tool.</em></p><p><em>This bill also addresses a second surface the rules instrument can&#8217;t touch: the internal-leverage coercion that arises when party leadership has pre-release access to how individual members voted in committee. The design solution &#8212; individual vote records route directly to the Clerk of the House or Secretary of the Senate rather than passing through committee hands &#8212; is a structural fix rather than a prohibition. Prohibitions on misuse are unenforceable. Eliminating the access surface is not.</em></p><p><em>This is not a perfect solution. It is a serious one.</em></p><p><em>What follows is the statutory text of the Deliberative Privacy in Committee Proceedings Act &#8212; a bill amending Section 133(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. It requires passage through both chambers. It is harder to reverse than the rules instrument and harder to achieve. Both are necessary. Neither is sufficient alone.</em></p><p><em>We will have much more to say about this &#8212; the constitutional argument, the political strategy, the companion instruments still in development, and what it will take to move something like this from a document in a repository to a law. That conversation continues now.</em></p><p><em>The legislative text follows.</em></p><div><hr></div><h2>Instrument summary</h2><p>This is a bill &#8212; federal statutory text requiring passage through both chambers and presidential signature (or veto override). It is the companion instrument to the rules-only document, which addresses floor votes through House Rule XX and a Senate Standing Order.</p><p>This instrument addresses committee votes. Section 104 of the LRA 1970 (amending Section 133(b) of the LRA 1946) currently requires:</p><ul><li><p><strong>House (Section 104(b)):</strong> Individual member attribution for every rollcall vote in any committee meeting, available for public inspection in real time.</p></li><li><p><strong>Senate (Section 104(a)):</strong> Member-by-member tabulation of rollcall votes on measures and amendments, reported in committee reports &#8212; a narrower, report-tied attribution operating after the markup stage is complete.</p></li></ul><p>Both provisions create an attribution surface that organized interests use in combination with campaign finance disclosure data to score, target, and coerce members during the legislative term. This instrument replaces both with an electoral-calendar attribution design: aggregate totals and party breakdowns immediate; individual member attribution released at electoral accountability moments.</p><p><strong>Why this requires statute rather than rules alone:</strong> The House-side Section 104(b) provision is a Title I provision of the LRA 1970, enacted under the House&#8217;s rulemaking power (Section 101(2)), and is modifiable by House rule. A statutory amendment is cleaner architecture &#8212; it aligns the U.S. Code text with practice, removes ambiguity about whether a later House rule supersedes an earlier statutory text, and simultaneously addresses the Senate side.</p><p><strong>Relationship to the rules instrument:</strong> The rules instrument and this bill are operationally coupled and should be enacted simultaneously. Enacting the floor vote rules instrument without this companion creates a displacement incentive &#8212; organized interests shift targeting upstream to committee votes where real-time attribution remains available.</p>
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          <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-section">
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Deliberative Privacy Reform — Rules-Only Instrument]]></title><description><![CDATA[House Rule Amendment and Senate Standing Order]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-rules</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-rules</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 22:15:35 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l7mf!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Febb4084a-db8f-42f9-bfba-283e8af53810_500x500.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Electoral-Calendar Attribution Design</h2><p><em>TSB Legislative Project | Restoring Deliberative Space</em> <em>Version 1.3 &#8212; April 2026</em></p><div><hr></div><p><em><strong>What you&#8217;re looking at, and why it matters</strong></em></p><p><em>Over the last couple weeks, Church Bells published structural vulnerability briefs on <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/public-law-91-510-legislative-reorganization">Sections 120 and 121</a> and <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/public-law-91-510-legislative-reorganization-26b">Section 104</a> of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 &#8212; the provisions that created the information architecture organized interests now use to score, target, and coerce members of Congress during the legislative term. For the details of this problem, <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/legislative-servitude">Legislative Servitude</a> is the place to start.</em></p><p><em>The diagnosis: transparency, captured and weaponized, became a coercion tool more powerful than any lobbyist&#8217;s phone call.</em></p><p><em>Here&#8217;s what that looks like in practice. A member who breaks with their party on a single amendment vote gets singled out &#8212; the deviation is logged, scored, and used. A lobbyist conditions a PAC donation on a member&#8217;s voting record: how much are you going to give if you can&#8217;t verify the member voted in your interests? And increasingly in the last decade, members who vote to hold executive officers accountable face organized backlash specifically designed to punish that vote. The mechanism is always the same: real-time individual attribution feeds a targeting system, and the targeting system feeds a coercion loop.</em></p><p><em>The result is lawmakers are never free to vote for their constituents or their country, and face an impossible choice: vote with party leaders and organized interests, or lose your job. This isn&#8217;t corruption in the traditional sense &#8212; no laws are broken. It&#8217;s the system working exactly as designed. Party leaders and lobbyists benefit from the current architecture, and that benefit flows downstream into every other area of governance. The dysfunction you see in Congress is not a character problem. It is an output of this design.</em></p><p><em>This is the first piece of corrective legislation.</em></p><p><em>Designing a fix is genuinely hard. This is a complex systems problem, not unlike computer security &#8212; you can&#8217;t just eliminate the vulnerability without breaking something else. We need to protect deliberative space and preserve accountability at the same time, and those goals are in tension. Citizens vote by secret ballot precisely because public voting enables coercion. But elected officials aren&#8217;t private citizens &#8212; constituents have a legitimate right to know how their representatives vote. We can&#8217;t resolve that tension by pretending it doesn&#8217;t exist. We have to engineer around it.</em></p><p><em>The timing mechanism is how we do that. Aggregate vote totals and party breakdowns are immediate and always public &#8212; the outcome of every vote is visible the moment it happens. Individual member attribution is held and released before every primary and every general election, when constituents can actually use it to make decisions. Yes, organized interests can still exploit the release window. But the timelines are compressed, the real-time scoring infrastructure stops working, and the between-session coercion that has hollowed out deliberative capacity for fifty years loses its primary tool.</em></p><p><em>This is not a perfect solution. It is a serious one.</em></p><p><em>What follows is the rules-only instrument &#8212; a proposed amendment to House Rule XX and a companion Senate Standing Order implementing this design. This is patient zero. Fix this, and future reforms become more feasible. Leave it broken, and nothing else works the way it should.</em></p><p><em>We will have much more to say about this &#8212; the constitutional argument, the political strategy, the companion instruments still in development, and what it will take to move something like this from a document in a repository to a rule of the House. That conversation starts now.</em></p><p><em>The legislative text follows.</em></p><div><hr></div><h2>Design summary</h2><p>This document contains two operative instruments:</p><p><strong>1A. Model House Rule</strong> &#8212; New clause added to House Rule XX (Voting and Quorum Calls) governing the timing of individual Member attribution for recorded votes.</p><p><strong>1B. Model Senate Standing Order</strong> &#8212; Parallel instrument governing the timing of individual Senator attribution for roll call votes.</p><p>Both instruments share the same underlying design: <strong>aggregate results and party breakdowns are always immediate; individual member attribution is held and released at electoral accountability moments, not in real time.</strong></p><p>The companion statutory amendment covering committee markup votes under Section 104 of the LRA 1970 is a separate instrument. This document addresses floor votes only. The displacement risk created by floor-only reform is documented in the Known Gaps section and in the Church Bells brief on LRA 1970 Section 104.</p>
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          <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/deliberative-privacy-reform-rules">
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   ]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Same Gravity]]></title><description><![CDATA[P0.6: Why saints hit the ground too]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/same-gravity</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/same-gravity</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 04 Apr 2026 23:14:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png" width="1456" height="971" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:971,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:2425117,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/i/193175189?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!2hfl!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F616f2edd-6706-4821-82ff-113737058703_1535x1024.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>We&#8217;ve been told for decades that if we elect better people, government will work better.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">The Statecraft Blueprint is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>That&#8217;s not true.</p><p>And it&#8217;s not failing because people are bad&#8212;it&#8217;s failing because of how it&#8217;s built.</p><p>I&#8217;ve been trying to explain this for months. Every time I try, it doesn&#8217;t land. People nod politely. Then they go back to arguing about which candidate would be better, or ranting about the villain du jour.</p><p>So let me try a different approach. I&#8217;m going to walk you through what I&#8217;m seeing, step by step. At the end, I want to know: can you see it too? And if not&#8212;what am I missing?</p><p>If you do see it, then we can start asking the real questions together.</p><p>Here&#8217;s the claim: <strong>The way government actually functions is closer to physics than philosophy.</strong></p><p>In philosophy, there aren&#8217;t right or wrong answers. It&#8217;s perspectives and endless debate.</p><p>In physics, there ARE right or wrong answers. Systems have properties. Those properties produce predictable outcomes. You can study them. You can understand them. And&#8212;here&#8217;s the hope&#8212;you can change them.</p><p>Over the decades of watching government and politics, I have concluded that it is much closer to the second thing. Not the values part&#8212;what we SHOULD do. But the mechanics part&#8212;how decisions actually get made, how legislation actually gets produced. That&#8217;s not random. That&#8217;s not a philosophical conundrum. That&#8217;s a system with properties.</p><p>Let me show you what I mean.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Two Systems That Make the Sausage</h2><p>First, let&#8217;s agree on what I mean by &#8220;legislation.&#8221;</p><p>When I say legislation, I mean the rules that citizens and businesses must follow. If you don&#8217;t comply, you can be held accountable. Fines. Penalties. Consequences.</p><p>The Constitution said Congress would write these rules. That&#8217;s the original system.</p><p>But along the way, Executive Orders got introduced. The President issues an order. Government departments and agencies adopt that order as policy. Citizens and businesses comply&#8212;or face consequences.</p><p>In practice, Executive Orders often function like legislation&#8212;creating binding rules that citizens and businesses must follow. Whether Congress writes a bill or the President signs an Executive Order, the result is the same: rules you have to follow.</p><p>So we have two systems for making the sausage. Let&#8217;s look at how they actually work.</p><h3>The President System: One Light Switch</h3><p>Think of a light switch. Flip it one way, the light turns on. Flip it the other way, it turns off.</p><p>The President System works like that.</p><ul><li><p>The country elected Trump</p></li><li><p>Trump issued tariff orders</p></li><li><p>Departments and agencies collected the tariffs</p></li><li><p>Citizens and businesses paid (or faced consequences)</p></li><li><p>If we&#8217;d elected someone else, we almost certainly wouldn&#8217;t have tariffs</p></li></ul><p>One input. One output. You can see the cause and effect.</p><p>This isn&#8217;t because the executive branch is better designed overall&#8212;it&#8217;s because the decision-making path is shorter and more visible. And that visibility is part of why authoritarianism has been gaining ground globally. It&#8217;s not just that strongmen are appealing. It&#8217;s that one-switch systems are <strong>transparent.</strong> You know where the rules came from. You can trace cause to effect. Your vote changed something you can point to.</p><h3>The Congress System: 435 Switches with Hidden Wiring</h3><p>Congress is completely different.</p><p>Imagine 435 light switches&#8212;one for each House member. But here&#8217;s the problem: there&#8217;s wiring behind the wall you can&#8217;t see.</p><p>You flip your switch. But you don&#8217;t know:</p><ul><li><p>Which combination of switches will actually turn on the light</p></li><li><p>What the hidden wiring is doing to your signal</p></li><li><p>Why flipping your switch doesn&#8217;t seem to change anything</p></li></ul><p>This is why Congress has terrible approval ratings. People in each state flip their switches&#8212;they elect their representatives&#8212;but they can&#8217;t see what&#8217;s happening behind the wall. Flipping switches starts to feel random.</p><p>It&#8217;s not random. There&#8217;s a system back there. The wiring follows rules. But if you can&#8217;t see the wiring, you can&#8217;t understand why your switch doesn&#8217;t do what you expected.</p><p><strong>Here&#8217;s what I see behind the wall:</strong> Rules, incentives, and pressures that shape what legislators do&#8212;regardless of who they are.</p><p>Let me show you what I mean.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Wiring Behind the Wall</h2><p>Imagine your state elects a saint. Not a politician&#8212;someone with genuine integrity, the values you wish every representative had.</p><p>They arrive in Washington. They&#8217;re one of the 435 switches.</p><p>Here&#8217;s what they find behind the wall:</p><h3>The Budget Process</h3><p>The federal government doesn&#8217;t run on autopilot. If Congress doesn&#8217;t pass a budget by the deadline, operations stop. Shutdown.</p><p>Your saint didn&#8217;t design this. They can&#8217;t unilaterally change it. It&#8217;s part of the wiring.</p><p>When the deadline approaches and negotiations collapse, your saint can vote no on a bad deal. The shutdown happens anyway. The light turned on&#8212;partially because of how some of the other 434 switches were set, but largely because of how the wiring works.</p><h3>Bundling</h3><p>Your saint wants to vote yes on some things and no on others. Too bad.</p><p>Legislation comes bundled. Massive packages. Thousands of pages. The wiring only allows all-or-nothing.</p><p>Leadership uses this strategically. They bundle things so that any vote is painful. Your saint faces impossible choices&#8212;designed to be impossible.</p><h3>Seniority and Party Pressure</h3><p>Your saint discovers <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/legislative-servitude-how-transparency">how power actually flows</a>:</p><ul><li><p>Committee assignments come from party leadership</p></li><li><p>Campaign resources flow through party channels</p></li><li><p>The longer you serve, the more influence you accumulate</p></li></ul><p>The wiring rewards loyalty and longevity. It punishes defiance.</p><p>Here&#8217;s what this means for YOU as a voter: The system makes it rational to re-elect the same people over and over. A 20-year incumbent has more power than a freshman. Replace them, your district loses influence.</p><p>The pressures shape not just how legislators behave&#8212;but how it&#8217;s rational for voters to behave.</p><h3>Transparency (That Backfires)</h3><p><a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/legislative-servitude">Every vote is recorded</a>. Sounds good, right? Accountability.</p><p>But every vote also becomes attack ad material.</p><p>If your saint represents a purple district, they face impossible math: vote against their constituents or against their party. If your saint represents a safe district, the math is easier but no less perverse: vote with the party even against their constituents&#8217; interests, or face primary threats from the flank.</p><p>We see this constantly. <a href="https://ringthebells.org/p/safeguard-american-voter-eligibility">Consider Senator Mike Lee of Utah</a>. Utah&#8212;a red state&#8212;has been hailed for its mail-in voting system, leading the nation as an example of how to do elections well. And now Senator Lee is pushing legislation that would cripple that very system. He chose to align with the President and party leadership to actively harm something his own state built and his own constituents rely on.</p><p>Whether you agree with the policy or not, what matters here is the pattern: that&#8217;s not a character flaw. That&#8217;s the wiring working exactly as designed. The pressure to align with party leadership overwhelmed representation of state interests.</p><h3>The Result</h3><p>There are many other pressures and incentives legislators face, including, but not limited to:</p><ul><li><p>Fundraising demands (30+ hours per week dialing for dollars)</p></li><li><p>Lobbyist access and revolving door incentives</p></li><li><p>Media dynamics that reward conflict over compromise</p></li><li><p>Primary election timing and mechanics</p></li><li><p>Committee jurisdictions that fragment coherent policy</p></li><li><p>The filibuster and other procedural chokepoints</p></li></ul><p>Each of these is something your saint can&#8217;t individually change, but each shapes their behavior.</p><p>Notice what all of these have in common:</p><ul><li><p>None are controlled by the individual legislator</p></li><li><p>All create predictable behavioral pressure</p></li><li><p>All persist regardless of who is elected</p></li></ul><p>Your saint is one switch among 435. The wiring behind the wall determines which combinations produce which outcomes.</p><p>Within months, your saint is behaving like everyone else. Not because they sold out. Because <strong>the wiring shapes the behavior.</strong></p><p>You can swap out all 435 switches. If the wiring stays the same, the outcomes stay the same.</p><p>This is what I mean when I say &#8220;it&#8217;s not a personnel problem, it&#8217;s a system problem.&#8221; Not vague frustration. Specific wiring. Specific pressures. Specific outcomes.</p><h3>What &#8220;Structure&#8221; Means</h3><p>All of this&#8212;every pressure, every rule, every incentive&#8212;combines into something we rarely name: <strong>structure.</strong></p><p>The <em>combination</em> of these rules, procedures, pressures, and incentives is what I mean when I say &#8220;the structure&#8221; of something. When I say something structural is failing, I&#8217;m saying the current combination isn&#8217;t producing the intended result. And when structure fails, outcomes fail&#8212;no matter who&#8217;s in the system.</p><p>Here&#8217;s an example: The Constitution created checks and balances between the branches. It was predicated on the idea that members of Congress would act to check the actions of the executive branch.</p><p>But now members of Congress are reluctant to check the executive branch when their team&#8217;s member is president. (Remember how committee assignments and campaign resources flow through party leadership?) The incentives in the wiring have overwhelmed the designed check.</p><p>This is a structural failure. The Congressional check on Executive power is functionally weakened&#8212;not because the people are bad, but because the wiring produces different behavior than the founders anticipated.</p><div><hr></div><h2>You Can&#8217;t Out-Jump Gravity</h2><p>Everyone keeps thinking: if we just find the right person&#8212;someone with real integrity, real courage&#8212;they&#8217;ll fix it.</p><p>This is like thinking: if we just find a better jumper, they won&#8217;t hit the ground.</p><p>But gravity doesn&#8217;t care how good your jumper is. Gravity pulls everyone down.</p><p>The wiring behind the wall works the same way. Budget deadlines. Bundling. Party control. Seniority incentives. Every legislator faces the same gravity. Every legislator hits the ground.</p><h3>But Here&#8217;s the Difference</h3><p>Gravity is a natural law. We can&#8217;t change it.</p><p>The wiring behind Congress? <strong>That was designed by people.</strong></p><p>The budget process that allows shutdowns? Congress created it. Congress could change it.</p><p>The bundling that forces all-or-nothing votes? That&#8217;s a procedural choice.</p><p>The seniority system? The transparency rules? All designed. All changeable.</p><h3>This Is What Bridges Do</h3><p>A bridge is how you overcome gravity.</p><p>Think about it. A tractor-trailer drives over an overpass. Forty tons. Gravity wants to smack it to the ground. But the bridge handles it.</p><p>Gravity is still there. The bridge doesn&#8217;t eliminate gravity. It creates a structure that lets you stand under a forty-ton vehicle as it passes safely over your head.</p><p>The same way we can design and build beams and girders and supports&#8212;and combine them to build a bridge that handles known loads&#8212;we can design rules, policies, procedures, and incentives that produce better outcomes.</p><p>Just like we know a beam of given material, shape, and dimensions will support a given load, we know that certain transparency policies will put pressure on legislators to posture. We can predict it. We can measure it. And we can design around it.</p><p>This is engineering, not philosophy.</p><h3>The Hole I&#8217;m Trying to Show You</h3><p>Here&#8217;s the hole in American democracy that almost nobody sees:</p><p><strong>Congress is dysfunctional to the point of paralysis. And the solution we&#8217;ve been told our whole lives&#8212;elect the right leaders&#8212;won&#8217;t work.</strong></p><p>The hole is this: we&#8217;re trying to fix outcomes by changing people, when the system is what&#8217;s producing those outcomes.</p><p>The wiring determines the outcomes more than the people do. You can&#8217;t out-jump gravity.</p><p>If we want a system where voting for elected officials produces legislation that reflects the collective interests of the citizenry, we need different wiring.</p><p>The fundamental ideas the founders put in the Constitution are solid. But they were limited by what they could foresee. And the world has changed drastically.</p><p><a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/wet-ashes">As I wrote in &#8220;Wet Ashes&#8221;</a>: the original system was designed for <em>correction</em>, not <em>prevention</em>. That made sense in the 18th century. But in the 21st century, billions of dollars in potentially unconstitutional tariffs can be collected before any correction happens&#8212;and even then, the correction is only partial. The money can&#8217;t be returned to the people who paid it. The pace of modern governance has outrun the pace of constitutional correction.</p><p>We need to update the system.</p><p>The bridge can be fixed. The wiring can be changed.</p><p>But first, we have to see that there&#8217;s a problem with the wiring&#8212;not just the switches.</p><h3>About Those Midterms</h3><p>Right now, many people are looking toward the 2026 midterms. They&#8217;re hoping that if we can just elect different people&#8212;people with integrity, people who will push back&#8212;we can start turning off the lights we don&#8217;t want and turning on the lights that got turned off.</p><p>I understand the hope. I share it.</p><p>But those new representatives are going to encounter the same wiring. The same budget process. The same bundling. The same party pressure. The same transparency traps.</p><p>Within months, they&#8217;ll be behaving like everyone else. Not because they sold out. Because the wiring shapes the behavior.</p><p>If we want different results, we need to change the wiring&#8212;not just the switches.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Can You See It?</h2><p>That&#8217;s what I&#8217;m seeing. Government isn&#8217;t a philosophical conundrum. It&#8217;s a system with wiring. The wiring produces predictable outcomes. Right now, the wiring is producing dysfunction&#8212;regardless of who we elect.</p><p>This is more like physics than philosophy. And that&#8217;s actually hopeful. Because systems can be understood. And systems can be redesigned.</p><p>We don&#8217;t need 100 million people to become structural engineers. We just need enough people to stop yelling at the jumper and start looking at the bridge.</p><p>Can you see the hole? Does this make sense? I&#8217;ve been trying to explain this for months. If something&#8217;s not clear&#8212;if there&#8217;s something I&#8217;m missing&#8212;tell me. Leave a comment. I want to understand where the gap is.</p><p>Because once you see it, the question changes&#8212;from &#8220;who should we elect?&#8221; to &#8220;how should this system be designed?&#8221; And once enough people say the system should change, we can start figuring out how to make it happen.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Systems, not saints. Structure over personalities.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Wet Ashes]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Constitution was designed to correct. Not to prevent.]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/wet-ashes</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/wet-ashes</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 19:59:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png" width="1456" height="794" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!uSKS!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbe768f8b-8171-4788-bfe5-a79e8c282fd7_2816x1536.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>Sean Lupton-Smith had spent a decade proving that American manufacturing could still work. Not as a slogan &#8212; as a business model.</p><p>He built Electric Bicycle Co. in California starting in 2014. Custom e-bikes, assembled domestically, components sourced from Taiwan, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States. For years he&#8217;d been managing the reality of a global supply chain &#8212; carefully limiting his China-sourced parts, lobbying for tariff relief, watching what foreign competitors were doing to undercut him. He knew the landscape. He knew the pressures.</p><p>When the 2024 election came, he made a calculated bet. He voted for the candidate he believed would finally tip the scales for domestic manufacturers like him. The promise was simple: tariffs would punish foreign competitors flooding the market with cheap, unregulated imports. American builders would get their edge.</p><p>He wasn&#8217;t being naive. He was making the most informed decision he could, given everything he knew about his industry.</p><p>Then the tariffs landed &#8212; and they hit his own components. Parts climbed from 25% to 55% and kept going. He waited for the relief he&#8217;d been told would follow for domestic manufacturers. It didn&#8217;t arrive fast enough.</p><p>$6.1 million in liabilities. $953,000 in assets. Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The storefront in Huntington Beach is now a smoke shop.</p><p>His own words, after it was over: <em>&#8220;I thought Trump would save the day.&#8221;</em></p><div><hr></div><h2>The Sprinkler Fired</h2><p>Here is the part that should stop you.</p><p>The courts eventually pushed back on the tariff overreach. Judicial challenges worked their way through the system. Constitutional mechanisms engaged &#8212; exactly as designed. In the end, the correction mechanism fired.</p><p>Sean Lupton-Smith&#8217;s company was already gone.</p><p>Think about a sprinkler system. Its purpose is not to trigger after the room is fully engulfed in flames. Its purpose is to suppress fire before it becomes uncontrollable. A sprinkler that activates only after the building is a total loss has technically functioned. It has completely failed at its job.</p><p>The mechanism worked, and the damage is permanent. Both are true. And most of our political conversation has no way to hold them both at once.</p><p>The courts ruled the tariffs unlawful. And then: nothing. Under the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, you generally cannot sue the federal government for lost profits due to a policy later found unconstitutional. No mechanism exists to return the money collected. No guidance from the judiciary on what happens next. The executive branch, asked how to reverse the damage, says it was never told how. Stalemate. Some businesses had absorbed the tariff costs. Some passed them on to consumers who are still paying higher prices on necessities. Some &#8212; like Sean &#8212; simply closed. The ruling arrived into a void. The building was already ash, and no one could agree on who was supposed to sweep up.</p><p>This is the fundamental problem with a purely reactive system. Correction assumes there is something left to correct.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Serious Counterargument</h2><p>I want to be fair to the other side of this, because it deserves a fair hearing.</p><p>I had a <a href="https://therenovator.substack.com/p/the-megalomania-movement/comments#comment-210097582">debate recently</a> with <a href="https://substack.com/@jackjordan1">Jack Jordan</a>, a constitutional lawyer who writes at <a href="https://blackcollarcrime.substack.com/">Black-Collar Crime</a>. Jack&#8217;s argument was direct: the Constitution already contains everything we need. Prosecutors. Congressional oversight. Judicial review. Citizens who refuse to accept fraudulent rulings. If these tools were properly used, he argued, the system would work. The problem isn&#8217;t that we lack tools. It&#8217;s that we&#8217;re failing to use the tools we have.</p><p>This is not a stupid argument. Constitutional scholars make it. It has two hundred and thirty years of historical support behind it. And Jack is right &#8212; the mechanisms exist on paper.</p><p>Existing on paper and functioning in practice are two different things. A mechanism that depends on conditions that no longer hold is not a functioning mechanism. It&#8217;s a ghost of one. Here&#8217;s where the conditions have changed &#8212; three structural failures, not personnel failures:</p><p><strong>The first problem is Congress.</strong> For most of American history, there was at least a functioning adversarial relationship between branches of government &#8212; not because everyone was noble, but because legislators had some institutional loyalty to Congress as an institution, separate from their loyalty to a party. The mechanism exists: Congress can check the executive. But that check requires members of the president&#8217;s own party to act against their political teammate. Today that means primary challenges, fundraising cuts, and political exile. The incentive runs entirely the wrong direction. A mechanism that requires Congress to check its own team is, for practical purposes, a mechanism that doesn&#8217;t function &#8212; not because the words aren&#8217;t in the Constitution, but because the conditions required for those words to do anything real have eroded.</p><p><strong>The second problem is the judiciary.</strong> Federal judges are appointed by the president and confirmed by a Senate that is frequently controlled by the president&#8217;s party. The people whose institutional job is to check executive overreach were, in many cases, hand-picked by the executive they are checking. When courts rule against a president &#8212; and sometimes they do &#8212; they are ruling against someone who selected them. That&#8217;s not a conspiracy. It&#8217;s a structural design feature that creates obvious and real limits on how much checking the judiciary can reliably provide.</p><p><strong>The third problem is citizens.</strong> The Constitution assumes an informed public capable of recognizing abuse and refusing to accept it. That&#8217;s not a cynical dismissal of citizens &#8212; it&#8217;s the founders&#8217; own stated premise. But in an information environment where five competing narratives are running simultaneously &#8212; where the same event generates contradictory headlines before lunch &#8212; that assumption is doing a lot of heavy lifting. The detection layer the founders counted on is operating under conditions they never imagined.</p><p>Jack is answering a real question. It&#8217;s just not the right question. The right question is not &#8220;do the mechanisms exist?&#8221; It&#8217;s &#8220;do the mechanisms prevent irreversible harm?&#8221; And that is a different question entirely.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The 1789 Problem</h2><p>In the tariff case, judicial review eventually functioned. The correction mechanism fired &#8212; exactly as designed. And Sean Lupton-Smith was already in Chapter 7.</p><p>This is the core failure &#8212; and it belongs to no one person. It&#8217;s a timing problem that didn&#8217;t exist in 1789.</p><p>In an agrarian society with horseback communication, damage accumulated slowly. A correction cycle measured in months or years was fast enough &#8212; the harm waited for the remedy. If a president overstepped, the effects rippled outward gradually. Courts could rule before the damage became irreversible. Congress could act before businesses closed and supply chains restructured and livelihoods disappeared.</p><p>In today&#8217;s economy, an executive order can collect tariffs, destroy supply chains, and restructure global trade relationships before a court challenge completes its first hearing. The damage doesn&#8217;t wait for the ruling. It distributes &#8212; into contracts, into inventory decisions, into business closures, into people&#8217;s lives &#8212; and once it has distributed, no ruling reaches it.</p><p>Damage speed and correction speed have diverged. The Constitution was built when they were the same.</p><p>Jack grades the system on process completion: did the mechanism fire? The right grade is harm prevention: did the mechanism stop irreversible damage before it occurred? In 1789, those were the same question. Today, they are not.</p><p>This is not a flaw in the Constitution. It is a change in the world the Constitution operates in. The design was right for its time. That&#8217;s exactly the problem.</p><div><hr></div><h2>You Cannot Bootstrap Your Way Out</h2><p>The obvious answer is: elect better people. Put people in office who will actually use the mechanisms.</p><p>The structural problem with that answer is that the system selects for exactly the behavior we are seeing. Party loyalty over branch loyalty gets rewarded with support, money, and reelection. Acting against your own executive gets you primaried. This is not a character failure distributed evenly across all politicians. It is a rational response to the incentive structure &#8212; something I&#8217;ve written about in depth in <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/legislative-servitude">Legislative Servitude</a> and <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/legislative-servitude-how-transparency">Legislative Servitude (Redux)</a>, and in <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-unavoidable-need-for-nuance">The Patient Leader</a>, which examines why the people who succeed in our political system are often exactly the wrong ones for improving it. The enforcers are inside the system. The judges were selected by the executive. The prosecutors serve under him. The legislators calculate their survival.</p><p>You cannot pull yourself up by your own bootstraps. Neither can a governance system with no correction layer outside the political pressures it is meant to check.</p><div><hr></div><h2>From Bucket Brigades to Sprinkler Systems</h2><p>Here is the thing about the founders that gets lost in these arguments: they weren&#8217;t behind. They were the state of the art.</p><p>In 1736, Benjamin Franklin didn&#8217;t call the fire department when Philadelphia faced fire risk. He founded a volunteer fire company &#8212; because there was no fire department to call. George Washington served as a volunteer firefighter in Alexandria, Virginia. Colonial law required every household to keep two leather buckets by the door. When the church bells rang, citizens formed lines from the nearest well and passed water hand to hand.</p><p>The founders built the Constitution while they were still the bucket brigade. The correction mechanism was all there was &#8212; not because they lacked foresight, but because that was all there was. In 1789, you built with wood, brick, and stone. You fought fires with buckets and bells and neighbors. Prevention at scale was not yet a human capability.</p><p>The first widely recognized fully paid municipal fire department wasn&#8217;t established until 1853, in Cincinnati &#8212; sixty-four years after the Constitution. It came after devastating fires demonstrated that bucket brigades, no matter how well-organized, couldn&#8217;t prevent catastrophic loss once a fire reached a certain scale. And even then, professional firefighters were only part of the transformation.</p><p>The larger shift was building prevention into the architecture of buildings and cities themselves. Portland cement was patented in 1824. Reinforced concrete followed in the 1840s and 1850s. Steel-frame construction arrived in the 1880s. Concrete and steel don&#8217;t ignite the way wood does &#8212; but they&#8217;re fire-resistant, not fireproof. There were still fires. So the work continued: fire codes, egress paths designed into structures before anyone struck a match, smoke detectors, sprinkler systems, and running beneath all of it, municipal hydrant systems that guarantee water is available at every block &#8212; so when the bucket brigade shows up, there&#8217;s actually something to fill the buckets with.</p><p>We didn&#8217;t replace the fire department. We added layers. Bucket brigades saved buildings and lives. They were genuinely effective &#8212; when people knew where the fire was and could coordinate fast enough to reach it. But we stopped depending on them alone, because we learned enough about how fire spreads to build differently.</p><p>The Constitution still stands. It still does what it was designed to do. But it is a bucket brigade operating in a world that needs sprinkler systems &#8212; and that is not a failure of the founders. It is an inheritance they left for us to complete.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Three Layers. Three Timelines.</h2><p><strong>Right now &#8212; ring the church bells.</strong></p><p>Bucket brigades were only effective when people knew where the fire was. That&#8217;s what church bells did. They weren&#8217;t firefighting equipment. They were the alert system that made the bucket brigade functional. Without them: individuals with buckets, no coordination, no idea where to run.</p><p>Right now, our governance bucket brigade has buckets. Courts. Congress. Civil society. The press. What it doesn&#8217;t have is a coordinated bell. Something that cuts through the noise, tells everyone where the fire is, how fast it&#8217;s spreading, and where to show up &#8212; before the damage becomes permanent.</p><p><a href="https://www.watchduty.org/">Watch Duty</a> is the closest analog we have. It&#8217;s a real-time wildfire tracking platform built by volunteers &#8212; active and retired firefighters, dispatchers, first responders &#8212; that synthesizes official data and human monitoring into a single coordinated alert system. It doesn&#8217;t fight fires. It makes the people fighting fires more effective by giving them coordinated, real-time information before the fire outruns the response. During the January 2025 Southern California wildfires, it was downloaded millions of times. People trusted it because it was structured, nonpartisan, and built around a single purpose: tell people where the fire is.</p><p>We need this for governance. A structured, coordinated platform &#8212; call it Church Bells &#8212; that tracks executive actions in real time, maps their impact as it distributes, and alerts citizens, journalists, legal organizations, and legislators when and where to respond before the damage becomes irreversible. Not ad hoc. Not informal. Built, maintained, trusted.</p><p>This is the TSB&#8217;s first concrete call to action. Church Bells needs to be built.</p><p>Here is what I know: the people who need to build it are not all the same person. Some of you reading this have technical capabilities &#8212; the ability to build systems that aggregate, track, and alert. Some of you have legal expertise. Some of you have organizational experience, or media connections, or money to fund the infrastructure, or simply the willingness to show up and do whatever work is needed. Church Bells will require all of those things. Not everyone builds the bell. Some people hang it. Some people ring it. Some people just make sure the church stays standing.</p><p>That conversation starts here.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Subscribe if you want to hear the Church Bells</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>This is not enough. I want to be honest about that. A better alert system doesn&#8217;t fix the underlying architecture. But it is what we have while we build the next layer, and it matters.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>Medium term &#8212; use concrete, not wood.</strong></p><p>The original checks and balances were designed around majority action &#8212; because the founders assumed that branch loyalty would motivate the majority to act against executive overreach when necessary. That assumption is gone.</p><p>Which points toward a counterintuitive design shift: give the minority real blocking power on executive actions specifically.</p><p>This feels wrong at first. Congress is already gridlocked. Adding more obstacles to anything seems like exactly the wrong direction. But there is a distinction that matters here: legislative gridlock &#8212; the inability to pass new things &#8212; is a different problem from executive overreach &#8212; the inability to stop things being burned down. Adding minority blocking power on executive actions does not make legislation harder. It makes unilateral executive action harder.</p><p>A president who knows the minority party can throw real structural roadblocks into emergency declarations, broad executive orders, or major trade actions has to calculate differently. The dynamic changes &#8212; not because people become more principled, but because the incentive structure changes.</p><p>What does this look like in practice? Emergency powers that automatically expire after sixty days without active congressional reauthorization &#8212; not passive acquiescence, but required affirmative support. A minority threshold &#8212; say, forty Senate votes &#8212; sufficient to trigger automatic independent review of executive actions with broad economic impact. Inspector Generals with removal protections that don&#8217;t route through the executive they are investigating. Economic impact disclosures required before executive orders with major market effects take effect, giving minority members standing to challenge before the harm distributes.</p><p>And one more that deserves its own sentence: executive orders should have to prove their constitutionality <em>before</em> they take effect, not after. An expedited judicial review mechanism &#8212; triggered automatically for any executive order with broad economic or regulatory scope &#8212; that resolves the legal question before implementation, not during it. This alone would have changed Sean&#8217;s story. The tariff question would have had to be adjudicated before a single dollar was collected. The legal battle would have happened on paper, not in the wreckage of closed businesses. This is not removing the president&#8217;s executive authority. It is placing a constitutional checkpoint before that authority distributes irreversible harm. It is the difference between stopping a fire at the match and fighting it after the building is gone.</p><p>None of these require members of Congress to be heroes. They create friction built into the architecture. The same way building codes create fire resistance without requiring anyone to be brave. You do not need heroic behavior. You need concrete walls instead of wood ones.</p><p>This slows the spread. It does not stop every fire. But it buys correction mechanisms time to catch up &#8212; which is exactly what failed for Sean Lupton-Smith.</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>Long term &#8212; the Governance Design Agency.</strong></p><p>The long-term solution is a prevention layer built into the governance architecture itself. A professional body &#8212; insulated from the political pressures it monitors, the way the Federal Reserve is insulated from the electoral cycles it is designed to outlast &#8212; that can act on signals before the cascade, not just correct the record after. I&#8217;ve written the institutional and legal framework in detail <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/gda-institutional-legal-framework">here</a>, and the foundational case for the agency <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-governance-design-agency">here</a>.</p><p>The sprinkler doesn&#8217;t replace the fire department. The GDA doesn&#8217;t replace Congress or the courts. It is the detection and prevention layer that gives correction mechanisms a fighting chance &#8212; designed by people whose job is governance architecture, not governance operation.</p><p>One more thing worth naming directly. I&#8217;ve had people tell me &#8212; including in the debate linked above &#8212; that my background in software engineering and systems analysis isn&#8217;t a qualification for this work. That without a formal degree in political science or constitutional law, I should defer to the experts. I understand the instinct. But there is no credential for governance architecture. No board, no licensure, no professional body &#8212; because it doesn&#8217;t yet exist as a formal discipline. Medicine has medical boards. Law has the bar. Engineering has licensure. There is no one to defer to.</p><p>Benjamin Franklin didn&#8217;t wait for a credentialed fire protection expert before founding the Union Fire Company. There was no such expert. He looked at the problem, applied the best thinking available, and built something. There were almost certainly people who said bucket brigades were good enough &#8212; that someone without formal training had no business proposing changes to how an entire city fought fires. The bucket brigade was not enough. I&#8217;m not asking you to take my word for it. I&#8217;m asking you to look at the problems, look at the proposed solutions, and decide for yourself whether they hold up. The field is being built from scratch, in public, and the blueprints are on the table.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Finishing What the Founders Started</h2><p>Benjamin Franklin did not fail to build a fire department. No one had built one yet.</p><p>The founders built the best governance architecture the world had ever seen, for the world as it existed in 1789. The correction mechanisms they designed worked &#8212; for a world where damage accumulated slowly enough for correction to reach it. That they did not build a prevention layer is not a failure. It is an inheritance. Something left for the next generation to add, when the knowledge and the need aligned.</p><p>The knowledge and the need have aligned.</p><p>Sean Lupton-Smith&#8217;s company is gone. The damage that destroyed it was real, and the correction arrived too late to reach it. That is not a story about a bad president or a weak court or cowardly legislators. It is a story about a governance system operating at 1789 speed in a 2026 world.</p><p>The question his story forces is answerable: <em>why did the correction arrive after the harm became permanent?</em> The answer is a design problem. Design problems have design solutions.</p><p>We are not abandoning the Constitution. We are finishing it. The founders built for their world. That is exactly what we need to do for ours.</p><div><hr></div><p><em>The Statecraft Blueprint is a governance architecture publication. If you found this useful, share it. The government loading ring is our symbol &#8212; a reminder that the system is not broken beyond repair. It is buffering. The next version is being built.</em></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">The Statecraft Blueprint and Church Bells is looking for builders. Whatever your capability &#8212; technical, legal, organizational, financial &#8212; there is a role.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Otaz!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27c2b3c0-baa4-43be-ac12-eec0f4d3b240_500x500.gif" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Otaz!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27c2b3c0-baa4-43be-ac12-eec0f4d3b240_500x500.gif 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Otaz!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27c2b3c0-baa4-43be-ac12-eec0f4d3b240_500x500.gif 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Otaz!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27c2b3c0-baa4-43be-ac12-eec0f4d3b240_500x500.gif 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Otaz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27c2b3c0-baa4-43be-ac12-eec0f4d3b240_500x500.gif 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Otaz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27c2b3c0-baa4-43be-ac12-eec0f4d3b240_500x500.gif" width="500" height="500" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Otaz!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27c2b3c0-baa4-43be-ac12-eec0f4d3b240_500x500.gif 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Otaz!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27c2b3c0-baa4-43be-ac12-eec0f4d3b240_500x500.gif 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Otaz!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27c2b3c0-baa4-43be-ac12-eec0f4d3b240_500x500.gif 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Otaz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F27c2b3c0-baa4-43be-ac12-eec0f4d3b240_500x500.gif 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why Democratic Compromise Can't Fix Structural Problems]]></title><description><![CDATA[Democratic compromise is vital for setting goals, but disastrous for engineering mechanisms]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/why-democratic-compromise-cant-fix</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/why-democratic-compromise-cant-fix</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2026 16:40:22 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png" width="1456" height="794" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:794,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:7283226,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/i/189312746?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!fHan!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F59519082-02c3-4599-be74-5702a6d0b6df_2816x1536.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button tabindex="0" type="button" class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>This week I published two essays on policy reform.</p><p><a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/why-your-health-insurance-isnt-safe">Monday: the Affordable Care Act</a> &#8212; why it was simultaneously too prescriptive and didn&#8217;t go far enough, locking arbitrary thresholds into statute while leaving 25 million still uninsured. <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/both-sides-keep-losing-on-wall-street">Wednesday: the Stop Wall Street Looting Act</a> &#8212; why its two-year dividend delay sounded meaningful but could be routed around in an afternoon, and why the broader dysfunction it was meant to address remains untouched.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">The Statecraft Blueprint is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>I didn&#8217;t discover the pattern by writing them. I broke a single long essay into three pieces specifically to let readers experience it &#8212; the same structural failure, two different domains, before naming it explicitly here. This is that third piece.</p><p>The pattern is always identical. We identify a real problem everyone can see. We debate solutions. We compromise, pass legislation, and declare progress. A few years later, both sides are equally frustrated. Conservatives say it was too prescriptive, too intrusive, didn&#8217;t respect market forces. Progressives say it didn&#8217;t go far enough, left the core problem untouched, got watered down by industry pressure.</p><p>Here&#8217;s what&#8217;s striking: both critiques are usually right. The ACA was too prescriptive AND didn&#8217;t go far enough. Dodd-Frank was too complex AND left systemic risk intact. No Child Left Behind created perverse incentives AND failed to close achievement gaps.</p><p>This isn&#8217;t coincidence. It&#8217;s a pattern. And the question worth asking isn&#8217;t &#8220;why did this specific bill fail?&#8221; It&#8217;s &#8220;why does every bill fail the same way?&#8221;</p><p>The answer is that we keep using the wrong tool for the job. But before I make that argument, I want to take seriously why the people writing these bills believe &#8212; not unreasonably &#8212; that they&#8217;re using the right one.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Why the Traditional Approach Makes Sense</h2><p>There&#8217;s a conventional wisdom in legislative drafting, and it didn&#8217;t emerge from nowhere.</p><p>The lesson Washington has learned over decades of policy fights is this: vague mandates get captured. If Congress passes a law saying &#8220;achieve universal healthcare coverage through whatever mechanisms work best,&#8221; what happens next is that the insurance industry, the pharmaceutical lobby, and the hospital associations write the &#8220;whatever mechanisms work best&#8221; part. The regulatory process becomes a negotiation between organized interests. The vague mandate arrives at implementation and gets translated into rules that protect the incumbent players.</p><p>Political scientists call this &#8220;regulatory capture,&#8221; and it&#8217;s well-documented and genuinely destructive. Progressives lived through it with financial regulation in the 1990s. Conservatives have watched it happen with agencies they created. It&#8217;s not a partisan phenomenon &#8212; it&#8217;s a structural one.</p><p>So legislators learned: if you want something to actually happen, write it into the law. Lock it down. Make the mechanism specific enough that there&#8217;s no room for industry to rewrite it at the regulatory level. The thirty-hour threshold, the fifty-employee cutoff, the two-year dividend delay &#8212; these aren&#8217;t accidents of sloppy drafting. They&#8217;re attempts to leave as little discretion as possible to the administrative process that follows.</p><p>This logic isn&#8217;t wrong. Legislative specificity really does reduce the surface area for regulatory capture. Vague mandates really do get gutted in implementation. The instinct to lock mechanisms into statute is a rational response to a real problem that reformers have been burned by repeatedly.</p><p>Here&#8217;s the issue: the cure creates a different disease. And it&#8217;s just as fatal.</p><div><hr></div><h2>Two Different Problems, Two Different Tools</h2><p>There&#8217;s a distinction that the legislative drafting instinct collapses &#8212; one that explains why specificity in statute both reduces one failure mode and guarantees another.</p><p>Some problems are <strong>policy problems</strong>: what goals should we pursue, what trade-offs are acceptable, what values should guide our decisions? These are normative questions. Reasonable people disagree. Democratic debate is exactly the right mechanism for resolving them. Compromise isn&#8217;t a weakness here &#8212; it&#8217;s how you build legitimate decisions from diverse interests.</p><p>Other problems are <strong>architecture problems</strong>: given that we&#8217;ve agreed on the goal, what institutional mechanisms actually achieve it? How do we design accountability structures that resist capture? How do we anticipate second-order effects and gaming responses? How do we build systems that remain robust as circumstances change?</p><p>These are technical questions. They require systems thinking, failure-mode analysis, and expertise in institutional design. Democratic debate is poorly suited to resolve them &#8212; not because democracy is bad, but because you can&#8217;t vote your way to a bridge that holds.</p><p>The traditional drafting instinct &#8212; write specific mechanisms into law to prevent regulatory capture &#8212; is solving a policy problem with the tools of architecture. But it&#8217;s doing the architecture badly, because legislative drafting isn&#8217;t engineering. And it&#8217;s creating a new problem in the process: mechanisms locked into statute that can&#8217;t adapt, can&#8217;t iterate, and can&#8217;t respond to what actually happens when implementation meets reality.</p><p>We&#8217;ve been choosing between two failure modes &#8212; vague mandates that get captured, and specific mechanisms that get locked &#8212; without recognizing that both failures come from the same root cause. We&#8217;re asking democratic process to do work that requires professional design. And neither version of that approach produces institutions that work.</p><p>The question isn&#8217;t &#8220;how specific should the legislation be?&#8221; The question is whether legislation is the right tool at all for the part of the problem we keep getting wrong.</p><div><hr></div><h2>How Policy Eats Architecture</h2><p>When democratic process tries to do architecture work, four things happen reliably.</p><p><strong>Compromise weakens the mechanism.</strong> Passing legislation requires building coalitions. Building coalitions requires giving stakeholders what they need to say yes. In a policy debate about values and priorities, this is exactly how it should work &#8212; different interests get represented, trade-offs get negotiated, the result has democratic legitimacy. But when you&#8217;re engineering a mechanism, compromise can destroy it. The ACA&#8217;s individual mandate was weakened until it lacked sufficient force to hold the risk pool together. The employer mandate threshold was set at fifty employees and thirty hours specifically because those were the numbers a coalition could agree on &#8212; not because they made engineering sense. The healthcare.gov implementation disaster came from procurement rules designed for political accountability, not technical competence. The compromises that made the bill passable made the mechanism fragile.</p><p>You don&#8217;t negotiate the specifications for load-bearing steel. The bridge either holds or it doesn&#8217;t.</p><p><strong>Amateur design leaves gaps.</strong> Politicians are extraordinarily skilled at coalition-building, persuasion, and representing constituent interests. These are genuine and difficult skills. They are not the same as institutional design, systems thinking, or failure-mode analysis. The difference shows up in the details. The Stop Wall Street Looting Act&#8217;s two-year dividend delay sounds like a meaningful restriction on private equity extraction &#8212; until you notice that funds can simply structure exits at the two-year-and-one-day mark. The ACA&#8217;s 29-hour threshold for employer coverage was immediately exploited by businesses converting full-time positions to part-time. These aren&#8217;t unusual examples of legislative failure; they&#8217;re predictable consequences of having non-engineers design mechanisms.</p><p><strong>Mechanisms get locked into legislation.</strong> The only way to get democratic buy-in is to specify mechanisms in the bill itself. You can&#8217;t pass &#8220;achieve universal coverage however works best&#8221; &#8212; you have to pass individual mandates, specific penalty structures, exchange requirements with defined parameters. Once those mechanisms are locked into statute, they can&#8217;t be adjusted without passing new legislation. Which, in a polarized environment, means they can&#8217;t be adjusted at all. The ACA&#8217;s individual mandate became a political target precisely because it was written into law &#8212; and once it was weakened, the surrounding architecture couldn&#8217;t adapt. Good institutional design requires iteration based on outcomes. Legislation prevents iteration.</p><p><strong>Implementation through broken governance corrupts intent.</strong> Even a well-designed policy faces a final obstacle: it gets implemented through the same broken architecture that produced the problem in the first place. Regulatory agencies subject to capture by the industries they regulate. Enforcement priorities that shift with each administration. Revolving door between regulators and regulated. No institutional memory across personnel changes. The policy intent arrives at the implementation layer and encounters a system that systematically degrades it. Not because anyone is villainous, but because the implementation infrastructure is itself poorly designed.</p><p>This is the policy trap in its full form. Democratic process produces legislation with weakened mechanisms, amateur engineering, locked-in specifications, and implementation through captured agencies. Then we&#8217;re surprised when the structural problem persists.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What Policy Should Actually Do</h2><p>Here&#8217;s what gets lost in this: policy is valuable. Democratic debate about goals and values is not just necessary for legitimacy &#8212; it&#8217;s genuinely the right mechanism for those questions.</p><p>When we ask whether America should prioritize universal healthcare coverage, or how to balance environmental protection against economic development, or what trade-offs are acceptable between worker protection and capital flexibility &#8212; these are normative questions. They&#8217;re questions about what kind of society we want. Different people have legitimate different answers. The democratic process exists precisely to aggregate those preferences, build consensus, and produce legitimate decisions.</p><p>Good policy sounds like: &#8220;We want universal healthcare coverage.&#8221; &#8220;We want workers protected from predatory financial practices.&#8221; &#8220;We want quality education accessible to every child regardless of zip code.&#8221;</p><p>Notice what these statements do and don&#8217;t contain. They articulate goals. They establish priorities. They reflect democratic values. What they don&#8217;t do is specify implementation mechanisms, set arbitrary thresholds, or amateur-engineer complex institutional systems. That&#8217;s not a weakness in these statements. That&#8217;s what makes them appropriate policy.</p><p>The problem isn&#8217;t that policy sets goals. The problem is that policy tries to specify architecture, and does it badly.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Separation That Would Fix This</h2><p>The solution is proper separation of concerns &#8212; a principle any systems engineer would recognize immediately.</p><p>The <strong>policy layer</strong> is democratic. Congress, representing the public, sets goals and priorities. &#8220;We want universal coverage controlling costs.&#8221; &#8220;We want domestic manufacturing capacity in strategic sectors.&#8221; &#8220;We want campaign finance that doesn&#8217;t corrupt policy-making.&#8221; These decisions require democratic legitimacy, and they should stay at the democratic level. What they should not do is specify implementation mechanisms.</p><p>The <strong>architecture layer</strong> is professional. Given the goal Congress has articulated, what institutional mechanisms actually achieve it? What accountability structures prevent capture? What feedback loops detect when the system is drifting from its goal? How do we anticipate gaming responses? This is work that requires genuine expertise in institutional design, systems thinking, and failure analysis. It requires the ability to iterate based on outcomes &#8212; something legislation cannot do.</p><p>The <strong>accountability layer</strong> reconnects them democratically. Professional architects propose systems. Democratic representatives approve or reject. Senate confirms leadership. Congressional oversight reviews outcomes. Democratic override remains available if architects exceed their mandate. But day-to-day design decisions are insulated from the political cycles that corrupt implementation.</p><p>This isn&#8217;t theoretical. We already use this model for monetary policy. The Federal Reserve doesn&#8217;t ask Congress to vote on interest rate adjustments or bank capital requirements. Congress set the mandate &#8212; price stability and maximum employment &#8212; and a professional body with democratic oversight implements it. We use the same model for transportation safety through the NTSB, for public health response through the CDC, for infrastructure standards through a range of technical agencies.</p><p>The question is why we don&#8217;t apply it to governance architecture itself.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Governance Design Agency</h2><p>This is what the Governance Design Agency would do.</p><p>Not make policy decisions. Not override democratic priorities. Not operate without accountability. The GDA would be constitutionally structured with democratic oversight, Senate confirmation of leadership, and congressional review of outcomes &#8212; just as the Fed operates.</p><p>What it would do is apply professional institutional design to the architecture questions that democratic process handles badly. Healthcare: design an institutional system that actually achieves universal coverage, with accountability mechanisms, feedback loops, and the ability to iterate. Campaign finance: design structures that remove pay-to-play incentives regardless of who&#8217;s in office. Budget process: design a mechanism that literally cannot produce government shutdowns. These are engineering problems. They require engineering solutions.</p><p>Consider how the healthcare example would work differently. Congress sets the goal: universal coverage with cost control. The GDA designs the institutional system, begins implementation, and monitors outcomes. Five years in, coverage has improved but cost control is lagging. Congress adjusts the mandate: maintain coverage gains, prioritize cost control. The GDA iterates the design without rebuilding the entire system from scratch.</p><p>Under the current model, that iteration requires new legislation &#8212; which means another decade of partisan fighting, industry lobbying, compromise that weakens the mechanism, and amateur engineering that creates new gaps. The structural problem persists because the system can&#8217;t learn.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Standard Objection</h2><p>This sounds like technocracy. It&#8217;s the opposite.</p><p>Technocracy means experts making value decisions that should belong to democratic processes. The GDA model does the reverse: it preserves democratic authority over value decisions (what goals to pursue, what trade-offs to accept) while applying professional expertise to technical decisions (how to build institutional systems that achieve those goals).</p><p>Democracy is too valuable to waste on bridge specifications. We need it for the decisions that actually require it: what kind of society we want, how to balance competing interests, what we owe each other. When we exhaust democratic energy on mechanism design &#8212; on thirty-hour work week thresholds and individual mandate penalty calculations &#8212; we&#8217;re spending legitimacy on engineering work and doing the engineering badly.</p><p>Better politicians don&#8217;t fix this. The tools available to politicians &#8212; legislation through democratic process &#8212; produce the failure pattern regardless of politician quality. We need different tools, applied by people with different expertise, with democratic oversight that keeps them accountable to the goals that legitimately belong to democratic decision-making.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Choice</h2><p>We&#8217;ve been running this experiment for decades. Healthcare, financial regulation, education, environment, infrastructure &#8212; the pattern holds across every domain. Democratic compromise produces half-measures. Amateur engineering leaves gaps. Mechanisms get locked into legislation. Implementation through broken governance corrupts intent. Both sides end up frustrated. The structural problem persists.</p><p>This is predictable. Not a bug in democracy &#8212; a consequence of asking democracy to do architecture&#8217;s job.</p><p>The solution isn&#8217;t less democracy. It&#8217;s properly structured democracy: clear about what democratic process should decide, and equipped with professional architecture to make democratic goals actually achievable.</p><p>Democracy sets the goals. Professional design builds the systems. Accountability keeps both aligned.</p><p>That&#8217;s the Governance Design Agency. That&#8217;s what I would build. Not tentatively, not as one option among many &#8212; because the alternative is choosing the failure pattern we&#8217;ve already lived through, again, across every policy domain, for another fifty years.</p><p>We can do better. The architecture exists. We&#8217;re choosing not to build it.</p><p><strong>Share the loading symbol. Demand professional governance architecture. Let&#8217;s build this.</strong></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">The Statecraft Blueprint is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Both Sides Keep Losing on Wall Street]]></title><description><![CDATA[One reform bill. Too prescriptive AND not far enough. That&#8217;s not a contradiction &#8212; it&#8217;s the pattern.]]></description><link>https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/both-sides-keep-losing-on-wall-street</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/both-sides-keep-losing-on-wall-street</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jason Edwards]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 16:33:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png" width="1456" height="794" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!rvK0!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbc9e0b17-522e-4d26-a571-f4d9dcac196e_2816x1536.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>When a conservative economist writes that Elizabeth Warren&#8217;s Wall Street reform bill is &#8220;chock full of excessive interventions and yet, ultimately, does not go nearly far enough,&#8221; something interesting is happening.</p><p>That&#8217;s Oren Cass &#8212; former Mitt Romney advisor, director of American Compass, free-market conservative &#8212; analyzing the Stop Wall Street Looting Act in his report <em><a href="https://americancompass.org/confronting-coin-flip-capitalism/">Confronting Coin-Flip Capitalism</a></em>. And he&#8217;s right. Not partially right. Structurally right.</p><p>Progressives see the problem clearly: private equity loads companies with debt, extracts value through fees and dividends, then walks away when the leveraged buyout collapses &#8212; leaving workers unemployed and communities hollowed out. The Stop Wall Street Looting Act (SWSLA) tries to fix this. It targets PE firms specifically, restricts dividends for two years after acquisition, limits interest deductions when debt-to-equity ratios exceed certain thresholds, and creates new liability rules.</p><p>And a conservative economist says it&#8217;s both too much and not enough.</p><p>Before we get to that question, let&#8217;s be clear about what&#8217;s actually at stake. When firms are heavily leveraged, downturns don&#8217;t just hurt investors. Leveraged companies cut jobs faster, freeze investment harder, and amplify recessions across entire communities. This isn&#8217;t incidental damage &#8212; it&#8217;s structurally incentivized. The system is designed to produce it.</p><p>How does that happen? How does a reform effort end up simultaneously over-engineered and insufficient?</p><p>It happens every time. Healthcare. Campaign finance. Banking regulation after 2008. The same pattern, different domain.</p><p>This isn&#8217;t a coincidence. It&#8217;s a structural problem &#8212; and it has a structural solution.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Two Ways Reform Always Fails</h2><p>The SWSLA suffers from two failure modes that appear contradictory but actually cause each other.</p><p><strong>Failure Mode One: Too Prescriptive</strong></p><p>The bill doesn&#8217;t say &#8220;protect workers from predatory financial practices.&#8221; It locks specific engineering mechanisms into law. Debt-to-equity ratios. Two-year waiting periods for dividends. Rules that apply only to PE firms, specifically defined.</p><p>The problem with this isn&#8217;t the intent. The problem is that financial firms don&#8217;t sit still. They restructure to avoid the label. As Cass observes, the main effect of narrow PE-specific rules would likely be to encourage firms to recast their activities in other forms &#8212; same economic substance, different legal wrapper. The rules become a maze to navigate, not a barrier to predation.</p><p>Arbitrary thresholds make it worse. Section 204 of SWSLA limits interest deductibility only when debt-to-equity ratios exceed 1. That specific number creates a bright line to game. Structure your deal to land at 0.99 and you&#8217;re fine. The rule adds complexity, distorts incentives around that threshold, and doesn&#8217;t address the root cause: the tax code subsidizes all debt, not just PE debt.</p><p>The two-year dividend restriction has the same problem. Cass is blunt: the restriction is hard to see as accomplishing anything beyond prompting PE firms to build up cash reserves inside their acquired companies and release them the moment the restriction expires. Amateur engineering creates workarounds. Every time.</p><p><strong>Failure Mode Two: Didn&#8217;t Go Far Enough</strong></p><p>While SWSLA over-engineers solutions for a narrow slice of the problem, the actual structural problems are much broader and go completely untouched.</p><p>The tax code still subsidizes debt across the entire economy. Interest payments are tax-deductible. Dividends are not. That single asymmetry tilts the system. <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49817">CBO modeling of effective marginal tax rates on capital income</a> found that debt-financed investment can carry a negative effective rate (around &#8211;6%) while equity-financed investment faces a strongly positive rate (around 38%). These aren&#8217;t statutory rates &#8212; they reflect how the deductibility rules change the actual return on investment. That incentive structure doesn&#8217;t just affect PE &#8212; it shapes how every major corporation in America is financed. SWSLA focuses narrowly on PE and leaves this foundational distortion in place.</p><p>Bankruptcy law still treats workers as unsecured creditors in any bankruptcy, not just PE-driven ones. Workers lose jobs without priority claims on assets in any industry, any context, any type of ownership structure. SWSLA tries to create PE-specific worker protections while the broader bankruptcy framework that creates worker vulnerability goes unreformed.</p><p>Regulatory capture &#8212; the process by which financial sector interests come to dominate the regulators meant to oversee them &#8212; is untouched entirely. Pay-to-play campaign finance, the revolving door between regulators and industry, the structural incentives that make capture inevitable: SWSLA doesn&#8217;t address any of it.</p><p>Both failure modes &#8212; over-prescriptive in the narrow lanes it addresses, and fundamentally insufficient at the structural level &#8212; exist in the same bill. That&#8217;s not a drafting error. That&#8217;s what happens when policy tries to do architecture&#8217;s job.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Missing Distinction</h2><p>We have confused two different kinds of work, and the confusion is destroying our ability to solve hard problems.</p><p><strong>Policy is democratic decision-making about goals and values.</strong></p><p>Should we protect workers from financial strategies that privatize gains and socialize losses? Should we prioritize long-term capital investment over short-term extraction? How do we balance market freedom with economic stability? These are normative questions. They have no objectively correct answer. They require representation, debate, and democratic legitimacy. Different people have legitimate disagreements about them, and the answers should evolve as society changes.</p><p>Democracy is the right tool for this. Compromise and representation are features here, not bugs. A Congress that debates and votes on whether to protect workers from predatory finance is doing exactly what it should do.</p><p><strong>Architecture is professional design of institutions and mechanisms.</strong></p><p>How do you actually protect workers from predatory finance in a way that can&#8217;t be gamed? What bankruptcy structure achieves that goal? What tax treatment creates the right incentives across the entire economy, not just for one class of actors? What accountability mechanisms prevent regulatory capture? These are technical questions. They have better and worse answers. They require systems thinking, understanding of incentives, knowledge of how complex institutions fail.</p><p>You don&#8217;t democratically compromise on whether the bridge supports the load. You engineer it to spec, then democratically decide which bridges to build.</p><p>When Congress tries to answer both questions simultaneously &#8212; setting the goal AND designing the mechanism &#8212; you get what you always get: compromises that water down the mechanism while political pressure narrows the scope. The architecture gets corrupted in the design process. What emerges is half-measures that don&#8217;t solve the structural problem and rigid rules that create workarounds.</p><p>This isn&#8217;t a critique of Congress. It&#8217;s a recognition that these are two different kinds of problems requiring two different kinds of work.</p><div><hr></div><h2>What It Should Look Like</h2><p>Here&#8217;s what proper separation of concerns produces &#8212; and it turns out a conservative and a progressive can agree on most of it once you strip away the amateur engineering.</p><p><strong>What Congress should provide:</strong> A clear policy mandate. &#8220;We want workers and communities protected from financial strategies that privatize gains and socialize losses. We want capital allocated to productive investment, not extraction.&#8221; That&#8217;s it. Democratic legitimacy for the goal. No debt-to-equity thresholds. No two-year timelines. No narrow definitions that financial engineers will immediately route around.</p><p><strong>What professional governance architecture should design:</strong></p><p><em>Bankruptcy reform with real teeth.</em> Workers should receive priority claims &#8212; something equivalent to six months of wages &#8212; ahead of financial creditors in any bankruptcy. Not just PE-driven bankruptcies. Any bankruptcy. This applies broadly, makes creditors wary of excessive leverage across all ownership structures, and actually protects the workers it&#8217;s meant to protect. This isn&#8217;t ideological &#8212; it&#8217;s how you make the stated goal achievable.</p><p><em>Tax treatment that doesn&#8217;t subsidize leverage.</em> Eliminate the interest deduction advantage that makes debt financing artificially attractive compared to equity financing across the entire economy. This addresses the root cause rather than policing symptoms. If you remove the subsidy driving overleveraging, you change incentives for every firm, not just the ones clever enough to call themselves PE.</p><p><em>Transparency requirements with real accountability.</em> Private funds should register benchmarks before they&#8217;re deployed, not after. Fees, performance, and returns should be publicly reported. This doesn&#8217;t prescribe outcomes &#8212; it creates information infrastructure so markets and regulators can actually function.</p><p><em>Reduce financial engineering&#8217;s artificial advantages.</em> Return stock buyback rules to something closer to what existed before 1982. Apply financial transaction taxes that make high-frequency trading pay the same costs that other economic activity pays. These aren&#8217;t punitive &#8212; they&#8217;re adjustments that remove artificial advantages currently baked into the system.</p><p>These proposals address root causes rather than symptoms. They apply broadly rather than narrowly, making them harder to route around. They can be adjusted based on outcomes rather than locked into political fights about whether to revisit the original legislation.</p><p>Notice something: these proposals come largely from Cass &#8212; the conservative. He&#8217;s not defending Wall Street. He&#8217;s not arguing for less regulation. He&#8217;s proposing structural architecture that actually works. A progressive and a conservative, applying structural thinking to the same problem, arriving at largely compatible proposals.</p><p>That&#8217;s what happens when you separate &#8220;what goals to pursue&#8221; from &#8220;how to achieve them reliably.&#8221;</p><div><hr></div><h2>Why This Keeps Happening</h2><p>This isn&#8217;t a financial regulation problem. It&#8217;s a governance architecture problem that shows up everywhere financial regulation is just the current example.</p><p>The pattern is identical in healthcare. The Affordable Care Act had a clear policy goal &#8212; expand coverage &#8212; and tried to achieve it by writing specific mechanisms into legislation: mandates with specific penalty structures, exchanges with specific designs, Medicaid expansion with specific thresholds. Every one of those mechanisms became a political target. Every stakeholder got carve-outs. Amateur engineering left gaps that were immediately exploited. The architecture was negotiated by people whose job is building coalitions, not designing robust systems.</p><p>The pattern appears in banking regulation after 2008. Dodd-Frank&#8217;s policy intent was clear: prevent another financial crisis. But implementation was delegated to regulatory agencies whose capture by the financial sector it was designed to prevent. The architecture didn&#8217;t address the capture problem, so the architecture got captured.</p><p>It appears in infrastructure, in education, in every domain where we ask democratic policy-making to simultaneously design the implementation. The failure modes are always the same: too prescriptive where political fights force specificity, not far enough where structural root causes go unaddressed.</p><p>This is a predictable outcome of a governance architecture that doesn&#8217;t separate the two kinds of work.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Governance Design Agency</h2><p>What I would build is an institution that makes this separation explicit and durable. I&#8217;ve laid out the full design in <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-governance-design-agency">The Governance Design Agency</a> and its <a href="https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/gda-institutional-legal-framework">institutional and legal framework</a> &#8212; the short version is this:</p><p>The Governance Design Agency &#8212; modeled on how the Federal Reserve handles monetary policy &#8212; would provide the professional architecture layer that democratic policy-making currently has to do badly or not at all. Congress sets the mandate: protect workers from predatory finance, ensure capital allocates to productive investment. The GDA designs the institutional mechanisms that actually achieve it: the bankruptcy structure, the tax treatment, the transparency requirements, the accountability systems.</p><p>The GDA isn&#8217;t making policy. It&#8217;s doing engineering. It&#8217;s designing the bridge to the spec Congress provides.</p><p>Democratic accountability runs in both directions. Congress confirms GDA leadership. Congress can reject proposed architecture and send it back. Congress retains the power to change the mandate when democratic preferences evolve. What Congress doesn&#8217;t do is also design the engineering &#8212; because that&#8217;s not what democratic deliberation is designed to do well.</p><p>The obvious objection: won&#8217;t the GDA just get captured by the financial sector faster than Congress does? That&#8217;s a real risk, and it&#8217;s why the design matters. Unlike regulatory agencies that depend on industry expertise and rotate staff with the firms they oversee, the GDA&#8217;s mandate is architectural &#8212; it designs systems for all sectors, not just finance, which breaks the single-industry capture dynamic. Its output is publicly reviewable before Congress approves it. That&#8217;s not a perfect firewall, but it&#8217;s structurally better than what we have now, where capture is baked into the current architecture with no accountability mechanism at all.</p><p>This is why we have a Federal Reserve Chair for monetary policy rather than asking Congress to set interest rates through legislation. Not because monetary policy is unimportant &#8212; because professional design of monetary mechanisms produces better outcomes than political compromise on the mechanisms themselves.</p><p>Governance design is no different. We just haven&#8217;t built the institution yet.</p><div><hr></div><h2>The Broader Point</h2><p>When Oren Cass &#8212; a free-market conservative &#8212; and Elizabeth Warren &#8212; a progressive champion of worker protection &#8212; both look at Wall Street and see a structural problem, and then produce reform efforts that fail in opposite directions, the failure isn&#8217;t partisan. It&#8217;s architectural.</p><p>Both sides are trying to solve a real problem through a process that systematically produces the wrong kind of solution. Too prescriptive in the mechanisms it does address. Not far enough in the structural causes it leaves untouched. Amateur engineering that financial sophistication routes around within years.</p><p>The solution isn&#8217;t better Democratic or Republican proposals. It&#8217;s a governance system that does the two kinds of work separately: democratic legitimacy for policy goals, professional design for institutional mechanisms.</p><p>Financial reform keeps failing because we keep asking policy-making to do architecture&#8217;s work.</p><p>We don&#8217;t lack intelligence or capital or political will. We lack correct incentive architecture. That&#8217;s a design problem. Design problems have design solutions.</p><p>That&#8217;s not a people problem. That&#8217;s a design flaw &#8212; one we know how to fix.</p><p><strong>Share the loading symbol. Demand professional governance architecture. Let&#8217;s build this.</strong></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://statecraftblueprint.org/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Stop watching people use hammers on clockwork. Subscribe for the blueprints.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>