Hm, I feel like Armitage addresses a lot of your objections in his "Tax Warfare" document. He's pretty upfront about the legal issues.
"Two constitutional principles create the framework for
everything that follows. Understanding both, and especially the tension between them, is essential before considering any action.
The first principle is the anti-commandeering doctrine. Across
three landmark Supreme Court decisions spanning from 1992
to 2018, the Court has held that the federal government cannot
force states to implement or enforce federal programs. In Printz v. United States (1997), Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that the federal government "may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers...to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program.
This principle was extended in
Murphy v. NCAA (2018), where Justice Alito wrote that the
anti-commandeering doctrine "is simply the expression of a
fundamental structural decision incorporated into the
Constitution, i.e., the decision to withhold from Congress the
power to issue orders directly to the States.
What this means in practice is that states participate in federal
programs voluntarily, in exchange for federal funding. When
that funding is illegally withheld, or when the federal government fails to honor its obligations, the constitutional basis for state cooperation weakens considerably. States cannot be compelled to serve as administrative arms of federal
enforcement.
The second principle is the Supremacy Clause, as interpreted in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). Chief Justice Marshall established that states have "no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress.
Marshall's famous dictum that "the power to tax is the power to
destroy" created a doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity
that, while narrowed over subsequent centuries, still prohibits states from actively obstructing federal operations.
This creates genuine constitutional vulnerability for the most aggressive strategies outlined in this guide. We should be honest about that. A full employer escrow mandate would likely be struck down under McCulloch's broad prohibition. But "likely to be struck down" is not the same as "not worth trying."
The Republican legislators who introduced tax escrow bills in 2009 and 2010 knew their proposals faced serious constitutional obstacles. They introduced them anyway. Their playbook has always been to advance aggressive interpretations, force litigation, accept adverse rulings, modify the approach slightly, and try again. Over decades, this strategy has shifted the boundaries of what courts consider acceptable. We are not obligated to fight with one hand tied behind our
backs while they use both.
One further distinction requires acknowledgment. The
precedents that support state opposition, including sanctuary cities, cannabis legalization, and REAL ID, all involve states withdrawing cooperation from federal programs where states
previously participated. Tax escrow is structurally different. States do not currently serve as intermediaries in federal income tax collection. Employers remit directly to the IRS through the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System. A state law redirecting those payments does not withdraw existing cooperation. It interposes state control into a relationship where states have no current role.
This distinction matters legally. The Ninth Circuit's 2024 decision in United States v. King County held that while anti-commandeering protects states from being conscripted into federal enforcement, intergovernmental immunity bars states from obstructing federal operations or discriminating against those with whom the federal government deals. A full employer escrow mandate would almost certainly be characterized as obstruction rather than non-cooperation.
Additionally, 26 U.S.C. § 7501 designates withheld taxes as funds held "in trust for the United States.
These are not state funds or employer funds. They are employee funds held by
employers as trustees for the federal government. A state law redirecting trust property to state control faces not only Supremacy Clause challenges but potential claims of conversion.
None of this means the strategy is worthless. It means we should understand what we are doing. We are not withdrawing cooperation. We are forcing a confrontation over whether states
can leverage their position as employers and regulators, and
whether federal enforcement capacity can actually compel
compliance at scale. That confrontation may clarify constitutional boundaries in ways that inform future action, or it may reveal enforcement weaknesses that create practical leverage regardless of legal outcomes. Either result has strategic value."
You're absolutely right - this is an important distinction I should have made more clearly in the essay.
Armitage is more legally sophisticated than I gave him credit for. In his Tax Warfare document, he explicitly acknowledges the constitutional vulnerabilities, the Supremacy Clause issues, the distinction between non-cooperation and obstruction, and that full employer escrow "would likely be struck down." He's not confused about the law.
What he's arguing is different: "likely to be struck down" is not the same as "not worth trying." His strategy is to force confrontation, test boundaries through litigation, and "reveal enforcement weaknesses that create practical leverage regardless of legal outcomes."
That's a legitimate strategic choice. It's the Republican playbook from 2009-2010 with tax escrow bills - advance aggressive interpretations, force litigation, accept adverse rulings, modify slightly, try again. Over decades, this can shift boundaries.
So let me reframe my concern:
The issue isn't that Armitage doesn't understand the legal distinction. It's that the "try it anyway and force litigation" strategy has costs that aren't being fully accounted for:
Political capital is finite. Every lawsuit you lose on legally dubious grounds makes the next one harder. Courts start seeing you as bad faith actors rather than serious litigants.
Adverse precedent is dangerous. When you force a confrontation and lose, you don't just lose that case - you create binding precedent that makes future legitimate challenges harder. The Ninth Circuit's King County decision Armitage cites? That's now law that future state actions have to navigate around.
It fragments coalition. Legal scholars, constitutional law groups, and institutionalists who would support aggressive but lawful federalism will not support strategies they know are legally dubious. You lose allies you need for the long game.
It plays into authoritarian hands. When blue states pursue legally dubious obstruction, it gives cover for red states to do the same - and gives Trump justification for emergency powers, federal intervention, and "restoring law and order."
Compare to what worked: The 130+ multistate lawsuits during Trump's first term won ~83% because they used legitimate legal theories. Sanctuary cities survived because they rest on solid anti-commandeering doctrine. Cannabis legalization works because states aren't actually nullifying federal law - they're just not helping enforce it, and the feds chose not to prioritize enforcement.
Courts will move boundaries in your direction (they might move them against you)
Federal enforcement is weak enough that "practical leverage" matters (it might not be)
The political cost of losing is worth the information gained (it might not be)
We have time for multi-decade boundary-shifting (we might not)
My argument is: Spend that political capital on things with better odds. Demand Congress repeal the AUMF (legally straightforward, huge impact). Push for inspector general restoration. Build state capacity through legitimate compacts. Use anti-commandeering aggressively where it's on solid ground.
And build toward constitutional amendment for professional governance architecture.
The question isn't "should we be aggressive?" It's "should we be aggressive in ways that work or in ways that might backfire spectacularly?"
I appreciate you pushing me to be more precise about this. Armitage isn't legally confused - we just disagree about strategic wisdom of forcing confrontations you're likely to lose.
Because I am not an attorney, I won't debate the legal points. I agree it would be better from a national defense perspective, if the government were not completely corrupt, for the U.S. to remain whole. Unfortunately, we don't have the luxury of time to create a system to prevent abuse of power. We have to work with any tools available while we still have rights. It's later than you think.
Thank you for taking the time to share that - you're raising something I should address more directly.
You're absolutely right that we can't wait for the GDA to exist before we act. I've never argued we should.
In my Authoritarian Toolkit essay (https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-architecture-of-executive-power), I outlined specific reforms Congress could pass tomorrow: repeal the AUMF that Trump is using for unauthorized military action, restore inspector general protections, reinstate ethics requirements, fix the budget process so shutdowns can't happen. In my Congressional ethics piece (https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/players-making-the-rules), I detailed accountability mechanisms. None of these require constitutional amendment. They require sustained citizen pressure.
That's what I mean by "heroic effort" - not waiting for someone to save us, but organizing 40,000 people (Armitage's subscriber count) to demand Congress repeal the AUMF. Imagine that energy directed at specific, achievable reforms instead of pursuing legally dubious separation.
Here's my distinction: Aggressive federalism (the legal parts of what Armitage documents) - absolutely use those tools right now. Anti-commandeering, interstate compacts, coordinated litigation, state innovation. These are real, they work, and they're constitutionally sound.
But the soft secession parts that require nullification or obstruction of federal authority - those aren't tools. They're fantasies that waste political capital on losing court battles.
You say "it's later than I think." Maybe. But I think it's also earlier than Armitage thinks. He's written that the American democracy experiment is over, that democracy has basically never beaten fascism. That's historically accurate - but we also have tools previous generations didn't have. Information technology, coordination capacity, historical examples to learn from.
This is the learned helplessness trap I write about constantly: if you believe it's too late, you abandon solutions that could work in favor of desperate measures that can't.
I think democracy can still be saved. Not easily. Not without sustained effort. But saved.
And that means:
Short-term: Use every legitimate federalism tool aggressively
Medium-term: Build political will for structural reforms (AUMF repeal, ethics restoration, budget fixes)
Long-term: Constitutional amendment for professional governance architecture
The question isn't "do we have time?" The question is "are we going to spend our energy on things that work or things that feel good but fail?"
This is the learned helplessness trap I write about constantly.
"Rely on Congress and you'll be dead before this ship sinks" expresses real frustration with a broken system. I get it. But it's also giving up while calling it realism.
Let me clarify what I mean by "building political will for structural reform":
I'm not saying "hope Congress spontaneously reforms itself." I'm saying citizens force Congress to act through sustained, coordinated pressure.
Here's what that actually looks like:
40,000 people (Armitage's subscriber count) demanding Congress repeal the AUMF
Coordinated pressure campaigns targeting specific legislators and legislation
Primary challenges for representatives who refuse to act
State legislatures passing resolutions demanding federal action
Using legitimate federalism tools (anti-commandeering, compacts, litigation) while we build long-term capacity
That's not passive waiting. That's organized force.
The alternative - soft secession through legally dubious state obstruction - also requires court battles, also takes years, and faces all the constitutional barriers I outlined in the essay. So the real choice isn't "quick fix vs. slow fix." It's "constitutional path that's hard but possible vs. unconstitutional path that feels active but fails in court."
Yes, the ship is sinking. But that makes it more important, not less, to use tools that actually work rather than tools that feel satisfying but create adverse precedent and waste political capital.
Democracy has never beaten fascism by fragmenting. Soft secession is playing on fascism's home turf - division, weakened institutions, fragmented collective capacity - and democracy will lose that game. We need to change the game. Change the system. Build the governance architecture that makes democratic self-governance work at scale across profound differences.
The cathedral work is harder than the crisis response. It's also the only thing that lasts.
I would argue you are exhibiting learned helplessness. you want to lean on the institutions you were taught to believe in. I want to believe in the people and leave the broken system behind. there is no use in beating a dead horse.
I think there's a fundamental misunderstanding here about what institutions are.
Institutions aren't separate from people. Institutions are people organizing collectively with rules and structures. When you say "believe in people, not institutions," you're creating a false choice.
And ironically, that's exactly what every Trump supporter says too. "Drain the swamp." "Believe in the people, not the corrupt institutions." "Tear down the establishment." That rhetoric is how authoritarians dismantle the very structures that protect democratic governance. When we echo that same anti-institutional rhetoric - even from the opposite political direction, even with good intentions - we're doing the authoritarians' work for them.
If you're going to rely on always having the right person in charge, you better come up with a bulletproof way to ensure only the best person gets in there. Which seems like a very high bar - and one that's never been cleared in human history.
Every form of collective action requires institutions.
State resistance? That's state government institutions.
Community organizing? That creates new institutions.
You can't escape institutions. You can only choose which ones and what rules they operate under.
This is the Hero Trap I write about: expecting people to be better than the systems allow them to be. James Madison said it plainly: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary." But we're not angels. We respond to incentives. We make decisions based on the structures around us.
That's not cynicism. That's design thinking - from the founders of our country.
The question isn't "people vs. institutions."
The question is: "Do we design institutions that work with human nature, or do we hope humans transcend their nature?"
Even if you found the perfect person - high moral character, best intentions, incorruptible ethics - put them into our current system and watch what happens. The incentives are all wrong. Spend 30+ hours a week fundraising or lose your seat. Choose between governing well and surviving primary challenges from extremists. Face electoral cycles that punish long-term thinking. Navigate a Supreme Court that's been captured. Work within a budget process designed for failure.
How long does their willpower last? How many cycles before they compromise? How sustainable is heroic resistance to structural dysfunction?
Governance architecture says: build systems where even flawed, self-interested people produce good outcomes. Make it easy to do the right thing and hard to do the wrong thing. Create accountability with teeth. Design for durability across generations.
The alternative says: hope we keep electing heroes, or hope state governments are more virtuous than federal government, or hope courts uphold doctrines that are two votes from collapsing, and trust that this somehow ends better than every other time in history when democracies relied on heroism instead of architecture.
One of these approaches designs for reality. The other hopes reality will be different than it's ever been.
I'm not "leaning on institutions I was taught to believe in." I'm leaning on the fundamental ideas this country was founded on - that you design systems to work with human nature, not against it. We've just been neglecting the maintenance. The architecture is 250 years old, built for a different era, and desperately needs professional renovation.
That's not learned helplessness. That's the opposite.
I like this critical essay, but I disagree that we have the benefit of structural reforms at the federal level. I'm supportive of Armitage's proposals not as a tool to soft secession, but as leverage against authoritarian takeover.
All 3 branches of the federal government have been captured by fascists and their enablers. More than half of the state governments are in the same hands, and getting more and more entrenched. The federal bureaucracy has been hollowed out and career employees have been replaced with loyalists.
If we don't push back as aggressively as the autocrats, we will get rolled over. Armitage proposes that blue states use their leverage to elicit concessions. For example, trigger laws that withhold tax dollars from the government in case of election interference, legality aside, is a warning with teeth against the next logical step in the authoritarian playbook. Aggressively arresting federal officers that commit crimes directly pushes back against the terror tactics of a budding fascist regime.
Only by resisting in this way do we have any hope of enacting reforms in some post-Trump era. The strictly legal approaches are not enough to stop what is coming.
It will take a generation to repair the damage that's already been done, let alone reform the system for the better. I'm all on board the reform train, I've written articles about it. But a Constitutional Convention is a pipe dream when more than half the states are in gerrymandered fascist supermajorities. Expecting Congress to pass laws or amendments is likewise foolish. Even if they managed to get something through, SCOTUS is in the hands of naked GOP partisans for the next decades. The path to reform is bottom-up, from state ballot initiatives and state-level reform.
The only way I see out of this without soft secession is if these conditions get met.
1. A majority of incumbent Democrats lose their primaries to more combative challengers.
2. The nation votes in a Democratic supermajority, overcoming GOP belligerence, illegal seizures of ballot boxes by ICE, intimidation at the polls, potentially Insurrection Act, etc.
3. The new Dems get seated somehow without Mike Johnson calling the election illegitimate and refusing to seat them.
4. Dems impeach and remove SCOTUS judges and every member of the cabinet including Trump.
5. Dems pass laws stripping power from SCOTUS and the President, call a Constitutional Convention, etc.
The probability of this happening is infinitesimal.
This is a thoughtful critique and I agree with more of it than you might think.
Where we align:
You're right that all three branches have been captured or severely compromised. You're right that we need aggressive pushback. You're right that bottom-up state action is essential. You're right that expecting Congress to spontaneously reform is foolish.
And you're right that some of what Armitage proposes IS legitimate leverage right now.
States aggressively using anti-commandeering - absolutely. Interstate compacts building parallel capacity - yes. State prosecutors charging federal officers who commit crimes in their states - this is legitimate state sovereignty, and it should happen.
Where I think you're making a strategic error:
The trigger laws withholding tax dollars - this is exactly the kind of aggressive action that courts will strike down under the Supremacy Clause and intergovernmental immunity. Not because the courts are fair, but because even captured courts won't allow states to directly obstruct federal revenue collection. You'll lose that fight, create adverse precedent, and give authoritarians cover to do worse.
But here's the deeper issue: Soft secession faces all the same obstacles you correctly identify, PLUS constitutional ones.
You list the conditions needed for federal reform:
Dems primary incumbents
Overcome voter suppression/intimidation to win supermajority
Get seated despite Mike Johnson
Impeach and remove SCOTUS/cabinet
Strip power, call convention
And you say the probability is infinitesimal.
Okay. Now list what soft secession requires:
Blue states coordinate aggressive resistance
Courts uphold state authority despite Supremacy Clause (we're 2 votes from losing this at SCOTUS)
Federal government doesn't use force to override states (we're 2 votes from National Guard in Chicago)
Red states don't retaliate with their own "soft secession"
This somehow creates leverage for... what? Negotiating with fascists?
Interstate issues (rivers, air, commerce, disease) somehow get managed without federal capacity
This leads to... democracy restoration? How?
The probability of soft secession working is also infinitesimal - and it has worse failure modes.
Here's what I think you're missing:
You say "the path to reform is bottom-up, from state ballot initiatives and state-level reform."
I completely agree. But bottom-up toward what?
Bottom-up toward fragmentation? That's soft secession, and it faces all the obstacles you listed plus constitutional barriers.
Bottom-up toward building political will for federal constitutional reform? That's what I'm arguing for.
The strategy I'm proposing IS bottom-up:
State-level aggressive use of legitimate federalism tools (anti-commandeering, compacts, prosecution of federal crimes)
State ballot initiatives for structural reforms (ranked choice voting, independent redistricting, campaign finance)
State legislatures passing resolutions demanding federal action (AUMF repeal, ethics restoration, budget fixes)
Building interstate coordination on legitimate grounds
Primary challenges to incumbents who won't fight
Sustained pressure campaigns targeting specific legislation
Using every legitimate tool to resist while building toward constitutional amendment
Not waiting for Congress to spontaneously act. Forcing Congress to act through coordinated state and citizen pressure.
You say a Constitutional Convention is a pipe dream with gerrymandered fascist supermajorities. Maybe. But we're 20 states into the Convention of States movement (they need 34). That's conservatives organizing bottom-up for constitutional change. Why can't we?
The difference between us isn't "federal vs. state action."
It's "fragmentation vs. federation."
You want states to use leverage to resist. I want states to use leverage to force structural reform. Both start bottom-up. One leads to weaker collective capacity when we need it most. One leads to professional governance architecture that survives authoritarian cycles.
About "we'll get rolled over if we don't push back aggressively":
Agreed. Push back aggressively. But strategically. Every constitutional violation you commit gives them cover to do worse - and they have more power to exploit that precedent than you do.
State prosecutors charging federal agents who shoot civilians? Do it. Anti-commandeering? Max it out. Interstate compacts? Build them. Coordinated litigation? File everything. State innovation? Go wild in areas not preempted.
But trigger laws withholding federal taxes? That's the kind of aggressive action that loses in court, creates bad precedent, and wastes political capital on a losing battle.
You don't have to choose between "aggressive resistance" and "legal purity."
You choose between "aggressive resistance using constitutional tools" and "aggressive resistance using unconstitutional tools that backfire."
I'd rather spend political capital on fights we can win while building toward the long game.
I think you've misunderstood what I'm arguing for.
Your work on state resistance is essential. It holds the line. It prevents scope creep. It keeps authoritarianism from expanding further. I said that in the essay - we absolutely need to keep doing this.
But that's working from the outside in. The system absorbs it and works around it.
What I'm proposing works from the inside out - building citizen pressure to force the system to change.
Here's the difference:
State anti-commandeering, interstate compacts, coordinated litigation - these are defensive tools. They protect space. They prevent worse outcomes. They're necessary.
But they don't create durable change. They don't fix the structural problems. They don't make the system learn or improve.
What creates durable change is organized citizens forcing Congress to act:
Not "hoping Congress fixes this." Not "waiting for the right person."
Building sustained, coordinated pressure that makes refusing to act politically impossible.
Imagine 40,000+ people - your subscriber count - organizing to demand Congress repeal specific policies the Trump administration is using (e.g. the AUMF). Not asking nicely. Not hoping. Demanding. Primary challenges for those who refuse. Coordinated campaigns. Making it clear that political survival depends on action.
That's not state resistance. That's citizen power forcing systemic change.
Your work builds organizing capacity and political will. That's valuable.
My concern is that soft secession directs that energy toward fragmentation instead of toward forcing the structural reforms that would actually fix the system. Soft secession focuses on the symptoms, not the diseases.
We both know Congress won't spontaneously reform. But organized citizens can force them to. That's not faith in institutions - that's organized power.
The question is: do we use that organizing capacity to fragment, or to force fundamental reform?
You're right about the observation. The administration has ignored court orders. The Supreme Court has abandoned constitutional principles. Congress barely functions.
So here's my question: If law doesn't matter, why would soft secession work?
Soft secession relies entirely on legal doctrines - anti-commandeering, interstate compacts, state authority. If "law has been ceremonial for quite some time," then those legal protections are just as meaningless.
And we're watching this get tested right now. Federal agents operating in Chicago and Minnesota against state wishes. The Minnesota AG investigating the ICE shooting while the administration claims absolute immunity. Sanctuary cities being threatened. The administration is testing whether it can ignore state sovereignty the same way it ignores court orders.
We're a hair's breadth from those protections failing entirely. In December, when Trump asked the Supreme Court to lift the block on deploying National Guard forces in Chicago to protect ICE operations, three justices - Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch - were ready to allow immediate military deployment in an American city over state objections. The vote was 6-3. We're two votes away from the Court blessing complete federal override of state authority.
So either:
* Law still has some force (even if weakened), in which case we should use constitutional paths that strengthen it, or
* Law is completely dead, in which case no legal strategy works - not soft secession, not resistance, nothing.
You can't have it both ways. You can't say "law doesn't matter" while proposing a strategy that relies on constitutional doctrine to protect state autonomy.
Here's what I think you're actually observing: Law is being violated because enforcement mechanisms are broken. That's not the same as law being dead. It means the architecture that makes law enforceable needs rebuilding.
When an administration ignores court orders, the answer isn't "give up on law." The answer is "build enforcement mechanisms with teeth." When the Supreme Court is captured, the answer isn't "abandon constitutional process." The answer is "reform the architecture that allowed capture."
This is exactly why we need governance architecture, not soft secession. Soft secession accepts the broken system and tries to work around it. Governance architecture fixes the system so it can't be broken this way again.
You're proving my point about learned helplessness: when you're convinced nothing works, you abandon solutions that could work in favor of giving up while calling it strategy.
The law matters because we make it matter through collective enforcement and institutional reform. It stops mattering when we decide it doesn't and stop fighting to make it real.
I'd rather build enforcement mechanisms than accept powerlessness.
> "resistance to their lawlessness by demanding the law suddenly starts working feels like beating my head against the wall and just praying I wake up in a new reality."
I've been beating my head against that same wall since September 18, 2001.
I watched Congress and the Bush administration, capitalizing on fear, tear down guardrails and constitutional constraints. I tried to explain that these powers would be abused. That the Patriot Act wouldn't stay limited. That once you give executive branch these tools, they don't give them back. That the architecture matters more than who's in charge.
People called me a conspiracy theorist. Paranoid. Overreacting.
For decades, I kept hoping for the right person. Waiting for elected officials who would fix the systems. Some would try - like Rep. Jolley pushing to ban Congress members from stock trades. It went nowhere. The system ate it.
So yeah, I know exactly what beating your head against a wall feels like. It hurts. It doesn't go away.
Now this is my full-time work. Every day I engage with very dark parts of our society, harsh realities about how badly broken our governance is. Every day I have to look at the dysfunction and not look away.
But here's what those decades taught me:
Hoping for heroes doesn't work. Waiting for the right person doesn't work. Shortcuts that feel good but violate the architecture don't work either - they just give authoritarians cover to do worse.
What works is building systems that don't depend on heroes.
That's not "demanding the law suddenly starts working." That's understanding why it stopped working and fixing the structural problems. That's governance architecture.
It's harder. It takes longer. It requires sustained collective effort instead of quick fixes. But it's also the only thing that actually lasts.
And honestly I still struggle everyday. I have to work through those feelings that I'm creating ideas/designs/solutions that, even if they do get accepted, I probably won't be around to see (planting seeds for trees whose shade I'll never sit under).
But this work is way better than beating my head against a wall.
I appreciate you engaging seriously with this. And I'm glad the legal analysis is helpful - that's exactly what it's for.
But I think there's a fundamental confusion in your framing: We're not resisting the system. We're resisting authoritarian capture OF the system.
That's a crucial distinction.
When you say "resistance isn't really effective when relying on the very system it is trying to resist" - you're treating the constitutional framework itself as the enemy. It's not. The enemy is the people violating it.
The system we're (or at least, I am) trying to preserve:
* Separation of powers
* Federalism with clear boundaries
* Constitutional rights with enforcement
* Democratic accountability
* Rule of law
What we're (I'm) resisting:
* Authoritarian capture of those structures
* Violation of constitutional limits
* Court packing and institutional sabotage
* Regulatory capture by concentrated interests
* Abuse of emergency powers
You don't resist authoritarian capture by abandoning the structures authoritarians are trying to capture. You resist by using those structures, strengthening them, and building new accountability mechanisms.
About "knowing which lines to cross":
This is where I think you're headed toward dangerous territory. When blue states cross constitutional lines, it gives cover for red states and federal authoritarians to do the same. "They're violating the Supremacy Clause, so we can ignore anti-commandeering." "They're obstructing federal authority, so we can deploy National Guard against state wishes."
Every constitutional violation you commit becomes precedent for worse violations by the other side. And they have more power to exploit those precedents than you do.
The harder path - the one that actually works:
Use legitimate tools aggressively. Anti-commandeering where it's on solid ground. Interstate compacts within constitutional limits. Litigation on strong legal theories. State innovation in areas not preempted.
While doing that, build political will for structural reform. Force Congress to act through sustained pressure. Build toward constitutional amendment for governance architecture that can't be captured this easily.
Not "suddenly demanding the law starts working." Making the law work through collective enforcement and structural reform.
That's not praying for a new reality. That's building one.
You say my conclusion is wrong. Maybe. But what's your alternative conclusion?
That we should cross constitutional lines, hope courts don't strike us down, and trust that authoritarians won't exploit the precedent we set?
I'd rather build enforcement mechanisms that survive us than win tactical victories that undermine the long-term fight.
Hm, I feel like Armitage addresses a lot of your objections in his "Tax Warfare" document. He's pretty upfront about the legal issues.
"Two constitutional principles create the framework for
everything that follows. Understanding both, and especially the tension between them, is essential before considering any action.
The first principle is the anti-commandeering doctrine. Across
three landmark Supreme Court decisions spanning from 1992
to 2018, the Court has held that the federal government cannot
force states to implement or enforce federal programs. In Printz v. United States (1997), Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that the federal government "may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers...to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program.
This principle was extended in
Murphy v. NCAA (2018), where Justice Alito wrote that the
anti-commandeering doctrine "is simply the expression of a
fundamental structural decision incorporated into the
Constitution, i.e., the decision to withhold from Congress the
power to issue orders directly to the States.
What this means in practice is that states participate in federal
programs voluntarily, in exchange for federal funding. When
that funding is illegally withheld, or when the federal government fails to honor its obligations, the constitutional basis for state cooperation weakens considerably. States cannot be compelled to serve as administrative arms of federal
enforcement.
The second principle is the Supremacy Clause, as interpreted in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). Chief Justice Marshall established that states have "no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress.
Marshall's famous dictum that "the power to tax is the power to
destroy" created a doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity
that, while narrowed over subsequent centuries, still prohibits states from actively obstructing federal operations.
This creates genuine constitutional vulnerability for the most aggressive strategies outlined in this guide. We should be honest about that. A full employer escrow mandate would likely be struck down under McCulloch's broad prohibition. But "likely to be struck down" is not the same as "not worth trying."
The Republican legislators who introduced tax escrow bills in 2009 and 2010 knew their proposals faced serious constitutional obstacles. They introduced them anyway. Their playbook has always been to advance aggressive interpretations, force litigation, accept adverse rulings, modify the approach slightly, and try again. Over decades, this strategy has shifted the boundaries of what courts consider acceptable. We are not obligated to fight with one hand tied behind our
backs while they use both.
One further distinction requires acknowledgment. The
precedents that support state opposition, including sanctuary cities, cannabis legalization, and REAL ID, all involve states withdrawing cooperation from federal programs where states
previously participated. Tax escrow is structurally different. States do not currently serve as intermediaries in federal income tax collection. Employers remit directly to the IRS through the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System. A state law redirecting those payments does not withdraw existing cooperation. It interposes state control into a relationship where states have no current role.
This distinction matters legally. The Ninth Circuit's 2024 decision in United States v. King County held that while anti-commandeering protects states from being conscripted into federal enforcement, intergovernmental immunity bars states from obstructing federal operations or discriminating against those with whom the federal government deals. A full employer escrow mandate would almost certainly be characterized as obstruction rather than non-cooperation.
Additionally, 26 U.S.C. § 7501 designates withheld taxes as funds held "in trust for the United States.
These are not state funds or employer funds. They are employee funds held by
employers as trustees for the federal government. A state law redirecting trust property to state control faces not only Supremacy Clause challenges but potential claims of conversion.
None of this means the strategy is worthless. It means we should understand what we are doing. We are not withdrawing cooperation. We are forcing a confrontation over whether states
can leverage their position as employers and regulators, and
whether federal enforcement capacity can actually compel
compliance at scale. That confrontation may clarify constitutional boundaries in ways that inform future action, or it may reveal enforcement weaknesses that create practical leverage regardless of legal outcomes. Either result has strategic value."
You're absolutely right - this is an important distinction I should have made more clearly in the essay.
Armitage is more legally sophisticated than I gave him credit for. In his Tax Warfare document, he explicitly acknowledges the constitutional vulnerabilities, the Supremacy Clause issues, the distinction between non-cooperation and obstruction, and that full employer escrow "would likely be struck down." He's not confused about the law.
What he's arguing is different: "likely to be struck down" is not the same as "not worth trying." His strategy is to force confrontation, test boundaries through litigation, and "reveal enforcement weaknesses that create practical leverage regardless of legal outcomes."
That's a legitimate strategic choice. It's the Republican playbook from 2009-2010 with tax escrow bills - advance aggressive interpretations, force litigation, accept adverse rulings, modify slightly, try again. Over decades, this can shift boundaries.
So let me reframe my concern:
The issue isn't that Armitage doesn't understand the legal distinction. It's that the "try it anyway and force litigation" strategy has costs that aren't being fully accounted for:
Political capital is finite. Every lawsuit you lose on legally dubious grounds makes the next one harder. Courts start seeing you as bad faith actors rather than serious litigants.
Adverse precedent is dangerous. When you force a confrontation and lose, you don't just lose that case - you create binding precedent that makes future legitimate challenges harder. The Ninth Circuit's King County decision Armitage cites? That's now law that future state actions have to navigate around.
It fragments coalition. Legal scholars, constitutional law groups, and institutionalists who would support aggressive but lawful federalism will not support strategies they know are legally dubious. You lose allies you need for the long game.
It plays into authoritarian hands. When blue states pursue legally dubious obstruction, it gives cover for red states to do the same - and gives Trump justification for emergency powers, federal intervention, and "restoring law and order."
Compare to what worked: The 130+ multistate lawsuits during Trump's first term won ~83% because they used legitimate legal theories. Sanctuary cities survived because they rest on solid anti-commandeering doctrine. Cannabis legalization works because states aren't actually nullifying federal law - they're just not helping enforce it, and the feds chose not to prioritize enforcement.
Armitage's "force confrontation" strategy assumes:
Courts will move boundaries in your direction (they might move them against you)
Federal enforcement is weak enough that "practical leverage" matters (it might not be)
The political cost of losing is worth the information gained (it might not be)
We have time for multi-decade boundary-shifting (we might not)
My argument is: Spend that political capital on things with better odds. Demand Congress repeal the AUMF (legally straightforward, huge impact). Push for inspector general restoration. Build state capacity through legitimate compacts. Use anti-commandeering aggressively where it's on solid ground.
And build toward constitutional amendment for professional governance architecture.
The question isn't "should we be aggressive?" It's "should we be aggressive in ways that work or in ways that might backfire spectacularly?"
I appreciate you pushing me to be more precise about this. Armitage isn't legally confused - we just disagree about strategic wisdom of forcing confrontations you're likely to lose.
Because I am not an attorney, I won't debate the legal points. I agree it would be better from a national defense perspective, if the government were not completely corrupt, for the U.S. to remain whole. Unfortunately, we don't have the luxury of time to create a system to prevent abuse of power. We have to work with any tools available while we still have rights. It's later than you think.
Thank you for taking the time to share that - you're raising something I should address more directly.
You're absolutely right that we can't wait for the GDA to exist before we act. I've never argued we should.
In my Authoritarian Toolkit essay (https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/the-architecture-of-executive-power), I outlined specific reforms Congress could pass tomorrow: repeal the AUMF that Trump is using for unauthorized military action, restore inspector general protections, reinstate ethics requirements, fix the budget process so shutdowns can't happen. In my Congressional ethics piece (https://statecraftblueprint.org/p/players-making-the-rules), I detailed accountability mechanisms. None of these require constitutional amendment. They require sustained citizen pressure.
That's what I mean by "heroic effort" - not waiting for someone to save us, but organizing 40,000 people (Armitage's subscriber count) to demand Congress repeal the AUMF. Imagine that energy directed at specific, achievable reforms instead of pursuing legally dubious separation.
Here's my distinction: Aggressive federalism (the legal parts of what Armitage documents) - absolutely use those tools right now. Anti-commandeering, interstate compacts, coordinated litigation, state innovation. These are real, they work, and they're constitutionally sound.
But the soft secession parts that require nullification or obstruction of federal authority - those aren't tools. They're fantasies that waste political capital on losing court battles.
You say "it's later than I think." Maybe. But I think it's also earlier than Armitage thinks. He's written that the American democracy experiment is over, that democracy has basically never beaten fascism. That's historically accurate - but we also have tools previous generations didn't have. Information technology, coordination capacity, historical examples to learn from.
This is the learned helplessness trap I write about constantly: if you believe it's too late, you abandon solutions that could work in favor of desperate measures that can't.
I think democracy can still be saved. Not easily. Not without sustained effort. But saved.
And that means:
Short-term: Use every legitimate federalism tool aggressively
Medium-term: Build political will for structural reforms (AUMF repeal, ethics restoration, budget fixes)
Long-term: Constitutional amendment for professional governance architecture
The question isn't "do we have time?" The question is "are we going to spend our energy on things that work or things that feel good but fail?"
I'd rather spend it building.
rely on congress and you’ll be dead before this ship sinks
This is the learned helplessness trap I write about constantly.
"Rely on Congress and you'll be dead before this ship sinks" expresses real frustration with a broken system. I get it. But it's also giving up while calling it realism.
Let me clarify what I mean by "building political will for structural reform":
I'm not saying "hope Congress spontaneously reforms itself." I'm saying citizens force Congress to act through sustained, coordinated pressure.
Here's what that actually looks like:
40,000 people (Armitage's subscriber count) demanding Congress repeal the AUMF
Coordinated pressure campaigns targeting specific legislators and legislation
Primary challenges for representatives who refuse to act
State legislatures passing resolutions demanding federal action
Using legitimate federalism tools (anti-commandeering, compacts, litigation) while we build long-term capacity
That's not passive waiting. That's organized force.
The alternative - soft secession through legally dubious state obstruction - also requires court battles, also takes years, and faces all the constitutional barriers I outlined in the essay. So the real choice isn't "quick fix vs. slow fix." It's "constitutional path that's hard but possible vs. unconstitutional path that feels active but fails in court."
Yes, the ship is sinking. But that makes it more important, not less, to use tools that actually work rather than tools that feel satisfying but create adverse precedent and waste political capital.
Democracy has never beaten fascism by fragmenting. Soft secession is playing on fascism's home turf - division, weakened institutions, fragmented collective capacity - and democracy will lose that game. We need to change the game. Change the system. Build the governance architecture that makes democratic self-governance work at scale across profound differences.
The cathedral work is harder than the crisis response. It's also the only thing that lasts.
I would argue you are exhibiting learned helplessness. you want to lean on the institutions you were taught to believe in. I want to believe in the people and leave the broken system behind. there is no use in beating a dead horse.
I think there's a fundamental misunderstanding here about what institutions are.
Institutions aren't separate from people. Institutions are people organizing collectively with rules and structures. When you say "believe in people, not institutions," you're creating a false choice.
And ironically, that's exactly what every Trump supporter says too. "Drain the swamp." "Believe in the people, not the corrupt institutions." "Tear down the establishment." That rhetoric is how authoritarians dismantle the very structures that protect democratic governance. When we echo that same anti-institutional rhetoric - even from the opposite political direction, even with good intentions - we're doing the authoritarians' work for them.
If you're going to rely on always having the right person in charge, you better come up with a bulletproof way to ensure only the best person gets in there. Which seems like a very high bar - and one that's never been cleared in human history.
Every form of collective action requires institutions.
State resistance? That's state government institutions.
Interstate compacts? That's formal institutional agreements.
Legal challenges? That's court institutions.
Community organizing? That creates new institutions.
You can't escape institutions. You can only choose which ones and what rules they operate under.
This is the Hero Trap I write about: expecting people to be better than the systems allow them to be. James Madison said it plainly: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary." But we're not angels. We respond to incentives. We make decisions based on the structures around us.
That's not cynicism. That's design thinking - from the founders of our country.
The question isn't "people vs. institutions."
The question is: "Do we design institutions that work with human nature, or do we hope humans transcend their nature?"
Even if you found the perfect person - high moral character, best intentions, incorruptible ethics - put them into our current system and watch what happens. The incentives are all wrong. Spend 30+ hours a week fundraising or lose your seat. Choose between governing well and surviving primary challenges from extremists. Face electoral cycles that punish long-term thinking. Navigate a Supreme Court that's been captured. Work within a budget process designed for failure.
How long does their willpower last? How many cycles before they compromise? How sustainable is heroic resistance to structural dysfunction?
Governance architecture says: build systems where even flawed, self-interested people produce good outcomes. Make it easy to do the right thing and hard to do the wrong thing. Create accountability with teeth. Design for durability across generations.
The alternative says: hope we keep electing heroes, or hope state governments are more virtuous than federal government, or hope courts uphold doctrines that are two votes from collapsing, and trust that this somehow ends better than every other time in history when democracies relied on heroism instead of architecture.
One of these approaches designs for reality. The other hopes reality will be different than it's ever been.
I'm not "leaning on institutions I was taught to believe in." I'm leaning on the fundamental ideas this country was founded on - that you design systems to work with human nature, not against it. We've just been neglecting the maintenance. The architecture is 250 years old, built for a different era, and desperately needs professional renovation.
That's not learned helplessness. That's the opposite.
I like this critical essay, but I disagree that we have the benefit of structural reforms at the federal level. I'm supportive of Armitage's proposals not as a tool to soft secession, but as leverage against authoritarian takeover.
All 3 branches of the federal government have been captured by fascists and their enablers. More than half of the state governments are in the same hands, and getting more and more entrenched. The federal bureaucracy has been hollowed out and career employees have been replaced with loyalists.
If we don't push back as aggressively as the autocrats, we will get rolled over. Armitage proposes that blue states use their leverage to elicit concessions. For example, trigger laws that withhold tax dollars from the government in case of election interference, legality aside, is a warning with teeth against the next logical step in the authoritarian playbook. Aggressively arresting federal officers that commit crimes directly pushes back against the terror tactics of a budding fascist regime.
Only by resisting in this way do we have any hope of enacting reforms in some post-Trump era. The strictly legal approaches are not enough to stop what is coming.
It will take a generation to repair the damage that's already been done, let alone reform the system for the better. I'm all on board the reform train, I've written articles about it. But a Constitutional Convention is a pipe dream when more than half the states are in gerrymandered fascist supermajorities. Expecting Congress to pass laws or amendments is likewise foolish. Even if they managed to get something through, SCOTUS is in the hands of naked GOP partisans for the next decades. The path to reform is bottom-up, from state ballot initiatives and state-level reform.
The only way I see out of this without soft secession is if these conditions get met.
1. A majority of incumbent Democrats lose their primaries to more combative challengers.
2. The nation votes in a Democratic supermajority, overcoming GOP belligerence, illegal seizures of ballot boxes by ICE, intimidation at the polls, potentially Insurrection Act, etc.
3. The new Dems get seated somehow without Mike Johnson calling the election illegitimate and refusing to seat them.
4. Dems impeach and remove SCOTUS judges and every member of the cabinet including Trump.
5. Dems pass laws stripping power from SCOTUS and the President, call a Constitutional Convention, etc.
The probability of this happening is infinitesimal.
This is a thoughtful critique and I agree with more of it than you might think.
Where we align:
You're right that all three branches have been captured or severely compromised. You're right that we need aggressive pushback. You're right that bottom-up state action is essential. You're right that expecting Congress to spontaneously reform is foolish.
And you're right that some of what Armitage proposes IS legitimate leverage right now.
States aggressively using anti-commandeering - absolutely. Interstate compacts building parallel capacity - yes. State prosecutors charging federal officers who commit crimes in their states - this is legitimate state sovereignty, and it should happen.
Where I think you're making a strategic error:
The trigger laws withholding tax dollars - this is exactly the kind of aggressive action that courts will strike down under the Supremacy Clause and intergovernmental immunity. Not because the courts are fair, but because even captured courts won't allow states to directly obstruct federal revenue collection. You'll lose that fight, create adverse precedent, and give authoritarians cover to do worse.
But here's the deeper issue: Soft secession faces all the same obstacles you correctly identify, PLUS constitutional ones.
You list the conditions needed for federal reform:
Dems primary incumbents
Overcome voter suppression/intimidation to win supermajority
Get seated despite Mike Johnson
Impeach and remove SCOTUS/cabinet
Strip power, call convention
And you say the probability is infinitesimal.
Okay. Now list what soft secession requires:
Blue states coordinate aggressive resistance
Courts uphold state authority despite Supremacy Clause (we're 2 votes from losing this at SCOTUS)
Federal government doesn't use force to override states (we're 2 votes from National Guard in Chicago)
Red states don't retaliate with their own "soft secession"
This somehow creates leverage for... what? Negotiating with fascists?
Fragmentation doesn't accelerate authoritarian consolidation
Interstate issues (rivers, air, commerce, disease) somehow get managed without federal capacity
This leads to... democracy restoration? How?
The probability of soft secession working is also infinitesimal - and it has worse failure modes.
Here's what I think you're missing:
You say "the path to reform is bottom-up, from state ballot initiatives and state-level reform."
I completely agree. But bottom-up toward what?
Bottom-up toward fragmentation? That's soft secession, and it faces all the obstacles you listed plus constitutional barriers.
Bottom-up toward building political will for federal constitutional reform? That's what I'm arguing for.
The strategy I'm proposing IS bottom-up:
State-level aggressive use of legitimate federalism tools (anti-commandeering, compacts, prosecution of federal crimes)
State ballot initiatives for structural reforms (ranked choice voting, independent redistricting, campaign finance)
State legislatures passing resolutions demanding federal action (AUMF repeal, ethics restoration, budget fixes)
Building interstate coordination on legitimate grounds
Primary challenges to incumbents who won't fight
Sustained pressure campaigns targeting specific legislation
Using every legitimate tool to resist while building toward constitutional amendment
Not waiting for Congress to spontaneously act. Forcing Congress to act through coordinated state and citizen pressure.
You say a Constitutional Convention is a pipe dream with gerrymandered fascist supermajorities. Maybe. But we're 20 states into the Convention of States movement (they need 34). That's conservatives organizing bottom-up for constitutional change. Why can't we?
The difference between us isn't "federal vs. state action."
It's "fragmentation vs. federation."
You want states to use leverage to resist. I want states to use leverage to force structural reform. Both start bottom-up. One leads to weaker collective capacity when we need it most. One leads to professional governance architecture that survives authoritarian cycles.
About "we'll get rolled over if we don't push back aggressively":
Agreed. Push back aggressively. But strategically. Every constitutional violation you commit gives them cover to do worse - and they have more power to exploit that precedent than you do.
State prosecutors charging federal agents who shoot civilians? Do it. Anti-commandeering? Max it out. Interstate compacts? Build them. Coordinated litigation? File everything. State innovation? Go wild in areas not preempted.
But trigger laws withholding federal taxes? That's the kind of aggressive action that loses in court, creates bad precedent, and wastes political capital on a losing battle.
You don't have to choose between "aggressive resistance" and "legal purity."
You choose between "aggressive resistance using constitutional tools" and "aggressive resistance using unconstitutional tools that backfire."
I'd rather spend political capital on fights we can win while building toward the long game.
Good luck getting U.S. Congress to fix this.
I'll keep betting on cities and states as the place where our votes and voices have the most impact 👍
I think you've misunderstood what I'm arguing for.
Your work on state resistance is essential. It holds the line. It prevents scope creep. It keeps authoritarianism from expanding further. I said that in the essay - we absolutely need to keep doing this.
But that's working from the outside in. The system absorbs it and works around it.
What I'm proposing works from the inside out - building citizen pressure to force the system to change.
Here's the difference:
State anti-commandeering, interstate compacts, coordinated litigation - these are defensive tools. They protect space. They prevent worse outcomes. They're necessary.
But they don't create durable change. They don't fix the structural problems. They don't make the system learn or improve.
What creates durable change is organized citizens forcing Congress to act:
Not "hoping Congress fixes this." Not "waiting for the right person."
Building sustained, coordinated pressure that makes refusing to act politically impossible.
Imagine 40,000+ people - your subscriber count - organizing to demand Congress repeal specific policies the Trump administration is using (e.g. the AUMF). Not asking nicely. Not hoping. Demanding. Primary challenges for those who refuse. Coordinated campaigns. Making it clear that political survival depends on action.
That's not state resistance. That's citizen power forcing systemic change.
Your work builds organizing capacity and political will. That's valuable.
My concern is that soft secession directs that energy toward fragmentation instead of toward forcing the structural reforms that would actually fix the system. Soft secession focuses on the symptoms, not the diseases.
We both know Congress won't spontaneously reform. But organized citizens can force them to. That's not faith in institutions - that's organized power.
The question is: do we use that organizing capacity to fragment, or to force fundamental reform?
I'm betting on the second path.
lol. as if the law matters at all… wake up, dude. you counted them yourself, how many rulings has the administration ignored?
has the supreme court held up the constitution?
does congress even function?
the law has been ceremonial for quite sometime now… this administration is just being blunt about dropping the facade of law and order.
You're right about the observation. The administration has ignored court orders. The Supreme Court has abandoned constitutional principles. Congress barely functions.
So here's my question: If law doesn't matter, why would soft secession work?
Soft secession relies entirely on legal doctrines - anti-commandeering, interstate compacts, state authority. If "law has been ceremonial for quite some time," then those legal protections are just as meaningless.
And we're watching this get tested right now. Federal agents operating in Chicago and Minnesota against state wishes. The Minnesota AG investigating the ICE shooting while the administration claims absolute immunity. Sanctuary cities being threatened. The administration is testing whether it can ignore state sovereignty the same way it ignores court orders.
We're a hair's breadth from those protections failing entirely. In December, when Trump asked the Supreme Court to lift the block on deploying National Guard forces in Chicago to protect ICE operations, three justices - Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch - were ready to allow immediate military deployment in an American city over state objections. The vote was 6-3. We're two votes away from the Court blessing complete federal override of state authority.
So either:
* Law still has some force (even if weakened), in which case we should use constitutional paths that strengthen it, or
* Law is completely dead, in which case no legal strategy works - not soft secession, not resistance, nothing.
You can't have it both ways. You can't say "law doesn't matter" while proposing a strategy that relies on constitutional doctrine to protect state autonomy.
Here's what I think you're actually observing: Law is being violated because enforcement mechanisms are broken. That's not the same as law being dead. It means the architecture that makes law enforceable needs rebuilding.
When an administration ignores court orders, the answer isn't "give up on law." The answer is "build enforcement mechanisms with teeth." When the Supreme Court is captured, the answer isn't "abandon constitutional process." The answer is "reform the architecture that allowed capture."
This is exactly why we need governance architecture, not soft secession. Soft secession accepts the broken system and tries to work around it. Governance architecture fixes the system so it can't be broken this way again.
You're proving my point about learned helplessness: when you're convinced nothing works, you abandon solutions that could work in favor of giving up while calling it strategy.
The law matters because we make it matter through collective enforcement and institutional reform. It stops mattering when we decide it doesn't and stop fighting to make it real.
I'd rather build enforcement mechanisms than accept powerlessness.
I hear you on this:
> "resistance to their lawlessness by demanding the law suddenly starts working feels like beating my head against the wall and just praying I wake up in a new reality."
I've been beating my head against that same wall since September 18, 2001.
I watched Congress and the Bush administration, capitalizing on fear, tear down guardrails and constitutional constraints. I tried to explain that these powers would be abused. That the Patriot Act wouldn't stay limited. That once you give executive branch these tools, they don't give them back. That the architecture matters more than who's in charge.
People called me a conspiracy theorist. Paranoid. Overreacting.
For decades, I kept hoping for the right person. Waiting for elected officials who would fix the systems. Some would try - like Rep. Jolley pushing to ban Congress members from stock trades. It went nowhere. The system ate it.
So yeah, I know exactly what beating your head against a wall feels like. It hurts. It doesn't go away.
Now this is my full-time work. Every day I engage with very dark parts of our society, harsh realities about how badly broken our governance is. Every day I have to look at the dysfunction and not look away.
But here's what those decades taught me:
Hoping for heroes doesn't work. Waiting for the right person doesn't work. Shortcuts that feel good but violate the architecture don't work either - they just give authoritarians cover to do worse.
What works is building systems that don't depend on heroes.
That's not "demanding the law suddenly starts working." That's understanding why it stopped working and fixing the structural problems. That's governance architecture.
It's harder. It takes longer. It requires sustained collective effort instead of quick fixes. But it's also the only thing that actually lasts.
And honestly I still struggle everyday. I have to work through those feelings that I'm creating ideas/designs/solutions that, even if they do get accepted, I probably won't be around to see (planting seeds for trees whose shade I'll never sit under).
But this work is way better than beating my head against a wall.
I appreciate you engaging seriously with this. And I'm glad the legal analysis is helpful - that's exactly what it's for.
But I think there's a fundamental confusion in your framing: We're not resisting the system. We're resisting authoritarian capture OF the system.
That's a crucial distinction.
When you say "resistance isn't really effective when relying on the very system it is trying to resist" - you're treating the constitutional framework itself as the enemy. It's not. The enemy is the people violating it.
The system we're (or at least, I am) trying to preserve:
* Separation of powers
* Federalism with clear boundaries
* Constitutional rights with enforcement
* Democratic accountability
* Rule of law
What we're (I'm) resisting:
* Authoritarian capture of those structures
* Violation of constitutional limits
* Court packing and institutional sabotage
* Regulatory capture by concentrated interests
* Abuse of emergency powers
You don't resist authoritarian capture by abandoning the structures authoritarians are trying to capture. You resist by using those structures, strengthening them, and building new accountability mechanisms.
About "knowing which lines to cross":
This is where I think you're headed toward dangerous territory. When blue states cross constitutional lines, it gives cover for red states and federal authoritarians to do the same. "They're violating the Supremacy Clause, so we can ignore anti-commandeering." "They're obstructing federal authority, so we can deploy National Guard against state wishes."
Every constitutional violation you commit becomes precedent for worse violations by the other side. And they have more power to exploit those precedents than you do.
The harder path - the one that actually works:
Use legitimate tools aggressively. Anti-commandeering where it's on solid ground. Interstate compacts within constitutional limits. Litigation on strong legal theories. State innovation in areas not preempted.
While doing that, build political will for structural reform. Force Congress to act through sustained pressure. Build toward constitutional amendment for governance architecture that can't be captured this easily.
Not "suddenly demanding the law starts working." Making the law work through collective enforcement and structural reform.
That's not praying for a new reality. That's building one.
You say my conclusion is wrong. Maybe. But what's your alternative conclusion?
That we should cross constitutional lines, hope courts don't strike us down, and trust that authoritarians won't exploit the precedent we set?
I'd rather build enforcement mechanisms that survive us than win tactical victories that undermine the long-term fight.